The current flurry of plans for re-activating the constitutional treaty confirms what has been obvious since last summer and what I had defined as “Constitution nostalgia”. There is no shortage of projects that are diverse or of ideas that are unrealistic or from the realm of fantasy, when they are not downright bizarre. Also, those who welcome the deadlock are still there. They are still present in ultra-nationalistic circles and in some Member States, if not elsewhere. The first declaration by MEP Timothy Kirkhope, recently confirmed as leader of the British Conservatives at the EP, was: “The Constitution is dead. It has ceased to be. It is an ex-Constitution.” But on the whole the trend is clear: the European political world is increasingly aware of the fact that the EU is paying dearly for the stalled Constitution.
A very high cost. The recent document by the European Commission services on “the cost of no-Constitution” is instructive. If the Treaty had come into force as planned on 1 November this year, the EU would now be more effective in almost all areas: - energy (the Parliament in particular would have power of codecision to define Community policy in this field),- research (a legal base would exist for putting joint programmes into a single European area),- the fight against insecurity and terrorism, - common immigration policy, external relations (with the European Foreign Minister and common diplomatic service),- the clause of mutual defence if a Member State is aggressed (giving visibility and credibility to CFSP and ESDP), - and the institutional functioning (with “double majority” for Council decisions and the strengthening of the role of legislator of the European Parliament). Those who do not have the patience to read the complete document may refer to the summary by our editor-in-chief, Helmut Brüls, in bulletin no. 9316.
Consensus that cannot be found. The situation of many reactivation plans is effectively described in the latest of such plans reported on in our bulletin No 9316, that of the vice-president of the European Parliament, Gérard Onesta, who wrote in his presentation: “The quantity of plans being put forward is striking but their quality is not. Their authors cover every style: from gravedigging by stealth to wonderfully far-fetched utopia, from minimalist theses ranging from calculated cynicism to a very relative effectiveness”. Does Mr Onesta's “Plan A+” not fit into this description at all? Is it more likely to gain the essential and unanimous consensus? It is doubtful. It comprises complete texts of the Constitution (grouping the constitutional aspects) and of the parallel Treaty (which describes common policies), and it proposes the following road for approval: the Constitution would be approved by a majority of the States and population of the EU. Countries whose opinion is negative would have the possibility to leave the Union (for ever or for a given time). How could this formula be more easily approved than those that Mr Onesta described as being “on the wrong track”? Several Member States would refuse a majority approval procedure for the Constitution, with, for those who vote no, the choice between acceptance anyway, or departure. It would be better to imagine that, in the event of rejection, the “yes-vote” countries should themselves decide to go forward in an autonomous manner, as envisaged in the Penelope project and as Guy Verhofstadt seems to be suggesting.
Two categories. One could more or less divide the available projects into two categories: those that place emphasis on what is desirable for vigorously relaunching European construction, and those, less ambitious, that are mainly concerned about the chances of success. In fact, given what one knows of national positions, none of the plans already on the table seem likely to win the consensus required. The predominant trend calls for the text developed by the Convention and signed (with some changes) by all governments, to be used as a base, which confirms that, despite criticism, the Convention had worked well. It is not by chance that a clear majority of Member States has ratified the text. But the reservation of the two countries that voted “no” during the referendum, plus the reticence of principle from the British, seem to block the road. The plan that would not only be the most satisfying for Europe but also the most acceptable for all Member States and achievable within a reasonable time, does not yet exist.
The task of the next German EU Council presidency, which has the responsibility of proposing a roadmap in June 2007, is an arduous one and the results are far from certain. (F.R.)