Crucial question. The way in which the Turkey dossier is being managed reminds me of an obstacle course: jumping over a different hurdle at every moment. One day it's the trial against a renowned intellectual, in another it's Cyprus or the Article in the Constitution on the freedom of speech. These are important issues, as each of them underpins an essential element of the Community acquis. The danger is that by focusing in turn on a specific aspect, we are seeking an ad hoc compromise and if we manage to find it, we think that the difficulty has disappeared. Turkish negotiators are sufficiently skilled for making the concessions necessary to avoid rupture at the right moment. Therefore, negotiations are continuing without the fundamental question being posed: is accession the most appropriate solution for future relations between the EU and Turkey?
Negotiators cannot do otherwise because officially the answer has already been given: accession is the destination, provided Turkey respects the “Copenhagen criteria”. Several political forces and some Member States qualify this response by underlining that the result of the negotiations remains open and that the Copenhagen criteria have to be completed with the EU's internal condition: its “integration capacity”, namely the capacity to integrate new Member States without compromising its own goals, how it functions, as well as its common policies (see this section in EUROPE 9303). Overall reservations about the appropriateness of Turkish accession, although quite real, remain hidden behind official procedures.
EU should not act alone. A more frank attitude is required, which explicitly poses the question of the appropriateness and feasibility of this accession but which does not forget, however, that it was the EU that decided to negotiate and it cannot shy away from the issue alone. Unilateral rupture would be politically incorrect and provoke a serious crisis for which the EU would be responsible. This is the contrary of what Europe should be looking for, which is: a strengthening of its ties with Turkey through a new form of relations based on reciprocal trust and closer cooperation to be mutually defined. The reasons for opposing Turkish accession are too often the wrong ones; for example, the conflictual past with its cultural and religious differences. As if the wars of yesterday between European countries, today, definitive partners, had not been just as cruel over the centuries! The scale of European construction is in this respect dependent on the capacity of it having put an end to this conflict for ever.
Well, in that case why should Turkey not accede? Because valid reasons advise against it in the interest of both parties and the objectives sought could be better attained via another formula.
Intellectual laziness. I have recently read or reread quite a few texts in favour of accession and I have noticed that most of these arguments can be summed up in one sentence: no-one can challenge the added value that Turkish accession would represent to Europe, politically, economically and culturally. Moreover, my conviction is that this “added value” can be obtained through alternative links to accession, which has too often been encouraged out of intellectual laziness. I was particularly surprised by the text of an American expert, who laboriously highlighted the advantages that accession would bring for both parties through the freeing up of trade: low price Turkish products that would help keep inflation in Europe in check, the opening up of a vast expanding market to European exports etc. This great specialist ignores the fact that Euro-Turkish free trade already exists and Turkey is the only third country that is part of the Community's Customs Union: everything he is arguing far already exists! Instruments for deepening and improving current links are also available. The political will to take action and the willingness to agree to changes will facilitate the transformation of this current association (sluggish and blocked in some areas) into a live and dynamic whole, whereas a continuation of accession negotiations will periodically lead to divergences and conflict.
The reasons for this are numerous. I've already explained on several occasions in this column the impression I get of the Turkish authorities having not sufficiently assessed the extent to which the transfer of sovereignty is implicit in accession. Turkey will be expected to put its jealously guarded competencies in common and offer up most of the areas in which it acts to the scrutiny and sometimes the judgement of the European institutions. Michel Foucher, an academic and Ambassador of France has just declared in an interview with the Robert Schuman Foundation that, “the crux of matter lies undoubtedly in the capacity of the Turkish state to agree to a significant transfer of sovereignty” and pointed out that the general and presidential elections in Turkey would take place next year. I find his opinion comforting.
What accession involves for Turkey. Amongst other things, EU accession for Turkey would involve: a) reinforcing minority rights (notably the degree of autonomy for the Kurds and the scope of their linguistic and cultural powers; b) the weakening of the power of the military authorities (guardians of the state's secularism) in comparison to that of the civilian authorities. It is true that those defending secularism in Turkey are many; reports indicated that the recent funeral ceremonies of Bulent Ecevit in Istanbul became demonstrations in favour of the secular legacy of Ataturk with almost a million people attending. But Istanbul is not the whole country and the elections proved that.
Security issues, including the question on energy are fundamental. Let's look at developments in the North of Iraq. Analyses and reports from the field indicated that this huge autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan, which contains enormous oil resources, is now peaceful and developing rapidly. Its regional government is negotiating oil and ambitious cooperation agreements with several Western powers. Oil production will start in four months and will quickly become significant; at maximum production levels this has been estimated at a million barrels a day and oil reserves are impressive too. Turkey is well represented in this development and one of the oil wells beginning production in February is a Turkish/Canadian company. Cooperation between Turkey and Kurdistan is broadening and a connection between the local oil well with the Turkish one is planned for orientation on the Mediterranean. This is all very well and good. But Turkey's absolute demand is that Kurdistan should not become an independent state. We can understand the reasons for this.
We can also understand why Turkey needs total political autonomy in this affair, while the EU in today's uncertain climate could prove neutral on the question of a possible independent Iraqi Kurdistan if it is a matter of concern to the local inhabitants (the affairs involving Montenegro and soon that of Kosovo prove this). The strategic and economic stakes at play are colossal. This is an affair that Turkey would like to manage itself, the same goes for its future relations with the Turkish-speaking republics that came out of the former USSR. These issues can be added to those involving the status and character of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (isn't its very name eloquent sounding?) on which one should consult my column of the end of July: EUROPE 9239) and the territorial disputes that still remain with Greece.
European problems. The EU's position on the matter is just as complex. We know all about the problems (or at least we should know about them because in reality those who a priori support Turkish accession ignore them superbly): the demographic weight that would give Turkey the right in the future, if accession goes ahead, to first place at the Council of the Union and European Parliament, European border changes that would see Europe neighbouring Syria, Iraq, Iran, Georgia etc; the need to scrap current financial mechanisms in cohesion and agricultural policy to include Turkey and the full and free movement of persons.
According to several observers, the European project would subsequently be radically transformed and the EU would become a “tool for stability projection” (a description by Michel Foucher, already mentioned) instead of a Europe of power.
The question of public opinion can also be added. Turkey's accession would obviously have to be ratified by all Member States, without exception, and in some cases, notably France, by a referendum. All observers point out that ratification would be rejected in some Member States. At the same time, polls and other analyses indicate that the majority of Turkish public opinion is currently going against EU accession, partly because of religious reasons and partly due to reasons linked to maintaining national autonomy.
Real friends. The risks and difficulties cited should be accepted if accession is essential to future relations between the EU and Turkey. But this is not the case. No-one opposes the demand for closer economic and political relations and a “community of values” between the EU and US, between the EU and Canada any many other countries even if their accession is impossible. An analogy can be made with Turkey.
Turkey and the customs union, despite some shortfalls, is already a reality and the instruments are already there for closer relations with absolutely any country. Ongoing negotiations should be developed in view of a new kind of partnership. Sometimes I ask myself whether Turkey's real friends are those fighting for an accession that promises nothing but difficulties and divergences or those who have the lucidity to see further ahead and prepare the possible and desirable evolution. (FR)