Confusion between two notions. The most recent evolutions in the Turkish dossier are worrying. I am not just referring to the observation of Turkey having slowed down or indeed put an end to its programme of reforms (reading the summary of the resolution approved by the European Parliament on this subject would be enough: EUROPE 9274) and we'll soon know what the European Commission thinks. What is of most concern is the confusion between the two notions that should have been quite clearly separated: on the one hand, close, friendly and efficient relations between the Union and Turkey and on the other, Turkish accession to the Union as a full Member State. Today, if someone formulates any reservations s/he is accused of rejecting the ties and good understanding with Ankara and of considering the EU as a “Christian Club” (whereas it has already clearly been indicated that Albania, Bosnia and in the future, possibly Kosovo have a “vocation of accession”. If we don't manage to get over this misunderstanding, rifts between Brussels and Ankara, at the European Parliament and even between Member States, will become inescapable and dramatic.
I am well aware that the a priori rejection of any other possible result other than accession is the official position of the Turkish authorities. This is why I have always considered that accession negotiations should open up. I now believe that they should be continued, in good faith and clarity, while leaving the final result open. They are necessary because it is by clarifying the stakes at play and by assessing the scale of the constraints implied in accession, as well as their repercussions, that the negotiators will arrive, in my opinion, at the conclusion that the status of full member does not represent the appropriate formula for the EU or above all, for Turkey.
Repercussions. The EU will observe in negotiations, the impossibility of obtaining a balance in the functioning of its institutions (in the long-term Turkey would have the highest level of national representation at the European Parliament and would wield more weight than any other Member State at the Council in a system of “double majority”; it would also be impossible to fund its regional and cohesion policy (with the current rules, most available donations would go to Turkey), as well as its agriculture (taking into account the number of Turkish farmers). The alternative would be to transform the Union into a simple free-trade zone, by abandoning the objective of political power and the two pillars of European solidarity, regional and agricultural policy. These developments would please Washington and perhaps a few other European capitals but they would sound the death knell to any attempts of European integration. According to Jean-Louis Bourlangues, the Union would in this way follow the example of the Universal Postal Union.
Turkey will also gradually become aware during negotiations of the scale and importance of the transformations that it is expected to accept. I'll mention a few examples: radically expanded minority rights (including the Kurds); religious freedom; increasing obligations involving energy management (notably for transport networks), submission to decisions from the institutions and Court of Justice. Everything will be accompanied by a gradual reduction in national autonomy and foreign policy, including Turkish speaking countries that came out of the former USSR. This will result in some internal rifts, especially within the military and religious authorities, which the country would find difficult to bear. From a European point of view, the above mentioned examples would be positive but in this paragraph, I'm talking about the Turkish point of view.
Gradual awareness. I believe that the current slowing down in reforms and the renewed polemic on the Armenian affair, as well as the Kurdish tragedy and Cyprus affair, represent an initial effect in the gradual awareness of what becoming a full member of the EU would involve and that evolution in this direction will continue. In Turkey, the religious authorities and perhaps the Prime Minister himself, interpret the European principles of tolerance in the sense of greater flexibility with some of the secular standards inherited from Ataturk (Mr Erdogan ironically commented that his daughters could wear the veil in American universities but that the veil is banned in Turkish universities). The Kurds and their organisations vigorously support accession and have announced concessions in the sense of obtaining peace, in the prospect of widely benefiting from European rules in the future on minority rights and local autonomy. I am not going to go into the Cyprus case because I've nothing to add to what I wrote in this section at the end of July (EUROPE 9239). I do not believe that at the present time there is a genuine feeling of being “Cypriot nation” shared by the inhabitants of the island. Turkish Cypriots believe that their fellow citizens are in Turkey; the factors discussed in my above-mentioned commentaries speak for themselves and clarify the nature of the repercussions, as well as the solution to the “Cypriot problem” (explaining why Ankara will not accept EU injunctions) and how the Union will work at an institutional level in the future.
According to recent surveys, reticence regarding reforms is accompanied by a noticeable cooling off among the public. The “yes” or “no” camps regarding accession are on an equal footing. European pressure over Cyprus, religious freedom, respect for minority religious beliefs and ethnic minority rights are certainly playing a role in this development. Often reactions undoubtedly go in the opposite direction: those defending the intangibility of Ataturk's secular reforms are not the same as those balking at the demanding made for religious tolerance. It is also obvious that on some dossiers, like Cyprus, the EU cannot back down: how could it allow an accession country candidate join if it did not recognise one of its states?
A good scenario. Conclusion: the best solution would in my opinion be negotiations continuing and that the two parties reach a common agreement on concluding a reinforced partnership as the most appropriate formula, which does not threaten the ties that already exist (Turkey is the only third country participating in the Union's customs union), the institutional functioning of the EU and its solidarity policies, Turkish autonomy in its internal affairs, foreign policy (particularly with regard to the Turkish speaking republics that came out of the break up of the USSR, where Turkey's role is essential) or its energy policy. Partnership ties will be so strong that the advantages expected from accession would in fact be attained, while avoiding increasingly more identifiable contrasts and tensions.
Parliament long way off compromise. The EU is still a long way off obtaining an attitude that will facilitate this scenario. The debate at the parliament and the resolution adopted proves it. None of the political forces are budging from their positions of principle on one or other of the specific points. One group says that it is the opening up of Europe to the Muslim world; another says that it is about “Armenian genocide”; for a third group, the position of women; for several, the Cyprus affair. Too many MEPs endlessly mix up the question of “EU borders” with that of the greater “area of freedom and democracy”, which obviously represents a European ambition of going beyond the dimensions of the EU, otherwise one should be fighting for the accession of all southern Mediterranean countries. The scale of the confusion on this subject is clearly illustrated in the ideas of Italian radical Marco Cappato. The Socialist group rejects a priori any “alternative solution” and ignores the repercussions that accession could have on the EU itself: it is, nonetheless, a group that is, in principle, in favour of consolidating the European enterprise. Mr Wiersma's formula (“the EU needs Turkey as a partner”) does not make any distinction between full accession and reinforced partnership.
As is too often the case, the approved text includes, through its amendments, most of the positions, even when they are contradictory. Therefore, the demand to respect what we have unfortunately and inopportunely termed the EU's “capacity of absorption” is vigorously reaffirmed but at the same time, so is the rejection of any solution other than accession (Pasqualina Napoletano, “the objective is accession, as European socialists we reject any other kind of alternative”). The lengthy resolution cites a large number of details, such as the restitution of property from churches and monasteries but it does not appear very clear on the essential questions and does not achieve a synthesis of opposing positions.
A compromise has been initiated on one point: recognition of the Armenian genocide. This recognition is no longer explicitly indicated as a preliminary condition for accession but the demand has been affirmed that Turkey tackles and recognises its past and rapporteur Camiel Eurlings (EPP) and socialist Véronique De Keyser underlined that this point would weigh heavily at the time of reckoning, before the final decision. This is all very well, but French president Jacques Chirac has just reaffirmed that this recognition is a preliminary condition to accession…
Necessary reflection. This dossier is essential for the future of Europe and still requires some profound reflections with regard to the different arguments that can clash with each other. The “Confrontations Europe” association has set up a “research group” that, under the responsibility of Claude Fischer, examines the general nature of new enlargements but the question of Turkey is at the centre of these discussions. The orientation at the outset is critical of the notion of “capacity of absorption” and it is in favour of Turkish accession. The debates, however, which bring in an enormous range of competencies and opinions, are still in their initial phase. (F.R.)