Reasons for success. The press and European public opinion appear to have discovered the existence of the European Security and Defence Policy during the EU's intervention in the Lebanon (see this section yesterday). This is obviously something positive, as the ESDP represents, together with the CFSP, Europe's new frontier and contributes to the positive image of the EU in the world and its progress has been considerable. The attitude of “neutral” Member States is noticeably evolving and within the limits agreed on in accordance with their convictions and status, they are participating in the activities and initiatives (Sweden is today among the most active and effective countries). At the same time, the reservations of Germany regarding its participation in action outside of its national territory appear to belong to the past and the United Kingdom is playing a key role in the ESDP, which is indispensable if this policy is to be efficient and credible.
The coincidence existing between British convictions opposed to the concept of integration (see this section in bulletins 9230 and 9231 last July) and the nature of the ESDP has made this development possible. Defence policy is by nature, inter-governmental: the “Community method” is not applicable to orientations and decisions involving defence (even if the possibility of majority voting being applied to certain technical measures is envisaged). Therefore, the essential structures and instruments in this policy, which were already included in the Treaty of Nice, are increasingly being used despite the blockage on the advances contained in the Constitutional treaty. In this column there is no question of revising the historical developments that have occurred since the Franco-British declaration of Saint-Malo (December 1998). I can only advise interested readers to refer to No.71 of the “Cahiers de Chaillot” published by the European Union's Institute for Security Studies and in which Philippe de Schoutheete goes further than just a simple summary of the events, unveiling the hidden history too, notably what went on in the corridors of the Convention (he was an advisor to Michel Barnier, president of the Convention's “defence group”, and followed all the work). He provided a detailed report on the amendments that the Inter-governmental Conference introduced to the Convention's draft in November 2003, an aspect that I failed to mention in my summary yesterday but which are quite significant with regard to the ESDP. Ambassador Schoutheete also clarifies “the psychodrama at the HQ in Terveuren” and the events that allowed for certain accomplishments to be attained as intended in the Constitutional treaty (particularly the creation of an arms industry). Mr de Schoutheete's text can be consulted on the Institute of Security Studies' web site. In the preface Nicole Gnesotto, director of the institute, underlines the “demand for coherency”, which, in practice, compels Member States to pursue “collective effectiveness”, even if the ESDP is in essence inter-governmental.
British and French defence ministers and Javier Solana recently took part in a conference in Brussels and were invited to indicate whether they preferred the ESDP with or without the Constitutional treaty. The British minister said that the current situation without the Constitution was just fine; the French minister said that with the Constitutional treaty the ESDP would be more complete and efficient and Mr Solana refrained from any political judgement but pointed out that currently the ESDP depended on funding (rising, but still modest) from the CFSP, especially from voluntary contributions from Member States and that every year in May it had to pass round the collection plate. He indicated that with the Constitution the ESDP would have its own budget.
Insufficiencies. We should not conclude that everything's going well and that the ESDP could continue to progress by way of inertia. A determined political will remains necessary, as the shortcomings are many. In the absence of a European foreign affairs minister, the ESDP still has a very limited profile; its operational capabilities are modest (in strategic transport, mobility on the ground, satellite intelligence) and the goal of an armed corps of 60,000 deployable in sixty days appears to have been abandoned; most Member States have seriously insufficient defence budgets; the decisions from the European Defence Agency are not binding and its research budget is ridiculous. Moreover, the external aspects of the EU's common policies managed by the European Commission (trade policy, aid to poor countries etc) are not really integrated into a foreign policy perspective. The foundations exist but a lot remains to be done.
(F.R.)