From energy to spatial policy. The nostalgia surrounding the constitutional Treaty is not just to be found in the declarations and political stances of which several examples have already been cited in this column (see bulletin No9102), but also in specific references to the difficulties and obstacles that the EU has encountered and which would be better dealt with if the Treaty were in force, or about to be. The latest example of this was just last week. When asked why the EU does not have a common energy policy, European Commissioner Andris Piebalgs replied that it is because such a policy is not foreseen in any of the Treaties in force. The constitutional Treaty speaks of a “Union policy in the field of energy” and defines its objectives but … Another aspect often mentioned with nostalgia is that of the multiannual financial perspectives which, at the present time, result from a simple political agreement between Council and Parliament, which is fragile by definition. The constitutional Treaty had, however, foreseen a multiannual financial framework and had even spelled out the procedure for it: - unanimous Council decision subject to agreement of Parliament enacting by a majority of its members. From the second multiannual framework after entry into force of the constitutional Treaty, the Council would vote by qualified majority. Furthermore, the constitutional Treaty introduces space policy as an authority shared between the Union and the Member States.
I do not intend to repeat the list of innovations introduced by the constitutional Treaty, spoken of so often by others beginning with Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, but simply wish to stress that it is in the daily life of Europe that one hears wistfully said: If only there were the Constitution. Such regrets are oft expressed with reference to aspects that had been the most controversial, such as the social area and, in particular, the explicit recognition, for the very first time, of services of general interest as a pillar of the European model of society, with the explicit recognition that these should be financed by Member States with sufficient public subsidies to ensure they are brought to fruition. The more one reads the constitutional articles, the clearer they seem. On this point, citizens have been misled by untruths. The blocking of the provisions on defence policy is also often mentioned with regret, as well as the aborted birth of the post of European Foreign Minister (despite the difficulties relating to the definition of the role as a vice-president of the Commission and to the working of his/her services composed of Commission and Council officials and national diplomats).
Views differ on the road to follow. The fact that there are many regrets does not mean, however, that everyone holds the same views on the road that should be followed - far from it. Two weeks from now, the Parliament will be approving the Duff-Voggenhuber report. Nonetheless, after the more accommodating provisions introduced in institutional committee, the direction of the two rapporteurs in favour of immediate renegotiation of the constitutional Treaty followed by a European referendum was diluted to the point of leaving all possibilities wide open in practice. At the same time, there is a very wide range of opinions expressed by national governments. In the comments mentioned above, I only gave a few indicative samples, and guidelines set out are often contradictory. This is quite natural as we are only at the beginning of “reflection”.
Where the main equivocation lies. The great range of views, however, does not diminish the overall impression that the ups and downs entailed by ratification of the constitutional Treaty have strengthened rather than weakened the general awareness that the treaty is essential if progress in Europe is to be made. One point must, however, be quite clear and relentlessly pointed out: the constitutional Treaty does not bring and should not provide any answers to the challenges facing Europe today but rather establish the rules of the game and make instruments available to the EU, to its institutions and to the Member States to allow them to effectively come to grips with future challenges. The people will have to choose (with their votes), as well as the governments and the institutions. The major ambiguousness of the debates that preceded, and also followed, the referendums lay in the premise that the Constitution should itself determine the principles and the rules of the game, while allowing more liberal or more directive policies, with either more open or more closed polices, according to the wishes expressed by voters. On one point, however, a direction is taking shape: the suitability of giving up the name “Constitution” to retain that of “constitutional Treaty”, which is more in line with the meaning of the document and makes it possible to avoid the misunderstandings that were detrimental to the citizens' understanding of the document's reality and its aims.
(F.R.)