The fundamental reason why an alternative solution to Turkish accession has not been seriously considered is quite simply that Turkey has rejected this scenario. The authorities refuse to consider it, and economic circles states that the customs union exists, as well as an offshoot of the cohesion policy, so that the "privileged partnership" is already in place and nothing you can really be added to it. However, we may ask whether the Turkish authorities and political forces have carried out a careful and realistic assessment of the consequences of accession to the EU for their country. It is reasonable to assume that they have, and that Ankara is fully aware of the reality, and therefore the risks, of the operation; it may be for tactical reasons that they are currently rejecting any form of alternative, with the objective of getting the maximum when they negotiate it.
Kurdish autonomy and secularity. What risks for Turkey do I mean? They are mainly political and institutional in nature. The most determined proponents of accession are the Kurds, for the obvious reason that the application of Community rules and principles in terms of minority rights would guarantee them a greater degree of autonomy, both culturally (language, teaching, broadcasting, etc) and institutionally. The Kurds have already organised a demonstration in Brussels to call for the right to take part directly in negotiations with the EU. One might observe that this would be a source only of pleasure if its principles won the day; but for the time being, I would like to talk about the dangers to the Turkish State, particularly as there is another element which should be of concern to the Europeans: the guarantor for secularity in Turkey has always been the army, but under a European vision of things, this should be completely subordinated to civil powers. If the preferences of the Turkish electorate remain as they are, the secularity of the Turkish State could be in trouble.
We might also wonder whether the Ankara authorities have fully assessed the scope of the powers which would be transferred to Brussels to be exercised jointly, in fields such as oil and relations with the Turkish-speaking republics of the former USSR, and whether they are aware of the fact that the common agricultural policy and the cohesion policy could not be applied to their country in their current form.
No trauma or exclusions. I believe that during the negotiations, the above-mentioned issues will come to light, and that an alternative to full accession will gradually be sketched out, without trauma or exclusions proclaimed. I do not agree with those who aver that once negotiations start, that's it, and the endpoint will automatically be accession. Negotiations have, in fact, started, but that isn't it. Everything will depend on developments within the EU itself and the capacity of both sides to draft attractive and fair alternative formulae.
Stability pact and privileged partnership. From this point of view, things are finally moving. Irnerio Seminatore, president of the European Institute of International Relations (IERI), floated the idea of a "Stability Pact for the Southern Caucasus and the Greater Black Sea", involving Turkey, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia and which would be sponsored by the European Union to a certain degree, in accord with Russia and the United States. The creation of a regional stability zone would recognise the regional role of Turkey and organise access to the energy resources of Central Asia in a climate of cooperation and security.
At the same time, Parliamentary sources have drawn up the broad outlines of the "privileged partnership" which the EU may propose to Turkey and which would contain: Turkish involvement in the management of the joint European trade policy; the control of migratory flows and joint monitoring of Turkey's external borders; the creation of a "common organisation" of the Bosphorus; a specific development aid policy for Turkey; specific links for Turkey with the ESDP (whilst observing respective autonomy in foreign policy matters); specific chapter on the issue of Cyprus; Turkey's involvement with the Media programme and on the cooperation on cultural matters which already exists or is newly created between the Member States of the EU. This formula would reduce both the dangers for Europe and the restrictions for Turkey resulting from accession, and would allow Turkey to play its own role in a key region of the world.
Wisdom dictates that all paths open to the parties should be considered now, instead of wasting several years in fruitless discussions, which may occasionally err on the side of the unpleasant. (F.R.)