Nobody (or almost nobody) tells the truth. Negotiations on Turkey's accession are opened. This was inevitable. From the time the European Council set a date and imposed conditions, which Turkey has since fulfilled to the letter, the EU was also bound to respect its commitment and the episodes which preceded the event ought to have been overcome. But this inevitable development does not necessarily mean that the situation is entirely satisfactory. Quite the contrary; we have seen an indisputable split in the EU, and the official reasons given to justify the respective positions bear little relation to the truth.
Officially, both the proponents and the opponents of Turkish accession base their arguments on the requirement for Turkey to respect the "Copenhagen criteria": pluralist democracy, freedom of religion, respect for minorities and so on. This ought to mean that the door will remain closed for as long as Turkey fails to respect these criteria, and that it will be opened as soon as it does. However, this formula is not accepted universally. A proportion of the political forces and public opinion are opposed to Turkish accession in itself, whatever progress is made under the "Copenhagen criteria". Under this hypothesis, there is no question of checking up on Turkish progress, year on year, to make sure that they are going towards the political principles which characterise the EU, but followers of it believe that Turkish accession: a) would make the creation of a politically compact Europe impossible, and the abandonment of the European "solidarity" policies inevitable (agricultural policy, cohesion policy); b) would bring an unacceptable imbalance into its institutional functioning, because Turkey would have more weight than any other Member State within the Council, and the Turkish MEPs would represent the largest national group within the European Parliament. Those opposed to the opening of negotiations due to shortfalls in the application of the Copenhagen criteria are, in reality, opposed to the very principle of Turkish accession. Their strategy is weak, of which we have had two examples already; 1) when the time came to set a date for the opening of negotiations, much was made of various unacceptable provisions of the new Turkish civil code, which were detrimental to women; when the crunch came, the Turkish Parliament got rid of these provisions, and those opposed to setting a date for the negotiations found themselves without a leg to stand on; b) a few days ago, when the date of 3 October was being confirmed definitively, the opponents tried to use the fact that a seminar on the Armenian genocide, which had been due to take place in Istanbul, had been banned, stating that this ban made the opening of negotiations impossible. On the eve of the seminar, the Turkish authorities allowed it to take place, and once again, the European opponents found themselves without an argument. The same will happen throughout the length of the procedure, including on the issue of Cyprus: each time, the Turkish authorities will take the necessary measures justifying the continuation of negotiations, in extremis if needs be.
Hope and hypocrisy. Equally, those in favour of the yes have their weak spots and their hypocrisy. Some of them recognise the fact that the Union enlarged to include Turkey could no longer become a political entity, but states that in any case, this is an outmoded dream; so we may as well let the Turks in anyway. This is the view taken by Michel Rocard. Others would like the EU to do away with its agricultural policy and its cohesion policy, keeping just a few scraps of the CAP and a few financial transfers to the least favoured countries. That is the position of the United Kingdom; how could the UK black-ball Turkey's entry to the club, when this would inevitably lead to the development it would like to see? Others are convinced that the negotiations will not come to term and that Turkey itself will end up choosing a "reinforced cooperation", which will be as advantageous as possible for its interests, and they feel that the best course of action is to wait patiently for this to happen, thus avoiding an immediate clash, which would, by its nature, be traumatic.
However, it is certainly true that some of the reluctant camp are not playing they hypocritical game of "Copenhagen criteria", but are being quite open about their opposition in principle. Their essential bedtime reading is the slim volume, by now almost mythical, by Sylvie Goulard, "The Great Turk and the Republic of Venice", and their central argument is not that Turkey is not ready, but that the EU itself cannot absorb it without losing its soul and its ambitions. Certain members of the European Parliament are on her wavelength: Alain Lamassoure, Jacques Toubon, an increasing number of German CDU or CSU MEPs, etc. Other aspects were also raised: Irnerio Seminatore, for example, highlighted strategic elements.
But before I come back to any of these positions, fairness requires that I also take stock of the reasoning of those who support Turkish accession. That will be for tomorrow. (F.R.)