A justified link. I have not yet taken position on the future financial perspectives of the Union, on the letter by six Heads of Government calling for its budget to be limited to 1% of European GDP, on the reaction of the Commission President and the forecast to be proposed by the Commission in two weeks' time for the ceililng to be set between 1.22 and 1.24%. Why? Because I don't feel the current positions are definitive, and that there are factors which have been neglected until now which must be taken into account. For my money, the final positions will be determined by the results of negotiations on the Constitution, and that Germany could relax its stance somewhat if certain institutional uncertainties are overcome. I believe there is a link between the resources the "net contributor" Member States are disposed to put into the Union's pot, and the way in which this union will develop and take its future decisions. And I believe that this lnk is justified.
Unimpeachable reasoning, but... Romano Prodi's response, which was taken up by other Commissioners and figures, is based on solid and almost unimpeachable reasoning: we cannot ask the Union to do more and more with less money. In reality, nobody asked for the Community budget to be reduced to absolute figures. The 1% of GDP figure has only ever been exceeded by tiny amounts (1.02% in 1993, but that does not take rebates at the end of that year into the equation), and the sum of the budget will go on and on increasing. But the fact remains that a definitive ceiling of 1% would block any prospect of development, and would not allow sufficient resources to be put into new European priorities, or efficiently to contribute to the development of the new Member States. Therefore, Romano Prodi and all those who have started to think along his lines (and they are many) are, in principle, right.
But if we are to reach a compromise, we cannot neglect the arguments of those who want the 1% ceiling? Beyond the considerations outlined in the letter by the Heads of Government who called for this ceiling, I can see two other factors which I think are decisive:
a) Modalities for the approval of the annual budget. The starting point of the procedure is, and should continue to be, the European Commission's proposal. Within the Commission, the weight of the large Member States (who, logically, take care of most of the budget) will soon be less, and the "net contributors" will be very much in the minority. While so much remains unclear about the definitive composition of the Commission and how it will work, while it cannot prove its autonomy in the face of purely national interests, a certain wariness on the part of the net contributors is perhaps unavoidable. These comments also apply to further down the line in the budgetary procedure, involving Parliament and Council. The distribution of seats in the EP and the Council voting procedure will be decisive. I believe that only the system of double majority offers sufficient guarantees to the large countries and to the small and medium ones alike, to the net contributors, and the net beneficiaries. Let's be right about it- what the contributors will have to pay should not just be determined by the beneficiaries!
b) The general focus of the future Union. The significance and scope of solidarity are essential. If solidarity is a global concept presupposing the existence of a "European spirit", above and beyond national interestes and covering all aspects of a country's life, then economic, social, environmental policies, etc, and to an etxtent, foreign policy, will answer the common interest, even if they are not common policies. In order to build this Europe, with solidarity, with weight in world affairs, it must have the necessary resources. But for a "European area" where solidarity is confined to aid to the least favoured States, with the rest adopting an "every man for himself" attitude, and where even existing common policies (like CAP) are done away with, for this kind of Europe, the contributors have the right to say for themselves how much they will give. Those who prefer an intergovernmental EU will have to accept all that goes with it.
How can we tell which European waits us? There are no certainties, but for the time being, the one criterion we have is the Constitution. If it is approved as established by the Convention, this is a reason for confidence. At the start, I said that Germany will be more or less open in the coming negotiations on the financial perspectives (which will certainly be long and drawn out), depending on whether the Constitution has been adopted. If not, there'll be an EU with less solidarity and fewer common policies- and less money. (F.R.)