Encouraging conversion of opinion but … The converging opinions noted within the Convention on some aspects of the EU's institutional reform point to the possibility of consensus on problems such as the Union's status as a legal entity and simplification of its instruments and procedures, and even to some extent on subsidiarity and the right of own initiative (see same column yesterday). This is encouraging progress but the fundamental choices nonetheless remain open and the amalgamation hoped for by Chairman Valéry Giscard d'Estaing between the so-called "Community" thesis and the so-called "intergovernmental" thesis remains to be defined. For the time being, fundamental differences remain. Last week, the representative to the German government, Peter Glotz, reaffirmed his country's support for a clear distinction to be made between the legislative power (which must go to the Parliament and Council in co-decision) and the executive power (for the Commission, which should inherit the executive powers currently attributed to the Council). But the opposite tendency, aimed at a more or less insidious slide of major powers towards the intergovernmental side, to the detriment of the Commission, has also a large number of supporters. Synthesis remains difficult, and, to achieve it, it is necessary, according to the Chairman, to go beyond the quarrels of doctrine and to define first of all what one hopes to do before giving a detailed specification of the institutional scheme of things. And at any rate, several basic documents have still to come: that of the European Socialist Party early October, that of the European People's Party (EPP) during the second half of the same month, and, immediately after, that of the European Commission.
Forgetting Montesquieu. If I may be allowed to introduce a personal opinion into these short accounts (the aim of which is to give an account of the way the Convention's work is developing and which course it is taking), then I would reaffirm my conviction that the tendency towards restricting the role of the Council to that of co-legislator, by entrusting all the executive power to the Commission (which would be a poisoned gift for it, as I could demonstrate) deserves to be thrown out just as much as the tendency towards reducing the autonomy and the powers of the Commission. They are both equally doctrinaire, one federalist and the other intergovernmental, which would destroy the balance and the inter-institutional dialectic of the "Community method". The EPP governing bodies were leaning along the lines of the thesis presented at the Convention by Mr Glotz, but I believe that, after the informal meeting in Sardinia between the heads of government close to the EPP, this orientation will be corrected. "Forget Montesquieu!", recommended Jacques Delors, stressing the sui generis nature of the European institutional system, which does not rigorously follow the sacred rule of power sharing.
Be that as it may, I am not pessimistic, and here are two positive developments to show you why I am not:
"Governmental" Convention Members support the Commission. The first development that springs to mind concerns the behaviour of Convention Members who represent their Head of Government at the Convention. Newspapers overflow with criticism and sometimes sarcasm (sometimes of "high level", if not ministerial, origin) against Brussels bureaucracy and its excessive powers. One could therefore expect, within the Convention, reserved or reticent attitudes on the part of government representatives towards the European Commission. But, generally speaking, this is not the case. I shall above all cite Gianfranco Fini because of his national responsibilities (as Vice Prime Minister of Italy) and Pierre Moscovici because of his specific situation. Mr Fini declared that Italy intends the key and essential responsibilities of the European Commission to be safeguarded. Mr Moscovici, for his part, stressed that institutional reform "should not bring into question either the acquis or the original institutional nature of the Union, mainly the Commission's fundamental role of impetus". Why is Mr Moscovici's situation so specific? Because during the previous French government he was Minister of European Affairs and Member of the Convention, and this latter function was confirmed by President Chirac and by the new Prime Minister, Mr Raffarin, despite the change of governmental majority. This indicates significant continuity in France's European policy and allows one to believe that, at the time of the referendum on the new treaty, not only the right wing majority but also the Socialist opposition will invite citizens to vote "yes", burying the absurd but unfortunately customary rule that majority and opposition should vote in opposite directions.
The "Community method" attitude adopted by several other Convention Members who represent their governments is in no doubt. Names will suffice: Ana de Palacio and Louis Michel, the respective Foreign Ministers for Spain and Belgium and Jacque Santer, former President of the Commission and Henning Christophersen, Vice President of the Commission, as well as others. Overall, the attitude has been wary and reductionist on the part of the governments towards the Commission and which has been present in the press and numerous declarations but much less so at the Convention (with certain exceptions, of course).
National politicians are in the game. The second positive development concerns the representatives from the national Parliaments. At least partly, they arrived at the Convention with the strongly held view of increasing the punch of these Parliaments within a European institutional system (a fully justified demand) and with certain prejudices about this system and the claimed "democratic deficit" of the Union. In most cases, the few months participating in the Convention has been sufficient for helping them better understand what the Union really is and for getting rid of some of the misunderstandings about the European Parliament, as well as providing national Parliamentarians with greater momentum and enthusiasm. They were able to observe that the Convention overall (European Parliament included) recognises the demands for greater participation from the national Parliaments in Community activity. They were also better able to understand the originality of the institutional system of the Union.
I will use a late arrival as an example, the representative of the French National Assembly, Pierre Lequiller. He entered the Convention last June following elections in his country. A few weeks were enough for him to strike up appropriate contacts, get information, discuss and form a number of convictions about things and present his own 'institutional reform proposals', which are proof of his spirit of initiative and positive attitude towards European construction and its principles. Mr Lequiller stressed the importance of 'personalising' the Union by giving it a face. He declared in an interview, "I think that the next very important symbol for Europe, after the Euro, will be its face". A 'President of Europe' was therefore needed, who would be appointed for five years and who would deal exclusively with European affairs: if the choice focused on a head of Government, he would abandon his functions in order to take up the "full-time" job of Union President. From an institutional point of view, he would preside over what? The European Council, namely, meeting between Heads of State and Governments, as well as through the mediation of three Vice Presidents and the Ministerial councils. Mr Lequiller favours the President being the President of the European Commission as well. The first formula does not appear acceptable to me: the 'single face' of Europe would be obtained at the detriment of power sharing between the institutions and to the detriment of the Commission's autonomy. Even if the prerogatives of the Commission are respected, indeed strengthened, it can't be presided over by the President of the European Council and the Council. We can therefore forget the formula of a single President but can retain the second formula of Mr Lequiller. Simplification and rationalisation of the Council's work, outlined and in detail, would be accompanied by a reinforcing of Parliament's powers (co-decision with the Council would be the general rule in all Community matters) and those of the Commission (its monopoly on the right of initiative would be maintained and its role of guarantor of the Community interest would be strengthened). The project also foresees the creation of a 'Congress of European Peoples' (composed of MEPs and delegates from the national Parliaments, without legislative powers) and defines the methods for appointing the President of Europe and the President of the Commission, as well as other elements involved in how the institutions work, the innovations going in the sense of: ensuring greater transparency in the institutions and increased efficiency; strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the Community institutions.
My impression is that Mr Lequiller's starting point is that of a largely intergovernmental concept (especially in strengthening the competencies of the institutions and national government mechanisms) and that he made corrections at the same time as he deepened his knowledge of the Community situation. He was already a convinced supporter of a united Europe (he explained that during his electoral campaign he dedicated half of his interventions to the subject of Europe and witnessed a 'very favourable response whenever he explained the genuine stakes involved in European construction'). His participation at the Convention has allowed him to consolidate his positive orientation and that's why he represents an example of what's generally said about the development of Convention members from the national Parliaments.
(FR)