Considerations developed under this same heading on 4 and 5 September on the state of progress of the work of the Convention make me feel that the situation is more complex and disorganised than the impression given in the analysis made by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. The Chairman's attempt to achieve clarity is worthy of merit and fully justified by the aim. He was not addressing specialists but the public, and he had noted that citizens had an enormous need for simplification and readability. He therefore focused on what was essential, which is to say he explained the ambitions and the aims of the undertaking and its significance for the future of Europe. He would have been in contradiction with himself if he had gone into too much detail. But there are some risks that are implicit in any simplification and these he could not avoid. He was no doubt aware that his analysis might displease some of the Convention Members who do not see themselves correctly reflected in some aspects of Giscard d'Estaing's vision. In particular, we have:
1. Institutions: details and substance. The Chairman hopes a detailed institutional debate will not be needed. The Convention should define the nature of Europe to be built taking into account citizens' requests and preventing things from getting bogged down in technical discussions on procedures and on the respective powers of the different institutions. This concern of the Chairman is justified in some areas (subsidiarity, catalogue of powers) where, it seems, the Convention Members are effectively in the process of getting themselves stuck in up to the neck, within working groups, in legal details that have nothing to do with a Constitution. But there is also something else. The balance of powers is not a matter of rivalry between the institutions, but it does determine the smooth running and above all the effectiveness of the Union. Giscard d'Estaing has even put majority vote among the procedural issues. If we are to use the comment made by Alain Lamassoure: "when there are 25 or 30 members, making unanimity an obligation would mean preventing all action". These are essential questions.
2. A risk to be avoided. The Chairman solemnly confirmed the aim of a global constitutional Treaty developed by the Convention itself. That's fine. But for now he has not touched on the question of "what to do" in the case of differences of opinion between Member States on objectives and ambitions. In my view, the Convention must itself indicate that "its" Treaty will take effect between countries that have ratified it once there have been a certain number of ratifications. Europe cannot accept the risk of seeing this Treaty written off because just one government or a single parliament decides to reject it. Has nothing been learnt from the ups and downs of yesterday's Treaty of Maastricht and today's Treaty of Nice? Should one envisage an "opt out" system for fundamental aspects of the future Europe, in which some Member States would not participate?
3. An inescapable sphere. Differences between Member States now seem obvious with regards security and defence policy. This is one of the essential workshops of tomorrow's Europe, indispensable for "a more affirmed presence of Europe in the world" (as Giscard d'Estaing himself says). The firm determination to move forward in this field was above all confirmed by the Franco-German Summit end July. The alternative would not be renunciation of this chapter but rather its development among the "big" members outside Community structures. The Benelux countries were quick to catch on, as is proved by the initiative taken by the Belgian Prime Minister in favour of operational measures in the Community framework (see our bulletin of 24 July, p.5). It is not, in this case, a matter of discussing the respective powers of the different institutions (the Commission admits that the "Community method" cannot be transposed as such to ESDP, and Javier Solana has developed significant considerations on the subject), but of simply knowing whether the institutional Treaty will adequately cover this area despite the reservation expressed by some Member States.
4. Rebalancing EMU. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing has, as far as I know, not yet spoken of the problems of economic and monetary Union (EMU) and of EMU rebalancing, in the constitutional Treaty, between the economic chapter and the monetary section. He will not, however, be able to neglect this essential aspect of European construction. The Commission has already presented its views in a specific document addressed to the Convention (while the Parliament has failed to do so - see yesterday's EUROPE, p.12). I consider the subject sufficiently important to come back to it in detail very soon.
(F.R.)