Robert Toulemon, former Director General at the European Commission and currently President of the Association française d'étude pour l'Union européenne (AFEUR) has put together a "synthesis project" that explores the proposals for a federal Europe and a Europe of States, which the EUROPE bulletin has discussed on a number of occasions. At the end of May the author finished his definitive document. We are republishing it in this edition because he has modified some of the texts, with which some readers are already familiar and a number of readers have expressed a wish to read the document as a whole and also because our non-French speaking readers will be able to read it in other languages.
The objective of this project is indicated in the introduction, namely, the lack of reforms will mean that, "an enlarged Europe is an impotent Europe". There are two main principles: the EU will not be able to impose a trajectory for further integration on a Member State if it does not want this, but neither will a Member State or group of countries be able to prevent progress towards integration that is judged essential by the majority of Member States. The resulting "differentiation" will not be decided on by a self-proclaimed avant-garde and constituted on the fringes of the Community system but will be the result of the self-exclusion of those who do not wish to participate in a project (this was the case for the Euro).
The Toulemon Project is not a theoretical paper dreamt up in some office but rather, takes into account the numerous studies and proposals that have gone before from such eminent personalities as Jacques Delors or politicians such as Joschka Fischer, Tony Blair, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, Romano Prodi, as well as European and international movements and organisations. It aims to both synthesise these different tendencies that support either a federal Europe or a Europe of States and at the same time, safeguard that which is essential in the "Community Method", and which has been responsible for giving us the results that we have obtained over the last half century of European integration. It is essentially an address to the Convention on the Future of Europe and defined "as the last chance to get Europe ready before large-scale enlargement"
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FEDERAL EUROPE/EUROPE OF NATIONS
Proposals for a synthesis
Robert Toulemon - President of "l'Association française d'étude pour l'Union européenne"
Following the disappointments of Amsterdam and Nice, the decision to organise a Constitutional Convention and the very broad mandate contained in the Declaration of Laeken has been warmly received by those who saw European construction as being a political and humanistic project rather than an economic and commercial one, and the only grand design on offer at this beginning of the millennium. A lot of the credit is due to the Belgian Prime Minister, Verhofstadt.
Success, however, is far from being guaranteed. To succeed, the Convention will have to try and conciliate between two sides that have been opposed to each other for more than half a century over the European institutions - the school supporting the intergovernmental approach and that supporting federalism. But attempts at convergence could lead to a compromise represented by the status quo, or even by a retreat, like at Nice, or they could lead to the opposite, that is to say a synthesis allowing for real progress of the real Union.
The " status quo" compromise could consist in maintaining the current separation between the Community and intergovernmental areas,, which has led to a dangerous discrepancy between commercial and monetary integration and to a non-existent or embryonic economic, social and political union. The result is the absolute primacy of competition over positive interventions, resignation about exclusion and widespread poverty, a tragic lack of efficiency in the fight against international organised crime and an influence on the world scene that it is in no relation with the economic and demographic weight of Europe. Monetary Union itself could become more fragile if this situation is allowed to continue.
To succeed and respond to the expectations of accession candidate countries,the great enlargement to the East and South must be preceded or at least accompanied by the elimination of this discrepancy and by the rectification of the structural defects of the Union, without which, an enlarged Europe will be an impotent Europe Enlargement, but also the divergences separating current and future Member States call for a certain differentiation in integration. This will involve learning the lessons of two common sense principles, which, although unwritten, constitute the basis of European consensus: 1. The Union cannot force one of its members to accept its decision on an issue it deems essential. 2. A country or group of countries will not be able to indefinitely prevent any integration progress which is deemed essential by the majority. A third principle could be added, illustrated by the achievement of a monetary union of twelve: differentiation in integration can only result from self-exclusions and not from self-proclaimed avant-gardes set up on the margins of the Community system.
We ill try to demonstrate what could represent a synthesis, reviewing the three main areas whch will be covered by the work of the Convention:
objectives and competences
institutional architecture
constituent procedure and differentiation in integration.
I. Objectives and power-sharing
The first issue that Members will have to deal with when they get to the core of the subject is the preamble , which will have, first of all, to give legal force to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, as well as defining the common objectives of the members of the Union. What do we want to do together? We can agree without difficulty on peace and democracy, which are at the same time the essential objectives of the Union and its most legitimate reason of pride. Agreeing on the Union's own competence in the foreign and defence policy corresponding to these objectives will be less obvious. The single market as the basis of common prosperity will not raise any objections but will this be the case for monetary, social and fiscal union, which result from it? Will the Union's competence in the field of organisation and regulation of large energy networks, transport and communication networks be acknowledged, as well as its competence for the guarantee of the various safety measures sought by citizens: food safety, health care, transport, preventing accidents involving pollution and asylum and immigration regulation? Shall we take in consideration giving the Union its own resources of a fiscal nature, without which it will be unable to assume these different responsibilities and whose counterpart should be a corresponding reduction in national budgets?
Internal security, which involves an efficient fight against the different forms of international criminality - drug trafficking and trade in human beings, different criminal organisations - will not be opposed. But, like in foreign and defence policy, difficulties will appear when the it comes to granting powers to the Union in this field and to creating police and justice instruments, as well as instruments for the surveillance of external borders, without which there will be no European action commensurate the challenges it faces..
Rector Brugmans, founder of the College of Bruges, used to say in the early days of the Common Market, that we had created European federalism the other way around; We had given the Community some tasks, such as agricultural affairs and regional development, which could have remained essentially within the national competence, but we hadn't given it any responsibility in the fields that belong traditionally to federations: foreign policy, defence and until recently, monetary policy. This inversion, which has sometimes been attributed to Jean Monnet and to his method, forgetting that he had imagined a Community defence project at the very moment when, in Luxembourg he was setting up the Steel and Coal Community , not only condemns the Union to impotence on the international scene, but it threatens the acquis of the single market and monetary union. The Convention provides a last chance for Europe to rectify the situation before the great enlargement.
In France one hears specially , in left-wing circles, that the main shortcomings of Europe are found in the social area. In fact surveys show that people are ready to grant more power to the Union in the field of foreign and defence policy and the fight against international crime than in the social field, most of which should, according to them, be dealt with at national level. In this field, they are expecting the Union rather to accompany and supplement the activity of states, firstly by establishing favourable conditions for growth and employment in conditions compatible with the now strongly felt demands of sustainable development. Bringing Europe closer to citizens is not simply an institutional problem: it is equally, if not to a greater extent, a matter of giving Europe powers and means of action that meet their expectations. Hence one could assess the Convention by its capacity to extend the Union's competence to the essential part of foreign and defence policy and to combating organised crime at the international level.
Recognising a competence for the Union in foreign and defence policy does not mean that this competence should be exercised according to the standard Community procedures. Realism demands that the need for a relatively long transition period be accepted, during which the common executive would not have a monopoly for proposal and during which no state could be placed under constraint by the majority. This period should, however, mark progress against the current situation, where the Union has no competence n this field and has no explicit international identity. It should also be taken advantage of in order to provide the Union with instruments - diplomacy and armed forces - without which the idea of common foreign and defence policy would remain but a word. .
During this transition period the task of the Union would be to:
Approximate, harmonise and co-ordinate Member States' foreign policy insofar as this seems to be necessary to meet the Union's objectives1;
Provide itself with the necessary instruments to make the most of the common security and defence efforts: the intervention force, the European Armaments Agency responsible for big research programmes and military equipment, with a large enough budget provided by pooling a significant proportion of national arms budgets or, even better by incorporating an ad hoc chapter in the Union's budget. Without such measures, Europe would have to give up on any claim to wield influence within NATO or to play a major role on the world stage. It would have to resign itself, individually or collectively, to choosing between neutrality and dependence.
Clarification of powers will not be a one-way street. It will not simply involve extending powers to domains that logically fall to the European level, but restricting Community intervention in minor domains. This objective should be sought by allowing states or centralised bodies greater latitude in implementing EU law rather than in a rigid definition of areas of competence. For example, it is up to Europe to set out general objectives for consumer protection, public health and plant and wildlife, but not necessarily to regulate in detail safety rules to be respected for open-air markets or determine hunting seasons. In return, the Union should have a right of injunction over states or communities whose action goes against commonly defined objectives. Likewise, the management of agricultural markets should continue to be the Union's responsibility, but rural planning and combating farm pollution (recognised as a shared area of competence) should mainly fall to states or regions, along with the corresponding financial burden.
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1 Mr Alain Lamassoure made an interesting Communication to the Convention on this issue
This " setting straight" of the European project should be visible in the Union's budget. Budget appropriations for sovereign expenditure - defence, monitoring external borders, combating international crime, aid for third countries, but also combating extreme poverty and social exclusion - should largely exceed agricultural expenditure. The principle of subsidiarity whereby the Union should deal with issues that cannot be resolved at a lower level, and only those issues, should no longer be invoked only in one direction, to restrict Union powers but never to extend them.
Meeting the challenge of enlargement implies enlarging the Union's powers and not enough attention is yet being paid to this. New Member States from Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans will not only need substantial and sustained financial aid. They will have to be granted extremely broad technical assistance in administrative and judicial affairs, failing which financial aid might be ineffective. For example, it would be dangerous and unfair to make only the Baltic States, Poland, Slovakia and Romania bear the brunt of monitoring the Union's long external border that will run from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and of the fight against various forms of criminal activity along this border. This will have to be born in mind when determining objectives and powers.
II. Institutional Architecture.
The plan put forward by the federalists from the start - Commission becoming the government and the Council the second Chamber - is now out of date for at least three reasons. The first is connected with the role of scapegoat that the Commission plays for governments, many politicians and often the media, depriving it of the popular support without which its transformation into a political executive would be doubtful The second is connected with the determination with which most current or future Member States are demanding to have a representative in the College. The third is connected with the need to associate Member States in defining policies they will be responsible for implementing and also with the desire of the major Member States to keep a direct influence on the Union's foreign policy, and even more so for defence issues. Giving the Commission alone (such as it was transformed by the Nice Treaty) the management of traditional common policies hardly seems realistic, and even less so for new policies.
Conversely, whether composed of ministers or heads of state, the Council is already incapable (and will be even less capable after enlargement) of governing the Union. This inability is connected with the heterogeneous nature of an assembly that now has many members, to conflicts of interests, to the tendency to prefer inertia rather than qualified majority decision and to the succession of one six-month Presidency after the other.
This doubly impossible situation leads to the proposal to set up a Union Presidency that does not define on its own basic guidelines but also proposes them to the European Council and to Parliament, that is able to guarantee the consistency of all policies and permanently provide the Union's government. A political cabinet within the Commission, five or six public figures trusted by the European Council and the Parliament, would be appointed after the European elections in order to reflect the will of the citizen but following a procedure linking the Union's two highest bodies. This body could be called the Praesidium (referring to the Convention Praesidium) or Collegiate Presidency, but certainly not "Directory" ("Directoire" ), a word which in the European jargon,recalls a hegemony of big states. It would match European diversity better than a solitary President, even if appointed by the European Council or even by universal suffrage. While taking account of the European elections, its composition could reflect the diversity of dominant political trends in the Member States. It would make it possible to strike a balance between "big" and less big countries, between North and South, old and new Member States and also between the sexes. The Members of the Praesidium would represent the Union in the various international bodies, where their activity would have to comply with the Councils' instructions. They would chair the Councils, following a suggestion already made by Professor Quermonne with the aim of ending the six-monthly turnstile while extending government synergy between Council and Commission.
Their role would not be to substitute for the Commission but to chair it and lead its work after appointing members in consultation with governments. One can regret that all states, particularly the candidate countries, want to be "represented" in a body whose job is precisely to represent the common interest and not the individual interests of each, but we have to bow to reality and understand to an extent the very useful educational role that the Commissioners carry out in their home countries. However, no decisionof the Commission (which the Praesidium members would also be an integral part of) could be taken with out the agreement of the restricted Presidential College. This would eliminate one of the most disastrous consequences of the Nice Treaty, namely the political impossibility recently observed by the Chairman of the Convention of voting in a college where representatives of countries representing a tiny minority of the population of the Union would be the majority.
The President of the Praesidium and its four or five Vice-Presidents would deal with co-ordinating Commissioners' activities, thereby re-establishing necessary but already insufficient collegiality with the probably inevitable expansion of the College rendering this even more problematic. The President would be the face and the voice of the Union internally and externally. The Vice-President for Economic and Monetary Union would chair the ECOFIN Council and be the political representative for the Central Bank. Another President would be responsible for defence, armaments, space and research. Another for fundamental rights, internal security, monitoring borders, asylum and immigration. Another for competition (as long as a body independent from the Executive is created, as it should)) and also for solidarity policies in the Union's various fields of activity. During a transition period that should not exceed a decade2, the Members of the Praesidium should act in close liaison with national governments, particularly in terms of foreign relations and defence. Chairing the various Councils representing states, and able to demand double majority voting, they would have the means that are tragically lacking today to separate out from the chaos of national viewpoints a policy answering European's common interests. This would sideline the risk of seeing the European Executive reduced to the role of a secretariat. The sovereignty of states, however, would be safeguarded, during the transition phase at least, by the constructive abstention or derogation mechanism outlined in III.
The Praesidium's existence would also make it possible to solve the irritating problem of the Union Presidency, the lack of continuity and visibility due to the six-month rotation. The election of a President of the European Council (or the different Councils of Ministers) for an extended duration would clash with the problems inherent in any long-term accumulation of national and European functions: division of time and conflict of interests. Also, some heads of state, no doubt wanting to end their careers in Europe, seem to be considering appointing a public figure who would no longer have a national function. Such a solution would cause enormous problems and have the effect of inflating duplication in the system to the maximum, already the source of confusion, if not of conflict, today between High Representative Javier Solana and External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten. Putting two competing Presidents with identical profiles at the helm of the Union would certainly not contribute effectiveness, visibility or democracy. If heads of states' egos will not content themselves with an external Presidency, it would be better to keep the revolving Presidency or have a formal chairmanship by the oldest or longest-standing member rather than running the risk of a diarchy at the helm of the Union. Defenders of Community orthodoxy and supporters of a Europe of states may find it difficult to accept, but the most reasonable solution would be to give the presidency of both the European Council and the General Affairs Council, without voting rights,to the President of the Praesidium, and the presidency of the Councils of Ministers to the vice-presidents, depending on the areas they are responsible for co-ordinating.
Far from being turned into a second parliamentary chamber, the Council would continue to be involved in executive functions with prerogatives that could vary according to the topic. Hence prior agreement would be required for the most important decisions and an a posteriori control procedure for the others. The Council's legislative functions would be carried out respecting the transparency rules which are needed for such functions or transferred to a potential Chamber of states whose composition could be left for each state to decide for itself, leaving space for regional representatives with legislative powers recognised as "partners of the Union" as the European Parliament is proposing. In a Union called upon to expand to more than thirty Member States, the unanimous decision-making rule should be completely scrapped and replaced with two measures that can ensure a balance between different sized states and safeguard essential sovereignty - double majority (simple or two-thirds depending on the issue) of states or represented populations, and the option for states that find themselves in the minority to win derogations according to criteria outlined below. The double majority rule defended by Michel Barnier on behalf to the Commission was sidelined in Nice because it broke parity with Germany, a fracture that was agreed upon, however, in another form.
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2 It may seem strange almost half a century after the Treaty of Rome to propose another transition period. The delays in building the political European Union cannot be bridged overnight.
It has the merit, however, of clarity and adaptability for future rounds of enlargement. It meets common sense requirements and is easily understandable. For this reason, it is an important element of democratisation and transparency and should apply to all bodies representing states, particularly a potential chamber of states where each delegation would have one vote.
Control of the Executive composed of the Praesidium and Commissioners could be sufficiently assured by written and oral questions and Parliament interpellations. Nonetheless, if the Parliament were to be given the possibility of censure, it would be logical for the Executive to be given the right of dissolution possibly subject to European Council approval. If such were the case, provisions would have to be foreseen in order to keep to the timetable for forming the Executive following European elections. The Union's programme for the five years of executive and parliamentary mandates would be finalised by the Executive in agreement with a General Affairs Council preferably composed of specialised ministers or, for the States that refuse such a solution, of Foreign Ministers. This programme would be submitted to the European Council and to the Parliament or to a Congress of European and national parliaments for which less frequent meetings could prove desirable for reasons given below. The participation of national parliaments in the life of the Union could also be strengthened by the presence of representatives from the different national parliaments in the Council, sitting in legislative formation, or in an eventual Chamber of States.
Democratisation of the Union could also be enhanced through reform of the method for electing the European Parliament, with generalised proportional voting in constituencies that do not go beyond a certain number of inhabitants, for example five million. In order to promote the formation of European political parties presenting European programmes to the voters, it would be a good thing to give voters a second ballot, that would serve for the election of a small fraction of the Parliament, five to ten percent,on lists which would have to be transnational The number of the members of the members of the European parliament should be brought to less than five hundred, that is one representative for every one million inhabitants and twenty to forty on transnational lists. The aspiration of citizens for a participative democracy at every level should lead to the establishment of a referendum at the request of a significant number of citizens from an equally significant number of countries. In the same spirit, the day will come when citizens will demand that they be able to designate the Union Executive themselves. It will then be seen that the election of a collegial presidency would be the best way to avoid elections distorted by candidate nationality. In any case, the composition of the Executive and its method of designation should be reviewed upon expiry of the transitional period. The constitutional scheme thus sketched out should not be considered as final. The distinctive characteristic of European construction is that it evolves.
The institutional architecture would not be complete without transformation of the Court in Luxembourg into a constitutional Court, a function that it already partly fills. Citizens' appeals, with a view to gaining respect of the rights defined in the Charter approved in Nice but to this day not legally binding, should be possible subject to specific conditions in order to prevent appeals of a fanciful nature. The fight against international crime would not only justify the creation of a European public prosecution department but also the creation of one or several EU criminal courts that would apply common legislation still to be developed. It is not only the effectiveness of the fight against crime that would be better ensured in this way but also the right to have impartial judges. Furthermore, the States that hold terrorists who have carried out terrorist acts in another country would no longer come under the frequent threats made against them by criminal organisations.
Fundamentalists on both sides will not find this scheme of things satisfactory. A synthesis rather than a compromise, its merit is that it fulfils the fundamental concerns of all, while safeguarding the essence of the Community method. The role of the Executive remains that of making proposals and providing impetus. The main decisions continue to come under the responsibility of the Council, whether it sits at ministerial or at Heads of State level. Both of the main novelties consist in generalising double majority in the bodies representing the States and in the decisive function of impulsion and representation entrusted to a team that has the double confidence of States and citizens. . The States that are keen on ensuring that national governments have the key role would have the assurance that the Executive would not take initiatives that do not have the support of most national governments. Supporters of a Europe that is closer to the citizens would be pleased to see the Union with an Executive body that is identifiable and likely to one day be elected by universal suffrage. The requirement that there should be a majority of States for any decision by the European Council and the Chamber of States would give the small States the guarantee that their voices will not be ignored, without, however, drowning out the voices of the big States in an egalitarianism that is totally unconnected to reality. The risk of seeing a Commission that has too many members and is too national lose its authority would be palliated by the existence within it of a political office, the Praesidium, whose collegial nature would allow a balanced representation of the large States, medium and small States, men and women, and northern and southern countries -and also of different but not opposed political orientations . Supporters of effective control of subsidiarity would find satisfaction in the recognition of a legislative power equal to the Chamber of States. Those who want national parliaments to be more actively involved in Union matters would have the double satisfaction of being able to take part in the Chamber of States and the periodical convening of a Congress of Parliaments or of a Convention that will be proposed below, with regard to the constituent function. MEPs would finally receive full recognition of the fact that they are co-legislators on an equal footing with the Council possibly transformed into a Chamber of States and also be granted the power to vote on the income part of the budget. The autonomous regions, mainly the German Länder, would obtain Union partner status and the possibility of being represented at one of the legislative chambers. Those, finally, who criticise the extent of the powers of the current Commission on competition issues should approve the creation of a specialised body. The affirmation of the political function of the Executive appears difficult to reconcile with the almost jurisdictional side of its duties.
III. Constituent procedure and differentiation in integration
Three forms of differentiation in integration may be envisaged and have, moreover, already been tested in various forms, unlike enhanced cooperation , which remains virtual. The most radical form stems from refusal of the Treaty, of the constitutional pact or of a possible Constitution; the second is the refusal to accept certain chapters of the Treaty; and the third is the refusal to take part in an approach or specific action advocated by the majority. Under the first form we find the repeated refusals on the part of the Swiss and Norwegian peoples for membership that is already negotiated in the case of Norway and only contemplated in the case of Switzerland. It is worthy of note that such refusals do not deprive these countries of most of the advantages to be gained from the Single Market and are not a barrier to close cooperation with the Union. Constitution or constitutional pact? This dilemma could remain theoretical and with no more than presentational interest if it did not dissimulate a fundamental choice to be made concerning the future approval procedure and the entry into force of fundamental texts that define the aims, the powers, the competences and the institutions that will serve these objectives. There are two opposite theses on this. For the traditionalists and chancelleries in particular, the requirement of unanimity is obvious, whether it is a question of signing after the Intergovernmental Conference foreseen in 2004, or of parliamentary or popular ratification. For others, more audacious but also more realistic, the rule of constituent unanimity no longer has its place in a Union called on to bring together more than thirty States that are all different in their size, capacities and history. Can one imagine that Malta and Cyprus will tomorrow be able to hold all the other Union members in check?
This difficulty had in fact already appeared during the negotiation or the ratification of the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice treaties. It was resolved by the exemptions granted to the minority States in the initial treaties (United Kingdom, Denmark) or during re-negotiation followed by a second referendum (Denmark). It would probably be in the form of a second referendum in Ireland after the questionable assurance given to the Irish citizens that a treaty organising common defence would not damage their country's traditional neutrality.
Would it not be preferable to amend the revision procedure and stipulate that the new constitutional pact would take effect as soon as a majority of States representing two thirds of the Union population has ratified it, the other States being proposed associate status guaranteeing them their participation in the single market; and, if they so wish and agree to the rules, in monetary union? One might object that amending revision procedure requires unanimity. Strong political determination should make it possible to overcome this obstacle. European history shows that a small minority cannot in the long term be an obstacle to strong majority will, even in constitutional matters. Mrs Thatcher was able to see it for herself. Perhaps, the recognition of a country's right to withdraw from the Union if it is in deep disagreement with the direction it is taking would facilitate the agreement on the modification of the revision procedure in a majority sense. Legal rigour should lead the intergovernmental conference to adopt the new review procedure first of all and then make use of it after unanimous national ratification.
It is proves impossible to amend the review procedure or to obtain broad agreement on new objectives and on corresponding transfer of powers, for example in defence matters, in the fight against international crime or the elimination of dire poverty, the road of negotiated derogation seems both realistic and more conform to the Union's interests than that, not yet tested, of enhanced cooperation. It consists in authorising the States in disagreement with the majority to remain outside certain policies. Such is the solution that has allowed monetary union. However, it would be appropriate to draw the logical institutional consequence of this, that is depriving those requesting exemption of their right to vote (but not their right to take part in deliberations) in bodies representing the States. This solution is certainly not ideal but does have the merit of guaranteeing that a large majority of States take part in all policies, which is something obviously not guaranteed by enhanced cooperation. One could also foresee entrusting a body made up of national and European parliamentarians with the task of adapting the Union'scompetences without it being necessary to resort to the unwieldy revision procedure, which involves involving national ratification. This congress or convention whose meeting frequency would necessarily be decided in advance, could also ensure political control of the respect of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Finally, it is clear that, in a very enlarged Union, the rule of unanimity would be synonym with impotence, mainly in the fields of foreign affairs and defence where effectiveness requires speed of decision. On the other hand, it seems reasonable given the attachment of States to their sovereignty in "sensitive" areas to recognise that each State would, at least during a transitional period, have the right not to associate itself in an approach or action decided by the majority3. As in the previous hypothesis of a general derogation negotiated and included in the constitutional pact, the abstaining States should also abstain from voting for or against implementation measures. It will be noted that the simple rule of double majority would prevent the difficulties arising from new vote weighting in order to take into account the voluntary staying aside of certain Member States.
All of these provisions, conceived as a consistent whole, should make it possible to avoid falling into the trap of an à-la-carte Europe and into that of a two-speed Europe. The same cannot be said of enhanced cooperation or avant-garde projects that are all potential sources of complication and conflict. The only differences in integration that are politically acceptable and compatible with consistency of the European project are those resulting from auto-exclusion, that we should hope would be temporary if no privileges are attached.
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In insider terms, one could summarise the above proposals in the following way: - merger of the pillars with the generalisation of a Community method adjusted not only to the constraints of enlargement but also to the requirements of national sovereignties. In other words, it is a matter of combining into an original synthesis what is strongest in the Community method (the role of own initiative and the coherence of a supranational body associated to the principle of majority, which is the guarantee of effectiveness and democracy) and in the intergovernmental method (the guarantee that there is no constraint within major areas, that we are closely involved in the definition and implementation of Union policies). Unfortunately, it is not the most likely one. A certain historical fatigue on the part of the European peoples who have undergone so much, as de Gaulle said when speaking of France, explains their lack of enthusiasm for adopting the political, administrative and budgetary instruments that they need to perfect their social model and take part in the construction of a world order that meets their aspirations of the best in them. The most likely is also the easiest: making several improvements to the working of the Community pillar and continuing to fuel the illusion of a foreign and defence policy and fight against international crime following the principles inherited from the Vienna, if not Westphalia, treaties. Let us hope that at least the Convention and the Interngovernmental Conference will bear in mind the absolute need to bring Europe closer to its peoples, whether it is a matter of reforming the method of electing the Parliament or that of the Council decision-making procedure, the setting in place of participative democratic elements at European level and the definition of ambitious convergence criteria in social matters. Otherwise, can we rule out the risk that the miraculous achievement of peace and human progress will one day be threatened by the tragic alliance that ignoring or forgetting the past forms so easily with demagogy and the worst forms of nationalism?
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3 It would, however, be appropriate for the abstaining States not to be able to call for budgetary reversal as a consequence of their abstention.