Dishonest interpretation but…Precisions and denials are of no use: for much of the media and therefore public opinion, the European Commission has asked to become the government of the European Union. Its paper on the "project for the European Union" is available to everyone (it was in the annex of our bulletin on 25 May); a Commission note clearly explained that there was no question of it wanting to become the government of Europe. The Commissioner for institutional reform, Michel Barnier had been unequivocal about this (labouring the point, according to a colleague). But this has achieved nothing. This misunderstanding of an essential element of the Prodi project explains why, according to certain commentators, "the Eurocracy is essentially worried about its own powers". This is untrue.
While regretting the certain abusive interpretation f the document, I do not wish to assert that some criticisms are not justified. They are not only legitimate but to be welcomed. I have certain concerns about it myself, which I will outline for the moment, within the confines of the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) on which comments and anxieties have focused.
The Commission has created the impression of worrying more about who will lead and manage the CFSP than defining the necessary conditions for it to work well. I would have preferred this to have been done the other way round, initially analysing the criteria that would enable the CFSP to be effective and subsequently develop institutional mechanisms from the criteria. CFSP effectiveness depends on two preliminary conditions, a realistic budget allowing initiatives to be financed and a network of external representatives to guarantee an objective and serious basis for orientations that are to be kept to. The Commission refers to these conditions but after having designed the institutional structure in which "the centre of gravity of the political initiative and the implementation of the coherency of the different actions are located within the Commission". Before adding this affirmation with a tone that is quite peremptory, it is necessary in my opinion to explore three aspects (the list is limitless).
A. How to define the procedures to be applied? There are political decisions on which the outcome of either war or peace depend. It is true that the Commission rules out military operations from the field of action determined by Community procedures and decisions made by the majority; but it is the political decisions themselves that sometimes determine military intervention; we've seen this with Afghanistan and we could see it in the future with Iraq. Certain Member States have permanent seats on the UN Security Council and the right of veto; it is necessary for these powers to be jointly exercised so that the Union can take fundamental decisions. Nobody would envisage decisions on nuclear weapons being taken by around thirty EU countries deciding by majority qualified voting on a Commission proposal, and nobody would want this either. But how can a political decision on CFSP issues by reached, which would require a military decision being made by the Member States? How could a clear distinction on the issue be established?
B. How to safeguard autonomy and the collegiate character of the Commission? The hypothesis of inserting Mr CFSP into the ranks of the Commission warrants much attention. The current weight wielded by Mr Solana in the world is tied to the fact that those who meet or listen to him know that he is expressing the position of Member States or the great majority of them. This simple consideration will require that the Commission's right of initiative in the CFSP field be radically modified in relation to the right of initiative in other fields if Mr CFSP becomes a European Commissioner. Let's look at a recent example, reform of the Common Fisheries Policy. There are significant repercussions to the Commission's initiative, which will be decisive because the Commission has acted in total independence on the basis of acting in the European interest. It has dared to take a crucial initiative, which without intergovernmental procedure would never have existed. The reach and effectiveness of a Commission initiative are linked to its independence and ability to act without the prior consensus of Member States. In CFSP matters the opposite is true, the weight of a European initiative is linked to support from Member States and the fact that this support is obtained in advance and made known. Mr CFSP is unable to take decisions that other Member States could reject. It is therefore necessary to assess whether Mr CFSP in the role of European Commissioner would not threaten to reduce the autonomy and political freedom of the Commission and compromise its collegial character. It is obvious that the Commission proposals on foreign policy cannot be prepared according to traditional procedures with documents being sent in all directions, different Heads of Cabinet meetings for the different Commissioners to express their worries or request amendments and a definitive debate, as well as a possible Commission vote. The procedure will have to be significantly altered if Mr CFSP can be a Commissioner just like the others.
C. How can a stable Presidency at the "Foreign Affairs "Council. Be created? The third question regards reform of the Council. The possible end to the six-month rotation of the Presidency calls for further exploration of a more stable Presidential system. The ideal President of the "Foreign Affairs Council" would be Mr CFSP. Mr Barnier, however, believes that the Commission should not preside over the Council because it has to preserve its "specific role" and safeguard the system of "power-sharing by providing it with clarity and legitimacy". Consequently, if Mr CFSP becomes a Commissioner, he ought not to preside over the Foreign Affairs Council. Mr Barnier's thesis is based on perfectly good reasons; a Council President must find compromises between the different national positions, whereas the Commission must, as a general rule, defend its project if it considers that it corresponds to the general European interest. The roles are radically different. I would say that the attitudes regarding a debate at the Council on such a difficult and controversial subject is tackled by both the President and Commission still remain opposed. But at the same time, CFSP considerations formulated in the last paragraph will make Mr CFSP's Presidency of the Foreign Affairs Council appear quite appropriate. How can this contradiction be reconciled?
A starting point. I hope that the aims in this chronicle are clear, it does not intend to criticise the Commission document, an essential contribution to the work of the Convention but rather, emphasise that it is just a starting point and not the end result, as well as pointing out that different aspects need to be refined. Someone who is convinced that it is essential to safeguard the Community Method cannot oppose the fundamental direction of this document. If this method is ruled out from CFSP matters and the "third pillar", everything will be compromised. The Prodi/Barnier/Vittorino document was therefore necessary but the institutional mechanism requires further exploration and imagination.
Mr Barnier declared in a recent interview, "Some of our ideas will probably be taken up straight away, other in a few years or much late. What is important, is to not close the door definitively… This won't shock me if we decide to proceed in stages, if the High Representative of Foreign Policy does not immediately become the Vice President of the Commission if we go in the right direction". I can see that it's the same approach as Mr Lammassoure in his contribution on CFSP at the Convention, a clear perspective on getting there but accompanied by an appropriate transitional period. Michel Barnier added that, "we haven't come up with a proposal that's going to be accepted or dropped tomorrow morning". Everything therefore still needs to be discussed. At the beginning of July we'll have Jacques Delors' opinion, which could cast a new light on things.
Oral and written. I would like to conclude this perhaps rather doctrinaire chronicle, on a savoury dialogue, in full plenary session at the Convention, between Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and two Members who wanted an idea of what the President was going to say in his first Summit report on 21 June in Seville. The chronicler is Convention Member, Olivier Duhamel. Question to the President, "Can you send us your written report?" Answer, "Impossible, it's an oral report". Question, "Is it possible to give us a few words, orally, on what you are going to say, orally, to the Heads of Government?" Answer, "I will answer you in writing". Quoting from memory, explains Olivier Duhamel, but assuring us that this is exactly what he heard.