CFSP is a priority but… Opinion polls indicate that Europeans place Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) among the priority areas for the future extension of European powers. The Convention President, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, already indicated that an "operational proposal" on CFSP is part of this draft Constitutional Treaty, adding: it is crucial that the Convention leads to concrete proposals favouring a common external policy clearly perceived by public opinion. Moreover, in his New York speech, he anticipated a few guidelines. The European Commission proposed to adopt, new week, its first contribution towards the Convention, which notably relates to CFSP. The debate in this issue will thus rapidly develop. It is a positive realisation. Though at the same time it is a source for concern. Because, if the principal is clear - CFSP must be strengthened and developed - the methods are not. Even progress and innovation, apparently the most evident, require some thought.
Between Mr Patten and Mr Solana. Let us take the famous case of double employment, so often denounced, between the European Commissioner responsible for external relations, Mr Chris Patten, and the High Representative Javier Solana. Those who are favourable towards the progressive implementation of the Community method to CFSP feel that this dual responsibility must go: a Commission Vice-President should assume the tasks that are shared today. Though, even this straightforward operation hides pitfalls. If the Commission's authority remains unchanged, the result would be that the Commission Vice-President would act on instruction from the Council, and the principal of the Commission's independence could be undermined from within. It is true that in certain areas, for example in trade negotiations, the Commission acts on a mandate from the Council; though within this mandate, it is the Commission that negotiates, and it is the Commission which proposes the EU's positions in complete autonomy. To what extent would this be possible for CFSP? Moreover, the Vice-President responsible for CFSP should respect the legitimate requirement of reserve and secrecy, which could make practically impossible any frank and open debate in Commission, on the hot spots of foreign policy, and all clear and innovative stances.
For some time, several European parliamentarians have told me that the parliamentary hearings by Chris Patten are more open and dynamic, thus more interesting, than those by Javier Solana. Why? Because Mr Solana must religiously stick to the Council's official position, while Mr Patten may allow himself a certain degree of autonomy and straight talking. It is necessary to avoid the Commission becoming a sort of high-level secretariat for the Council through CFSP, which would necessarily retain, for a very long period of time, a clear cut intergovernmental character.
Traps of the majority system. The introduction into CFSP of majority deliberations deserves as much consideration. Are the governments that do not hesitate in calling for it aware that they find themselves sometimes, or even often, in the minority? They could see Europe adopt positions concerning the hottest aspects of world affairs, opposed to their convictions, but which they nevertheless have to follow? The former French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hubert Vedrine, has formulated, it seems, a few remarks on this issue, before leaving his ministerial duties. In his opinion, neither the political leaders nor public opinion have, as yet, integrated into their considerations a seemingly evident realisation: the "institutional jump" of CFSP implies that each country should renounce certain positions that it considers to be cornerstones of its policy. France in particular would risk, in his opinion, finding itself often in the minority, for example over African issues and, globally, the Atlantic relationship (that is to say, for him, the alignment with American positions) would gain strength. In an enlarged EU, the formula of majority deliberations would not necessarily lead to a clear and effective European foreign policy, but to often-contradictory compromises. It is thus necessary, according to Mr Vedrine, to consider other formulas, based for example on "cores" of Member States, who have particular responsibilities on a specific subject. This direction reminds me of what a former Permanent Representative asserted; we cannot put France in a minority with regards to Algeria, or Greece over Cyprus. It is necessary to take the history, traditional ties and realities into account.
These remarks in no way mean that the developments in CFSP are impossible today, but that the questions I have raised (there are others) merit thought. This is an area where it is not allowed to improvise. Giscard d'Estaing was right to assert that the Convention must present precise proposals, but they must be studied without dogmatism, nor prior position. (F.R.)