Strasbourg, 06/05/2002 (Agence Europe) - Regarding the particular situation of Diane Pretty, British national born in 1958 and struck down by lateral amyotrohpic sclerosis (incurable neuro-degenerative diseases leading to the gradual paralysis of the muscles), the European Court of Human Rights dealt as a priority the case submitted to it in view of recognising the person, almost wholly paralysed, the right to be assisted by her husband to commit suicide. In its ruling, passed down on 29 April, the Court unanimously observed the lack of any provision in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) of a nature to oblige a State to authorise assisted suicide. The ruling does not place back into question legislation authorising euthanasia.
Initially, Ms. Pretty had asked the British legal ministry not to prosecute her husband should he assist her in committing suicide. Whereas English law does not ban suicide, it assimilates to homicide or complicity to homicide the fact of helping a third person to commit suicide. The "Director of Public Prosecutions" reaffirmed the principle by which any individual or group of individuals is prohibited from an a priori exoneration. His refusal to make any undertaking not to prosecute Ms. Pretty's husband was confirmed by the British Courts. The plaintiff asked the European Court to note that the United Kingdom was thus misunderstanding her right to die with dignity. She claimed that this right stemmed from Article 2 of the ECHR (right to life) and that by refusing to let her to be helped to commit suicide, the United Kingdom was imposing an inhumane and degrading treatment on her, forbidden by Article 3 of the ECHR due to the extremely painful nature of the terminal phase of the Charcot disease (of the name of the French doctor who identified lateral amyotrohpic sclerosis in the 19th Century). In its ruling, the Court reaffirms that Article 2 has as goal to prohibit a State from committing any act hurting the physical integrity of a person and oblige it to guarantee this integrity. It considers that is could not be interpreted as conferring a diametrically opposite right, that of the right to die. In this sense, the ruling does not refer to the freedom of an individual, but stresses that, in the ECHR, nothing can oblige a State to authorise a third person to assist a person to die. Regarding the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment, the Court here too observes that it is not a question of preventing any attempt at the dignity of the human person and in particular any act of physical or mental torture, but states that one cannot deduce from Article 3 of the ECHR an obligation for a State to sanction acts intended to end a life, even to avoid suffering or the loss of dignity linked to an incurably sick person. The Court also considers that the general nature of the ban on assisted suicide is not disproportionate. It notes that the provision of the British law of 1961 was devised precisely to protect weak and vulnerable people, and takes account of the explanations of the British Government on the possibility of allowing the judge to inflict lesser sentences there where deemed appropriate.
This ruling has led to may comments over the past few days. Some have wanted to see in it a confirmation of the ban on euthanasia, we well as the possibility of placing back into question Dutch legislation on the issue. Belgium, where a bill de-criminalising euthanasia is currently being drawn up, basing themselves on this ruling, MPs considered that the European Court should logically note that the Belgian bill violates the ECHR. Euro-MP,Peter Liese (CDU) also welcomed the decision of the European Court as backing for palliative care and confirming that "there is no right to euthanasia". Reading of the ruling demonstrates, however, that at no time, did the Court come down in favour or against euthanasia. It simply answered the question submitted to it in a particular case, i.e., whether a State is held or not to authorise or tolerate assisted suicide. While answering negatively to that question, it makes a point of stipulating that it did not seek to determine whether the law in a given State misunderstands or not the obligation to protect the right to life and adds: "the measure by which a State allows or seeks to regulate the possibility of a free individual to have others harm them may give rise to considerations placing into conflict individual freedom and public interest for which a solution can only be found after an examination of the particular circumstances of the case in hand". It is foremost up to the State to assess the risk of abuse and the likely circumstances of any possible abuses committed that would involve a relaxation of the general ban on assisted suicides or the creation of exceptions to the principle", the Court also recognises, while stressing that, for vulnerable people suffering from a terminal illness, "there is an obvious risk of abuse, notwithstanding arguments developed as to the possibility of providing for safeguards and protective procedures".