A delicate balance. There is nothing surprising in the European Commission's proposals for the 2004-2006 financial framework for new accessions coming up against reservations, discontent and protests. That's the rule: a plan involving movements of money is always open to dispute, either by those who must cough up the money or those who are to receive it, and in most cases by both at the same time. Reactions of ill-humour are thus normal, on condition that the significance and scope of the stakes are never forgotten, by either party.
Let me explain. It often occurs that that politicians in candidate countries regret what they perceive to be the excessive importance the EU places on the technical details of negotiations, with the risk of losing sight of the broader picture: Europe's unification, the continent's stability. And some political and cultural circles in the West share this concern. Yet, if valid, it is as much so for the other side. The exact percentage of CAP aid for Eastern farmers, take a year give a year, is not an element that can define a country' success or failure in its accession to the Union! Sure, these are details that for some years to come can influence the living standards of millions of people; everything has a price. It is, therefore, necessary that the negotiators on both sides respect the balance between the political end-game of the operation and the actual repercussions of the technical aspects. This is no easy balance, as the EU cannot hand out discounts regarding the "acquis communautaire", if it does not wish to jeopardise the coherence of its construction.
Let's not speak of rejection. This preamble - which, while intending to be balanced, necessarily has the off-putting nature of a sermon - amounts to saying that one has not to dramatise the reactions coming from the different capitals. To speak of a "rejection" of the Commission's proposals on the part of one candidate country or another is, for the least, excessive, especially if the judgement precedes full knowledge of the document. Why, for example, denounce the assumed risk that a new Member State should find itself in a position of "net contributor" to the Community budget when we know full well that this possibility has been ruled out a priori, and that credits have been earmarked precisely to avoid that? Whatever the demands of domestic policy within the different countries, we have to stick to the facts and take into consideration the arguments that the Commission has used to support its proposals. These arguments can be roughly summed up as follows:
- the financial effort that the Commission is asking of the EU for the three years 2004, 2005 and 2006 is nevertheless impressive: 40 billion euro in commitment appropriations, 28 billion in payment appropriations. This means genuine financial solidarity between the current Member States and ten future Member States (all the candidates for membership, except Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey) and, by setting out a clear financial framework, it strengthens the prospects of completing negotiations with them by the end of the year;
- in exchange for what they will receive, the candidate countries would contribute some 5.5 billion euro a year to the Community budget. Whatever, no candidate country could be a "net contributor" to the Community budget in the initial years after accession. Appropriations of some 800 million euro a year will be available for compensations in case of need and to guarantee that the EU's financial support to each new Member State will not be less than what they receive under pre-accession support;
- the progressive nature of direct aid paid to farmers in the candidate countries is no response to a concern for budgetary savings but, especially, to the desire to avoid the creation, in these countries, of a privileged social category whose income would be much higher than those of other workers. In addition to direct aid, the EU will undertake to pay additional contributions to the restructuring of agriculture and rural development; this direction, focused on restructuring and aimed as increasingly disassociating aid , on the one hand, and the volume of production, on the other, has received the formal approval of WWF, finicky and severe body if ever there was one, and the EU intends making of this a pillar of its forthcoming reform of the CAP;
- for regional policy and cohesion policy in general, the Commission's proposals amount to placing at the disposal of the new Member States 25.5 billion euro over three years, corresponding to 2.6% of their GDP. This percentage (the EU's internal experience proves it) allows for an effective per capital increase in GDP in the beneficiary countries, if the appropriations are well used. One has, moreover, to take account of the countries' real "absorption capabilities", that is to say their ability to spend funds placed at their disposal effectively. Nor has one to forget the problem of the control over spending in those countries, over which the European Parliament is currently getting pretty excited (the Parliamentary Committee on Budgetary Control is in the process of examining the management of pre-accession aid);
- the Commission's plan also contains certain appropriations that were not planned for in previous financial perspectives and that have special importance for the countries directly concerned, as well as for the general interest. 60 million euro for the decommissioning of the nuclear power plant of Bohunice in Slovakia, 245 million for Ignalina in Lithuania; it's obvious that placing dangerous nuclear power plants out of service will be a great guarantee for all. Furthermore, and especially, the Commission proposes a provisional, decreasing financial instrument (200 million euro in 2004, 120 million in 2005, 60 million in 2006) to beef-up administrative services which, in a certain number of candidate countries, are responsible for implementing the "acquis communautaire", immense task and - for some of these countries - perilous. The Phare programme is already intervening robustly in supporting this task, but additional effort as accession looms is not asking too much.
Taking account of public opinion. This added funding provides Commissioner Verheugen's invitation all its significance when he calls on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe: not only to focus on a single aspect of the Commission's document, not to go to war against the agricultural chapter without taking account of other chapters, as the present plan is a whole, and if one particular aspect seems disappointing to one country or another, another aspect will provide a compensation.
A second general consideration should be obvious, but I have the impression that it is at times forgotten. Here it is: it's not the Commission that decides. The document we are discussing is but an overall framework submitted to the Council. It has to be approved by Member States as overall guideline, and then transformed into an EU negotiating stance in relation to each applicant country. The Commission had to take account of certain constraints, the main one being the obligation to remain within the framework of the "financial perspectives" set at the Berlin Summit in 1999, valid until 2006. And Verheugen has stressed before the European Parliament that the candidate countries have not to imagine that what the Commission is proposing represents a negotiating position, a point of departure that may be substantially altered. In fact, the Commission is proposing what is politically and financial feasible, and believes that the room for manoeuvre that remains is limited, as no Member State is prepared to review the financial perspectives 2000/2006 (Chancellor Schroeder and President Chirac have just recalled this explicitly). The EU's foreign ministers are currently having an initial exchange of views on the Commissions document; they will not reach conclusions, but certain individual stances may already have weight.
I would like to add a final remark: though it be true that the governments of the candidate countries must take account of their public opinion, they have not to forget that there is also a public opinion in Western Europe. And it is not always easy. Both EU institutions and national authorities must pursue their work of conviction, better to have the real significance of enlargement understood, and the EU's political and moral responsibility in achieving it, and to highlight the positive nature of the enterprise, economically too. But the preliminary debates within the European Parliament show that the task will not be easy. According to Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Germany's current budgetary situation has been caused by the enormous transfers of financial resources to the former East Germany, and this effect of the "small enlargement" can only hint at what the financial efforts of the "large enlargement" will be. Arie Oostlander said he was concerned because, in the Netherlands, part of the press is announcing a "financial disaster" for the EU due to enlargement. These are not rational predictions, but demonstrate that public opinion needs convincing, not bullying.
Romania, Bulgaria, the northern part of Cyprus. I would like to end with two observations. The first concerns the two countries of Central and Eastern Europe that are not covered by the Commission's document: Romania and Bulgaria. Mr. Prodi and Mr. Verheugen have placed emphasis on the need to send these two countries strong and substantial "political signals", to provide for special support for them, support adapted to their needs and to step-up accession negotiations with them. They have to be made to understand that they have not been sidelined, but, on the contrary, we're waiting for them. In addition, Romania is already taking into consideration the possibility of speeding-up its accession timetable: 2005 or 2006 (instead of 2007 as is currently scheduled in official texts).
The second observation concerns the two Mediterranean candidates. Attention is focused on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, but Cyprus and Malta must not be forgotten, which are on the whole prepared. Remains, of course, the problem of the division of Cyprus. A month ago, it represented one of the Commission's main concerns. Now, the fact that the Commission should have provided for specific and growing funding in its document for the northern part of the island (the one inhabited by ethnic Turks) shows to what extent the situation has evolved. It's a positive note worth stressing. (F.R.)