What can be taken for granted and what cannot yet. Following the debates and votes in the European Parliament, following the sketch of the "Laeken Declaration" drawn up by the President of the European Council, Guy Verhofstadt, following the stances taken by Romano Prodi and Michel Barnier, we are beginning to see the light of day regarding the Convention that is to prepare the EU's umpteenth institutional reform. Without returning to the texts or the debates themselves (for which the best source is probably our daily bulletins of last week), I shall add a few observations and stress some points that may be taken for granted:
- the Convention, its nature, its significance, are taking form. This remark may seem banal today, but only a few weeks ago nothing could be taken for granted, and compared to last year, this is a revolution. Governments have given up on the classical procedures that previously ensured them control and monopoly over decisions, and, once the Convention is launched, they will not be able to ignore the results it comes up with. The rapporteur, Jo Leinen rightly said that: "for the first time, a European treaty will be drawn up together by parliaments and governments" and not couched in the secrecy of diplomatic negotiations.
- some differences of direction between Parliament and the European Commission (already mentioned here regarding an address by Michel Barnier) have been confirmed. See below for the details;
- parliament has called for the Convention to discuss the "system of the presidencies of the Council". Jacques Delors recently qualified as "stupid" the current system by which, in the enlarged EU, each Member State will have the prospect of chairing the Council for six months...every 13-and-a-half years (see this section of 14 November). So far, no government has dared placed into question the half-yearly rotation;
- in its resolution, Parliament inserted some additional hardy institutional demands, including, notably: a) the Commission's president will have to be appointed by Parliament; b) the judges of the Court of Justice and Court of First Instance must be appointed by Member States through a qualified majority; c) full EP participation in decision-making procedures concerning trade policy, external economic relations and "enhanced co-operation" must be introduced. These are not demands easy to secure; but should the Convention take them on board, all will then be possible;
- according to Parliament, the "pause for reflection" between the end of the Convention and the beginning of the conclusive International Conference must not exceed three months, so as to avoid the Convention's results losing their edge and being less present in minds when governments begin conclusive deliberations.
Who will nominate the Convention's chair? There are two essential differences between the Commission and Parliament. The first is the appointment of the Convention's chair. According the Parliament, he or she should be elected by the Convention itself. Romano Prodi, on the other hand, favours appointment by the EU Summit, as a chair appointed by the heads of government and enjoying their support "will be better placed to create the climate of confidence necessary between the Convention and the European Council, essential condition for success" and will more easily secure his or her participation in the International Conference that will take the final decisions. The Commission President has asked Parliament to give more thought to this issue. The "grand manoeuvres" surrounding the candidates for this responsibility raise perplexities; in the waltz of names and support, it is not always easy to understand who is being frank and who prefers tactical shenanigans.
Safeguarding the level of ambitions. The second difference, the more important one, relates to the Convention's end goal. Parliament holds a stance by which the Convention must provide itself with a procedure enabling it to draw up a single and coherent proposal through consensus to submit to the IGC "being the only basis for negotiations and decisions" for Member States. Romano Prodi maintains the well-known objection: there is a risk that a broad consensus may only be found by seriously reducing "our ambitions". According to him, the Convention has to submit "strong options" to governments, accompanied by weaker minority options, so as not to "lower the level of ambition within the Convention already, even before the work of the IGC begins". Need I again repeat that I share the opinion of the President of the Commission, which was already that of Mr. Barnier?.
Other differences concern the optimal number of members of the Presidium that will assist the chair of the Convention, and other minor issues (leaving aside for now the question of the institutional autonomy of the future vanguard, on which the Commission remains silent). (F.R.)