Paris, 27/08/2001 (Agence Europe) - "Although they remained quite consistent and persistent in their condemnation of the behaviour of NATO and the United States, Russia's leaders nevertheless manifested a clear desire to improve mutual relations" with the West, during and after the NATO operation, Allied Force in Serbia, in 1999. This is affirmed by Charlotte Wagnsson in issue 28 of the "Occasional Papers" published by the WEU Institute for Security Studies, entitled "Developing the 'moral' arguments: Russian rhetorical strategies on security post-Kosovo". Ms Wagnsson, who teaches at the Department for Strategic Studies at the Swedish National Defence College, was a visiting fellow at the WEU Institute. She analyses the language and behaviour of the Russian leaders during and after the NATO campaign in Serbia. She notes that, although their rhetoric was "relatively pro-Western during the period 1992-97", from 1999 the Russian leaders had "officially interpreted the bombings [by NATO] as an attempt to impose the United States' will in world politics, thus reinforcing a unipolar world order". The Russian leaders had then condemned what they called the "theories of humanitarian intervention", urging for a stronger role for the UN and its Security Council, recalls Ms Wagnsson, who stresses that they had also appealed for a "joint struggle against separatism and terrorism in areas such as Kosovo and Chechnya". The Russian leaders have "elaborated increasingly on what could be termed moral - or 'ethical' - aspects of international relations", notes Ms Wagnsson, adding that "their version of international ethics was morally superior and ought to apply", and that Russia carried out a worthy mission, standing up for democratic values, for the common good of the civilised world". "A strategy of cooperation with the West was thus maintained during the period in question. Notably, Moscow promoted cooperation with the EU, reacting positively to the EU's initiatives of taking on a larger share of responsibility in the sphere of security", writes Ms Wagnsson. She stresses that the European Union is "important to Russia as a significant pole in a multipolar world, operating as a counterbalance to the United States" and that, from a Russian point of view, "European Security and Defence Policy may be interpreted as a step toward multipolarity". Even if the future EU Rapid Reaction Force is developed in collaboration with the Alliance, "it will not be NATO, which, from a Russian perspective, is a most significant advantaged", writes the author. Ms Wagnsson quotes at this point from the work by David Gowan, "How the EU can Help Russia", published by the Centre for European Reform in London, which suggests that Russia "could be integrated in the ESDP, e.g. by offering assets in support of an EU-led crisis-management operation, such as heavy-lift transport aircraft or satellite intelligence". Regarding the disagreement between the Union and Russia over Chechnya, Ms Wagnsson predicts that, whatever the EU policy may be, Russia will no doubt "keep pursuing a hard line vis-à-vis the breakaway republic", and that, if this line is seriously challenged, "it might become less transparent regarding developments in the republic".
Ms Wagnsson's comes to the conclusion that it will perhaps become increasingly difficult for Russian leaders to "continue promoting their version of morality while simultaneously pleading for closer relations with the West". She goes on to say that it is not at all clear that Russia will be able to "build a functional strategic partnership with a Western community that sanctions military intervention in defence of human rights, because to do so would be to condone precisely the kind of morality and code of conduct in international relations that it rejects".
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