The unexpected Prodi. The latest developments have made the link between institutional reform and accession negotiations inextricable. The link has always existed, but the Irish vote against the Treaty of Nice and the remarks by Romano Prodi have complicated the situation. The Commission president's comment on the legal possibility of achieving enlargement without ratification of the Treaty of Nice was unexpected as it was not at all necessary to bring this element into an already confused debate. It is true that Mr Prodi then forcefully insisted on the political need to ratify the Treaty, but his remark about legality has made its way, like a worm that gnaws into and eats away the fruit from the inside.
Havoc wreaked by the Irish "no". The origin of the complications is obviously the Irish "no". As the days pass, I become increasingly convinced that the strategy consisting of minimising this vote and considering it as temporary is inane. Two days in Prague with the possibility of listening to several parliamentary ministers, academics and journalists gave me confirmation that the Irish "no" has caused damage. Adding to the unfavourable opinion polls mainly in Germany and Austria, the "no" reinforces in political circles and in the public opinion of the Czech Republic the sensation of reticence on the part of the EU, a feeling that the official declarations fail to dissipate and which probably also exists in other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. And yet you only have to walk in the streets of Prague to feel deeply, physically, the extent to which these peoples and towns and villages are at the very heart of our civilisation. What a waste! How sad!
The "second division" does not exist. Is it still possible to give a little impetus and enthusiasm to this reunification of Europe that is sliding into disenchantment and gloom? No doubt, mainly considering the level of ambition that the highest leaders of the candidate countries have for the future of Europe. Not only in their bilateral contacts with EU governments but also in the multilateral meetings (like that, recently, organised by IRRI - see our bulletin of 28 June, p.4), several Prime Ministers took a stance in favour of an integrated Europe that is able to affirm its civilisation in the world and its economic and social model. Of course, it is out of the question, mainly in this editorial, to slip into the rhetoric of the "into my arms" style or into the facility of insufficiently rigorous negotiations. The acquis communautaire, a heritage that has been compiled over half a century of gradually building up a united Europe, remains intangible. There is no "order of priority" between deepening and enlargement, which are two parallel requirements, at the same level and of the same value. But the sometimes bitter nature of negotiations should in no way give the impression that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have the aim of joining a second class Europe. As soon as a country fulfils the necessary conditions and becomes a member, it will have exactly the same rights and the same duties as the current Union members. And it is in this sense that I interpret the very firm stance taken by the French European Affairs Minister in the last part of his article on the "French vision" of the future Europe (see this heading in EUROPE of 28 June). Given the disappointment noted in certain candidate countries, Mr Moscovici forcefully pointed out that France "refuses a two-speed Europe where new Member States - and some of the current members - are relegated to a second division in such an authoritative and lasting way".
Vanguard will remain open. Pierre Moscovici was right to reject such a project, and I hope that no-one has ever thought of it. Another thing is to create the conditions for a vanguard from now on, or a pioneer group, that could allow a move towards integration, while not allowing Europe to be reduced to a free trade area even if a certain number of countries reject the ambitious projects. Is Mr Moscovici convinced that the model of Europe that he sketched out on behalf of France will receive unanimous support? Many well-informed minds do not believe so, and they want to prevent the ambitious vision of the future Europe from being spoilt by the search for a cheap compromise to make everyone happy. It is therefore indispensable to safeguard the possibility of a vanguard open to all, in which the Central and Eastern European States will be welcomed. There will be no exclusion but only self-exclusion. Mr Moscovici himself states, moreover, that "in a wider and more heterogeneous Europe, it will be necessary to allow certain Member States to implement more ambitious policies between them", without being held up by the others but leaving them the possibility to join later on. It is exactly that. The differences of the "Moscovici formula" compared to the vanguard concern the hypothesis of separate strengthened cooperations, between Member States that would not always be the same, and the institutional aspect. Two major differences, but differences that can be smoothed out. (F.R.).