He wonders not, he affirms. Valery Giscard d'Estaing, former President of the French Republic, has reintroduced one element into the debate on the future of Europe which had been temporarily sidelined for reasons of appropriateness, that of "two Europes", which he had himself defined in his time: "Space Europe" and "Power Europe". He did so not by asking: to whom are the different projects flourishing in the European garden addressed? To all the countries of the enlarged Europe? To the "founding members" of the community? Or to the countries of the euro zone?
We know the official response: the projects we are discussing, whether they come from Berlin, Paris or elsewhere, are addressed to all…For the former President of the French Republic, this answer doesn't make much sense In a stance (published in "Le Figaro" of 26/27 May of this year), Mr. Giscard d'Estaing provided his answers. What strikes us is the serene tone of one who has no doubts; he wonders not, he is in no way perplexed, he states: "The greater Europe is too diverse to mould itself into a federal structure (…) This is where the essential weakness of the Schroeder project appears: he takes it for granted that there is a common will in Europe on the need to build an effective political system, and that differences only relate to means. I don't believe that this common will exists today (…) It would be unrealistic to seek a high level of integration among 27". Giscard d'Estaing makes no distinction between the current Member States and the applicant countries: he cites rather the United Kingdom, the Scandinavian countries and even Spain among those likely to prove reluctant. And he sees no other solution than to separate "the many and diversified whole" (Europe of 27, and more later) and the "European political power". According to him, the latter will be "continental", as any chance of seeing Great Britain agreeing to a federal structure is minimum". For the larger whole, the only problem that arises is to make it function, "in other words to use contemporary vocabulary, it's a problem of governance". In fact, for the former President, "objective data determine the choices of the future: a European Community with a federal structure, built within the vaster workings of the greater Europe".
A dangerous game. You may remember that Jacques Delors had reached similar conclusions a few years back already. If he has placed this aspect on the burner for now, it's probably to avoid any misunderstanding over his total backing for EU enlargement, and to avoid the game of the lists of countries: this one yes, the other no, etc.. It is moreover understandable that the highest-level politicians stick to presenting their vision, leaving the rest of the debate in question up to those who share that vision. But it is important to avoid another dangerous game: the temptation to smooth the rough edges, to render projects acceptable to all, which would remove all scale and coherence.
Results of self-exclusions. For those interested in this problem, I advise the essay by Robert Toulemon: "What constitution for What Europe?" (in May's issue of the "Revue de marche commun et de l'Union europeenne"). The former Director General of the Commission, today notably active in the European Movement, devoted the final part of his essay to the question that lies at the centre of this chronicle. He writes: "the concept of differentiation in integration (already a fact with Schengen and the euro, to which must be added the exemptions secured by Denmark regarding defence and citizenship) seems to be a necessity in a very enlarged and heterogeneous Europe of tomorrow and thereafter". But he does not believe in a vanguard that would construct itself within the Union; he considers that "differentiation would be the outcome not of any selection but of some self-exclusions". The current candidates for accession would also be able to be part of the vanguard. If they hesitate in transferring to the EU a significant fraction of their sovereignty, and if for that reason "they prefer to distance themselves from the central core, it would be their business", but in no way must they be excluded. The British problem is similar: "either Her Majesty's Government manages to convince the English to accept the euro and, with the euro, federal Europe, or else it will have to resign itself to a derogatory status that would not enable it to impede progress desired by others, notably in the economic and social field" (but nothing would prevent the U.K. from participating in a common defence policy).
How to achieve this objective? Through a Constitution, or a Constitutional Pact, that would emerge from the process that has just begun. Its particularity in relation to treaties negotiated in traditional diplomatic forms, would be the fact of taking effect when ratified by a simple or qualified majority of States, the others being offered "a status guaranteeing their rights". (F.R.)