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Europe Daily Bulletin No. 7960
Contents Publication in full By article 10 / 37
GENERAL NEWS / (eu) eu/competition

Commission adopts three important decisions concerning competition (Landesbanken, Holzmann and Glaxo) presented in detail by Commissioner Monti - Commission grants German public law credit institutions until March 2002

Brussels, 08/05/2001 (Agence Europe) - Other than the adopting of a joint proposal from Commissioners Pascal Lamy (trade), Erkki Liikanen (enterprise and information society) and Mario Monti (competition) presenting the European strategy in the face of the dispute opposing the EU against South Korea in the shipyard sector (see below), the Commission took, on 8 May, three important decisions concerning competition, commented upon at length before the press by Commissioner Monti, responsible for the dossier. The first concerns the State guarantees given to German public banks, with the formal request to the German government to modify, by March 2002, the system enforced to bring it into line with the European legislation concerning State aids; the second is the authorisation of restructuring aids in favour of Philipp Holzmann AG; the third in the ban on the dual pricing system practised by the pharmaceutical company Galxo Wellcome (GW) in Spain. Here, in the details, is the content of these three decisions:

  • State guarantees for German public banks: after having redoubled over the last months the contacts with the German government over the system of State guarantees enjoyed by the public law credit institutions ("Anstaltslast" and "Ghewahtragerhaftung"), the European Commission has just adopted a decision in which it calls in a formal manner on the German government to accept to modify the system of guarantees presently enforced to make it compatible with the system for State aid foreseen by the EC Treaty and to take the "appropriate measures". This decision had been raised last 26 April by Commissioner Monti following a meeting with the German Secretary of State for Finance Caio Koch-Weser meeting, which he qualified as "constructive" and "fruitful". Mr Monti had stated on this occasion that concrete positions where emerging and that it was appropriate, as a result, to anchor them in an established procedure (see EUROPE of 27 April). The German authorities are today invited to present, by the end of September, concrete proposals on the modifications that they intend to make. It is important to note, at this stage, that the German system existed before the entry into force of the EC Treaty in 1957, and that the Commission can only ask for modifications afterwards for the "existing" aids and not act retroactively for the previous aids. Let us recall that the procedure had been opened by a letter dated 26 January in which the Community competition services felt that, following a preliminary investigation launched following a complaint filed on 21 December 1999 by the European banking Federation, the system of guarantees in question constituted a form of State aid, incompatible with the common market.

The German government now has two months, as of the date of receiving the letter that has just been sent, to accept our request. It will then have until the end of September to present detailed proposals and end March (2002) to implement them, stated Mr Monti. It will generally retain the choice of specific solutions to favour, as long as they are in accordance with Community law, he added. The Commissioner indicated that a prorogation could nevertheless be a granted, if the Commission considers it necessary and justified, to allow for a harmonious transition of certain public banks. It is necessary to examine this case by case, adapted to a changing environment, he noted. The modifications should take place on the basis of a global model, foreseeing the abolition of the "Gewahrtragerhaftung" and a revision of the "Anstaltslast" in order for the State interventions to be subject to Commission checks. Within this global model, Germany will be able to prepare specific solution for certain banks (notably the break-up of the Westdeutsche Landesbank into two entities, see EUROPE of 12 and 13 February, p.11, but the Commission indicated that it does not have, at present, detailed information on all the solutions considered. If the government decided, improbably, to reject the appropriate measures proposed, the Commission would then find itself forced to enforce the following stage foreseen by the rule applicable to State aid, namely the implementation of a formal procedure against Germany.

  • Authorisation of aid in favour of Philipp Holzmann AG: The Commission also announced that its inquiry on the subject of aid to the German company Holzmann closed with a positive decision. It considers in fact that the company's restructuring plan is of a kind that restores long-term viability, an essential condition set out in European rules on aid for the restructuring of companies in difficulty.

Holzmann had opened bankruptcy procedure on 23 November 1999 after having discovered debts of EUR 1.2 billion which had not been included in its accounts records. With the support of Chancellor Schröder, the government had announced in December this same year that the public bank, Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), had announced a loan of EUR 76.7 million over 18-30 months, together with a.State guarantee of EUR 63.9 million. On the basis of this commitment, the banks came to an agreement on an improvement plan representing in total over EUR 1.5 billion, for financing in which they participated at over 90%. After an initial examination, the Commission had decided in January 2000 to open an indepth inquiry as it doubted that measures envisaged were compatible with the common market, mainly concerning the return to viability and the measures foreseen to offset competition distortion. In addition, the Commission had received very little information on the plan envisaged, for which it only had a very summary version. After having received the missing elements in April, the Commission was able to close the formal procedure and decided to authorise aid. The decisive element was that aid was relatively low compared to all the financial measures envisaged and competition distortion had been offset by measures of considerable magnitude limiting the presence of the enterprise on the market with, above all, a reduction in the number of staff, the closure of regional offices and disinvestment (rationalisation plans, sale or closure) in subsidiaries where Holzmann was present, mainly in Germany but also in other Member States. Commissioner Monti specified that this positive decision did not yet mean that the company was out of trouble but that it now had a precious tool for getting back on the road to profitability. In order for the operation to be a success, it is necessary for the measures envisaged to be taken very rapidly and for the situation in the construction sector in Germany not to worsen. In its assessment, the Commission also considered that Holzmann had modified the restructuring plan foreseen at the end of 2000 and that it had obtained in this context, from banks, a new credit line of EUR 256 million, as well as a credit line of EUR 63.9 million from KfW, both for one year. These measures had become indispensable because of the delay in the sale of assets as well as the fact that aid had not yet been released.

  • Prohibition of dual pricing system by Glaxo Wellcome in Spain: Furthermore, the Commission decided to prohibit the dual pricing system that Glaxo Wellcome (GW) had brought in for all its pharmaceutical products in Spain in order to limit parallel trade within the single market. According to this system, GW makes it an obligation for its wholesalers in Spain to pay a higher price for products that they export to other Member States than for the same products intended for the Spanish home market. In 1998, Glaxo Wellcome (having merged with SmithklineBeecham) had notified these new sales conditions in Spain to the Commission for approval, but four complaints had been filed by wholesalers and wholesale associations for pharmaceutical products involved in this parallel trade. GW does not challenge the fact that the system in question tends to hamper parallel trade, but claims that it does not restrict competition. In its view, the price differences between Member States are a result of differences between the regulatory measures adopted by each of the national governments, measures that not only concern the fixing of sales prices but also the reimbursement of pharmaceutical products. GW above all highlights the considerable price difference between Spain, where there are regulatory maximum prices, and the United Kingdom, where company profits are ceilinged but where companies are in principle free to fix their own prices …

The Commission considers that this system is detrimental to the integration of the national markets and reduces price competition for GW products. It did not accept any of the arguments put forward by the company. On one hand, it considers that GW is not content with accepting prices fixed by Spanish authorities as, in fact, there is always a possibility of negotiation. For four products, GW has even negotiated price rises. On the other hand, the parallel trade level depends on other factors of a non-regulatory kind such as exchange rate fluctuations. Finally, the Commission was not convinced by the argument that the losses suffered due to parallel trade seriously affect the R&D budget devoted to the development of medicines. "Pharmaceutical companies (…) cannot put in place distribution arrangements which perpetuate the partitioning of the single market into national markets", commented Mr Monti. Also, "parallel trade is often the only form of competition possible in the pharmaceuticals sector, given the patents held by companies", he added. GW, which had no fines imposed on it, will nonetheless have to put an immediate end to the system and must inform the Commission within two months of the measures it has taken to this end.

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