Forget Nice. Forget Nice, that would already not be all that bad, as outcome of the Franco-German meeting in Strasbourg on Wednesday. Forget, in the sense of putting an end to misunderstandings, incomprehension, resentment and rancour that the Summit of Nice left behind it. Some of the polemics now seem sterile, while remaining unfortunate. To continue discussing whether Nice was a success or failure would serve no purpose. Fact is, both are true. Nice was a failure, because the institutional reform is not brilliant: the functioning of the Council will be more complicated than before, and, as for the Commission, we shall have to start from scratch, or almost. We shall not once again develop what has already been developed in this same section. At the same time, Nice was a success due to the simple fact that a compromise (limp) was reached which allows for the resumption of enlargement negotiations, as the new "enhanced cooperation" formula could prove to be valuable and even revolutionary, and because the results other than institutional (economy, social, defence, etc.) are positive. The detractors of Nice tend all too often to forget this last element.
The Fault of the Presidency. To make the French Presidency carry the can for the semi-failure in institutional matters is just as unnecessary and largely unfair. France took a clear stance in favour of a reduced Commission, but that tendency only received minority support within the Fifteen, minority within the Commission, and rejected by candidate countries. Should the Presidency have tried to stick to its stance? Arrogance. Should it have accepted the insignificant compromise that was finally reached? Weakness, and failure for the reform. Not easy to play the role of referee under these conditions! Personally, I blame the Presidency for a single error: the abolition of two Commissioners for large countries (as long as all the "small" have a permanent Commissioner, the "large" should retain two, the Commission would be more balanced).
French susceptibilities. Over and above these details, if the polemic in France is virulent and does not seem to be abating, it's because the debate surrounding Nice has touched upon some very raw nerves linked to national prestige. In particular, for the first time it was a question of abandoning the principle of institutional equality between France and Germany. Could the latter in future have more weight than all the other countries in European institutions? Simply speaking about it was a shock. Some reactions in France can only be explained by hurt pride. That of Jean-Louis Bourlandes, for example, European parliamentarian often at the forefront of Community integration who qualified the outcome of Nice as "France's greatest diplomatic post-war defeat" (in Le Figaro). One can only wonder what he would have written if Chirac had agreed to the "uncoupling" of votes in Council between Germany and France. According to Bourlanges, Europe and "France's rank" are footing the bill for the operation; he claims (and this is clearly over the top) that France has "abandoned control of the European Parliament to the Germans". In fact, he sees the triumph of a "soft Europe" in which the traditional Franco-German driving force is replaced by an "immobile triangle" Germany/United Kingdom/Spain. Conclusion: he wants the Treaty of Nice to be rejected.
Official German moderation. Fortunately, official German reactions have been moderate and appeasing. Be it Chancellor Schroeder himself or the opposition (Karl Lamers' reply to Jean-Louis Bourlanges), the tone seems reassuring: Germany seeks no national hegemony as it wants to be increasingly "European". But French susceptibilities are so raw right now that even the Chancellor's stances in favour of integration are felt in Paris as pressure ("France has no wish to be shoved", a French diplomat told Jean Quatremer, journalist with Liberation). And yet, although some things should be forgotten, for others forgetting others would be unforgivable. Not long ago, the great fear of Europeans was that the new political generation in Germany should ignore or neglect the reasons and ideals that lay at the root of the politics of Adenauer, Schmidt, Kohl, and that it should pursue national power politics. Germany has 20 million more inhabitants than the other "large countries", Germany has a much higher GDP, Germany has the strongest currency. In a European intergovernmental system its weight would be such that one could speak of hegemony. But then we have the Chancellor coming down in favour of the "Community method" and for the strengthening of the European Commission, not asking to have greater power than the others within the Council, confirming that his country is giving up its national currency. And we complain!
Appeal by Chancellor Schroeder to France. It's true that Chancellor Schroeder could have been a little more cautious and not "upset" France with such peremptory statements. But all points to him having done so precisely to reassure, to prove that nothing has changed in Germany's European commitment. From a Community point of view, it's the French silence that is of concern, not Germany's frankness! Each word, each comma of the Chancellor's speech at the International Forum of the Bertelsmann Foundation, ten days ago, is an appeal to France, to the Franco-German entente in favour of putting Europe back on track: "between an intergovernmental Europe and an integrated Europe, Paris and Bonn must come down in favour of an integrated Europe. The new quality of Franco-German cooperation must allow for a strengthening of the Commission. We must think and act in the perspective of integration and not cooperation between governments." Sure, these are only statements of principle, and the importance will come at the time of putting them into practice. But the direction is clear.
France is not sixteenth century Florence. It's France that is hesitating, as we cannot hear it, outside some stances often fortunate and welcome but partial and sporadic, by Mr. Vedrine and Mr. Moscovici. Jacques Chirac's speech in Berlin has become famous for a few sentences and some spectacular words, but the choice between the intergovernmental method and the Community method was dubious, and that's the least we can say. We are told that Mr. Jospin will take a stance in March. We're looking forward to that. It's obvious that cohabitation does not facilitate clarity. France has meritoriously succeeded in presenting a single face to the outside despite the two-headed nature of its government, but any effort at coherence does not guarantee an identity of views between the President and the Prime Minister on the future of Europe. And at the time of the electoral campaign, Chirac and Jospin will have to mark out their differences. One can only hope that the reason for the silence does not reside in one waiting to hear what the other has to say, to contradict it… Baldassar Castiglione recounts (in his "Cortegiano") that representatives of two large rival families, Altoviti and Alamanni, were sitting in the Council of Florence (we were at the beginning of the XVIth century). During the session, Altoviti fell asleep: awoken by his neighbour as it was his turn to speak, still not fully awake, he declared: "Sirs, I say the contrary to what Alamanni has said". The latter was astonished: "but I still haven't spoken". To which, Altoviti replied: "I say the contrary to what you will say". As this Florentine anecdote bears no relation to the French reality, may the reader consider it as a means of lightening and brightening this section.
My conclusion goes back to the beginning. In Strasbourg on Wednesday, France and Germany will not be able to define a common strategy towards Europe, as France still has no declared doctrine. But it should serve to settle recent misunderstandings and lay down the indispensable bases for future cooperation. All the more so in that, meanwhile preparations for the great debate on tomorrow's Europe are progressing at an astonishing speed.
(F.R.)