Mission accomplished. Without brilliance maybe, but with the efficiency wanted the Biarritz Summit accomplished what was expected of it. The assessment was quick to be made.
Middle East. Europe is doing what it can, that is to say nearly nothing (other than paying, it must be said one day). Europe could do more for peace as it develops its foreign, security and defence policy. The progress in this respect are pretty spectacular for what can be reasonably optimist.
Serbia. The Commission fulfilled in record time its duty by proposing a budgetary package for immediate interventions and to start to examine the projects to be financed. The Heads of Government did their part by welcoming, with the appropriate emphasis and solemnity, the new Yugoslav President. Though it is now that everything starts, and the examples of Kosovo (where the victims are now on the side of the executioner of yesterday) and of Bosnia-Herzegovina (which gives the impression of wanting to continue to live from European aid instead re-establishing its economy and administration) proves that they should not over simplify the interpretation of reality. Serbia was over demonised previously, it must not be idealised today, it must prove itself.
Oil. The Heads of Government seem aware of the need that Europe does not exclusively act under the pressure of events to then fall into inaction, once the emergency over. Whatever happens, the EU must continue, with continuation and dedication, the efforts to free itself from the excessive dependence on a single source of energy and a single cartel of suppliers. Presently, it is a whole flurry of projects and good intentions: long-term agreements with Russia, development of alternative and sustainable energies, energy savings, re-launching research… How to have the assurance that this momentum will not flounder? Neither the interests of major oil companies, nor complacency, nor the cowardice towards certain external blackmail must not weaken the rise in awareness of Europe's fragility. There does not exist any true independence for those at the mercy of a cartel to get its economy working.
Institutional reform. The Heads of Government where correct in respecting their initial programme by dedicating most of their work in Biarritz to the reform of the institutions, despite the dramatic and emotional nature of current international affairs. If it does not provide itself with the structures and means enabling it to act effectively, it is in vain that Europe acts to have weight in the world market, it would be condemned to remain a practically impotent witness of events which influence its future.
The columns tells us that the Fifteen moved forward in Biarritz over a few aspects of the reform (reinforced cooperation, extension of qualified majority voting) while on other that compromises are not yet in sight (formation of the Commission, weighting of votes in Council).
Those who know the dossiers... Let us maintain some doubts or some perplexities on the consensus over reinforced cooperation. It would be based upon a relatively wide consensus around the joint proposal by Germany and Italy. Are the Fifteen really agreed over the concept defended in this document, which explicitly excludes dispersed cooperation - a group of countries do this, another do that - and on the contrary favour the thesis of a vanguard "open and functional" (this document is published in the N°2215 of our EUROPE/Documents series). Better so, if such a consensus exists, as long as nobody can fear or favour the risk of exclusion. He who will not take part, does not want to take part.
Certainly, it is often not the political leaders who refuse: the Danish government fought courageously, as far as possible, in favour of the country's participation in the Euro, and Tony Blair continues to assert with an admirable consistency that the United Kingdom must be at the heart of Europe to play a significant role. Those who know the dossier, know where the lies interest of the United Kingdom and Denmark
(and in Sweden too) democracy is a serious issue. The day of conviction may come; but what, meanwhile, must those wanting the currency, Cfsp, Esdp and the common legal area do, as they believe that everything is necessary? They cannot wait for the good will of the others, they have the right to move forwards and form an open vanguard, even though at the outset they may only be eight.
Applicant countries have nothing to fear. Nor must countries applicants for accession fear the risk of exclusion; they will join the EU as soon as they are ready, without any additional condition, and will then be able to say whether or not they want to push forward, but not prevent others from doing so. Who today can be sure that the future new Member States will all be prepared to accept the essential delegation of sovereignty? Those who say yes will be greeted with open arms; the others will not be able to block the movement. Today, Europe would have neither its currency nor its area without borders if it had waited for a unanimous consensus, if a group of countries had not created the Schengen Accord and the Euro.
Enhanced cooperation (the title is in the singular in the Italian-German document), with the vanguard stemming from it, is a simple, clear and unquestionable goal. The same does not go for the two most controversial aspects of institutional reform, that are much more problematic: re-weighting of votes, composition of the Commission.
Much different calculations… Negotiators see the re-weighting of votes in Council from two radically different perspectives. Chancellor Schroeder observed in Biarritz that, in an enlarged EU, his country, with its population of 80 million, would have 10 votes, whereas, with the same number of inhabitants, seventeen smaller countries would have 57 votes between them. At the other extreme, Luxembourg observed that it would be inequitable that 11 out of 27 countries should be able to take decisions imposed on all. It is obvious that the current weighting of votes must be reviewed; all is a question of measure, balance, modalities. Fair formulae do exist.
Well played, Mr. Persson! Regarding the composition of the European Commission, in the current rationale a compromise seems impossible between the two formulae opposing each other, that of a ceiling on the number of Commissioners and that of a "Commissioner of each nationality". One should take a step back, and to begin with admit the close link between the prerogatives and real independence of the Commission, on the one hand, and its composition, on the other. In an essentially intergovernmental Europe, no country should have to agree to being at times outside one or another institution. But if the Commission does in fact represent the European interest resulting from the synthesis of national interests, defined following an objective analysis without consideration of the political, economic of demographic clout of any of the partners, then the optic may change. It is true that certain small countries cannily avoided speaking of this problem in terms of powers within the Commission (being present to have further weight), and prefer pointing to the demands of democratic legitimacy and representation of a culture, a tradition, a way of life: "each Commissioner represents a bridge between the Commission and public opinion of their country of origin", said the Austrian Chancellor in Biarritz (and also see Ms. Ferrero-Waldner's stance in EUROPE of 14 October, page 16). And the Swedish Prime Minister, Mr. Persson, said that a European Commission without a French or German Commissioner would not be legitimate. Well played, Mr. Persson!
On the other hand, President Chirac observed that those who blocked the necessary reforms were delaying the enlargement process. To which Mr. Lipponen replied that he would have no truck with blackmail.
As we can see, on these bases, we shall achieve nothing (even though the tactical role of some statements or stances should not be ignored). The Presidency will have to manage a mixture with firmness, tact and understanding for the susceptibilities that are at stake. And, if possible, show imagination. Otherwise, we risk a deadlock.
Ferdinando Riccardi