This week in London, at the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), the future of global shipping climate policy is not being negotiated. It is being tested for survival. The road to the 84th session of the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC84) has been marked by progress and obstruction.
The international shipping sector carries over 80% of world goods trade by volume and accounts for 3% of global CO2 emissions. By 2050, emissions from the shipping industry are projected to increase by 90-130% on 2008 levels, if no measures are taken.
In 2023, IMO member states committed to net-zero shipping emissions by 2050. Two years of negotiations produced the Net-Zero Framework: a carbon pricing mechanism backed by 80% of member states by April 2025.
Then, in October, the United States and Saudi Arabia blocked it, not with arguments, but through a procedural manoeuvre at the extraordinary MEPC session meant to formalise adoption. Fossil fuel interests, framed as multilateral concern, prevailed without a vote or a single technical objection.
MEPC 84 is not the final adoption vote, scheduled for October 2026. Delegates must now develop the technical guidelines needed to implement the Framework. Without them, the October vote is meaningless; with them, a global carbon regime becomes possible.
These guidelines can bring tangible benefits. By accelerating the shift to alternative fuels and setting certification standards, they enable new supply chains, reducing dependence on fossil fuel imports and strengthening energy security for exposed coastal and island economies.
Opposing states cannot scrap the Framework, but they can weaken it by delaying guidelines, altering procedures, or fragmenting negotiations.
Three outcomes are possible: real progress that keeps October 2026 on track; partial advances that leave key issues unresolved; or procedural disruption that weakens the Framework before the final vote.
We support the Net-Zero Framework as approved. Five years of negotiations produced a text; an 80% majority endorsed it. Reopening it under minority pressure would set a damaging precedent. The Framework already reflects the lowest common denominator of a credible global carbon regime. Renegotiation will not produce something better, only something less.
The IMO Fund is not optional. It is the price of legitimacy. Without it, countries least responsible for shipping emissions and most exposed to its impacts have no reason to sign on. With it, the Framework becomes more than regulation: a mechanism for green investment and climate resilience across the Global South.
For port nations and small island states, it offers a rare opportunity to channel carbon revenues into port electrification and domestic clean energy, reducing import dependency and building energy sovereignty long denied by fossil fuel markets.
Those arguing for “more time” should recall the last failure on market-based measures. In 2011, negotiations collapsed. It took a decade to reopen the debate. A similar outcome now (when shipowners, fuel producers and ports need regulatory certainty) would be a historic failure.
The EU is not a spectator. Through FuelEU Maritime and the extension of the EU Emissions Trading System to shipping, Europe has already acted. But regulating a global sector regionally creates distortions. Without a global framework, European ports and shipowners face competition from operators with no equivalent carbon costs.
A functioning IMO Framework is not just a climate tool. It is an energy security instrument. A global shift away from fossil fuels diversifies energy sources, reduces exposure to supply shocks, and creates opportunities for European green fuel producers and port developers. If the IMO succeeds, the EU will need to adjust its regime for coherence. If it fails, Europe is left managing the externalities of a global industry alone.
European climate ambition depends on IMO success. That should translate into active diplomacy, not passive support. EU member states must coordinate, speak with one voice, and use every lever to (re)build the coalition needed.
What is decided in London this week will not be the final verdict. But it will determine whether that verdict, due in October, is still worth delivering. Between the regional level of the EU and the multilateral framework, there is also a plurilateral pathway, a coalition of the willing, which could become an increasingly relevant option if global consensus continues to fall short.
Pascal Lamy and Geneviève Pons from the think tank Europe Jacques Delors