Upon the announcement of the death of Jacques Delors, which was notified on 27 December to the AFP press agency by his daughter Martine Aubry, tributes began to flood in and numerous articles were published across the whole of Europe; the French newspaper Le Monde devoted its front page, its editorial and, most significantly, a quality dossier six pages long to him. All of this was very much deserved, given his achievements as President of the European Commission, a post he held for ten years (1985-1995): he oversaw the accession of Spain and Portugal to the European Community, the Single European Act, a raft of legislative measures for the completion of the single market, the Schengen agreements, doubling of the structural funds, a successful battle for the educational competence of Europe (Erasmus), reform of the common agriculture policy, a programme of aid to the poorest citizens, a pioneering role in the reunification of Germany, preparations for the new founding treaty (Maastricht) instituting the European Union and its citizenship, new competencies and, most importantly, a binding timetable to the single currency.
At the end of his ten years’ service, the Commission’s prestige had risen to heights unthinkable during the previous period. The powers of the European Parliament had increased considerably, particularly through co-decision with the Council of the EU; within that institution, the practice of qualified-majority voting was a common one. The case-law of the court of justice swelled remarkably, in accordance with the Community interest and that of the citizens. In Delors, the European Council had a quality point of contact who knew his direction of travel. With the USSR breaking up, the European Union had become so attractive that in addition to the accession of three new member states in 1995 (Austria, Finland and Sweden), the central and eastern European countries (CEEC), which benefited from its full solidarity from 1989, were also considering the prospect of joining.
If not deliberately, then certainly in their collective subconscious, the capitals wanted to start taking back control. Who could possibly follow Delors? The British and the Dutch wanted Ruud Lubbers, but neither Kohl nor Mitterrand was a fan. They put forward Jean-Luc Dehaene, whom the other group rejected: no doubt he was too much of a federalist or not easy enough to manipulate. Unanimity was reached as if out of spite for the Luxembourg head of government, Jacques Santer, who won a slight majority at the European Parliament. The “soft Commission” which then got to work takes the credit for the launch of the euro. However, the MEPs, breaking its traditional alignment with the Commission, began to hound it, drawing attention to the phenomena of cronyism, poor management and a weak sense of responsibilities, culminating in calling for an independent report, the “Report of the Wise” with its devastating conclusion. Noting that it no longer had a majority at the Parliament, the ‘Santer’ Commission resigned collectively in March 1999 to avoid a vote of no-confidence. The institution had reached its lowest point ever. In a little over four years, the inheritance of the Delors years had been squandered.
Additionally, the Community method, which had proved its worth and of which Delors was a staunch proponent, took a hit. Intergovernmentalism made its great comeback. This was manifested in the initiative by several ministers to create a convergence process in higher education outside the EU framework, known as the “Bologna process” (1999), then by the extraordinary European Council of Lisbon (March 2000), which launched the open method of coordination (OMC) with a view to achieving specific objectives by the end of the decade; its day-to-day actors were the ministers of the Commission. In both cases, the European Parliament was on the sidelines, taking these insults without flinching. Soft law became the flavour of the month, preferred by many to binding acts.
Delors wanted a social Europe, as expressed by the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, which was agreed upon by the European Council of Strasbourg (1989), but in a non-binding format due to the UK’s refusal to sign it. For Maastricht onwards, he insisted that monetary union required the addition of economic cooperation of equal political weight; his words fell on deaf ears. In 1993, the Commission produced the critical White Paper “Growth, Competitiveness and Employment. The Challenges and Ways Forward into the 21st Century”, which was quickly dubbed “the Delors Testament”. Amongst other things, he proposed vast investment in collective equipment; verbally, the finance ministers agreed, but what happened next would demonstrate a lack of implementation and reference.
Of humble origins, Jacques Delors spoke in simple terms on complex issues. He got into politics through his trade union work. Unquestionably, his lifelong love of football and cycling endeared him to the man in the street, but young people loved him too, as he made it possible for them to study abroad. He liked the press of all nationalities. HHis popularity in France was such that he would have been a strong candidate for the presidential elections of 1995, had he not declined to run. Then, speaking in public only rarely, he must have watched the European Union’s subsequent development with utter dismay, while its major players benefited neither from his thoughts nor his methods. He set up a reflection centre, “Notre Europe”, which produces quality studies and proposals. The press release published by the Institute on his death expresses deep sadness: “the whole of Europe is mourning one of its greatest architects”.
If my readers will indulge me, I would like to conclude with two personal anecdotes. A journalist, I attended his first press conference in his new position in the Berlaymont on 7 January 1985. Addressing a room that was full to bursting point, he took enormous pains to thank his predecessor, Gaston Thorn, who he felt had been unjustly criticised, for all his hard work. At that time, I also used to help the institution’s press service out in the mornings; they asked me for a brief analysis of Jacques Delors’ image following the European Parliament’s positive vote on his plan. Many years later, in 2004, to my enormous surprise I came across a passage in his Mémoires that used parts of my contribution, almost word for word: “the press review set up by our services revealed that it was the scale of the favourable vote that was most impressive. It also indicated that Jacques Delors’ image was almost “in transit”: would his image end up more European than French? – still the same mistrust on the part of journalists from several countries – and will his leadership come in addition to an intellectual ascendant that is already acknowledged; commentators will leave it to the future to decide.” (Pocket, p. 250-251). The work of a sensitive man, most assuredly.
My second anecdote. I became a Commission civil servant on 1 February 1984, one month after the Master joined. I had a ringside seat to watch his influence spread over the services, which were given new motivation. Two years later, Delors was awarded an Honoris Causa doctorate by the Catholic University of Louvain, whose student newsletter commissioned me to write a single-page profile of the new doctor. I gave my piece the title “Jacques Delors: for the honour of the cause” and send it upstairs for approval. A few days later, I got a phone call from the President’s cabinet: “Hello Mr Denuit, the President has read your text and really likes it. No changes.” Phew!
The Delors decade, which was completely given over to the general interest, were the very best years of my long career; and so I feel personally bereft at his passing.
Renaud Denuit