The first person to hold this challenging role was Baroness Catherine Ashton, Commissioner for Trade in the ‘Barroso I’ Commission. She was appointed by the European Council on 19 November 2009 (at the same session as Herman Van Rompuy became its President) and was heard by the Parliament on 11 January 2010, leaving no very strong impression. Her appointment was consolation for Tony Blair’s failure to secure the Presidency of the European Council and the frustrations of the Socialist family. She put her foot in it once or twice, she showed too much restraint, despite her largely declaratory diplomatic style, and did not bring enormous visibility to the role – although in fairness, she was starting from scratch here.
To succeed her in the role, the head of the Italian government, Matteo Renzi, managed to convince the European Council to appoint his young Foreign Minister, Federica Mogherini. She was selected on 30 August 2014 and took up her duties on 1 November as a member of the ‘Juncker’ Commission. Over the years, she proved the sceptics wrong, making a success of the role and making full use of its potential. Tireless, always quick to the scene of any tensions, tackling difficult dossiers from the Iranian nuclear affair to the conflicts in the Middle East, a prolific writer of communiqués in which she voiced the indignation of all Europeans over violence in all four corners of the world; an indefatigable champion of human rights and multilateralism, who was respected by her peers and senior politicians of Europe and elsewhere, she would also develop a conceptual vision of the future of security policy. She finished her term in office by freely taking position on a wide range of subjects, without ever being ‘reframed’. Without any sycophancy intended, she did a truly outstanding job.
On 2 July of this year, the European Council selected another Foreign Minister from southern Europe to take on the job. Following the written approval of the President-elect of the Commission on 26 July, the nomination of Josep Borrell was published in the Official Journal on 7 August (see EUROPE B12311B13). At his hearing before the ‘foreign affairs’ committee of the European Parliament, the former president of the same institution showed his knowledge of the individual dossiers and general framework of his future remit; his presentation was met with applause (see EUROPE 12343/2). For the third time in a row, then, the HR would come from the European Social Democrat family. But Borrell seems to be starting off with a higher degree of credibility than his predecessors.
In her mission statement, the President-elect gave him a few pointers: a more strategic, assertive and united approach to external relations; faster and more effective decision-making at the Council, in particular by making use of the provisions of the Treaty that allow qualified majority voting; better links within the Commission, between the external and internal elements of its ‘global’ action and coordination of Commissioners in charge of external relations dossiers and their financial instruments; a coherent contribution towards a European Defence Union.
There is a noteworthy sentence in the Lisbon Treaty: ‘the common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy’ (art. 42 TEU). The Treaty also unambiguously confers upon the HR an influential role (see also articles 43, 44 and 46 TEU). It is therefore not entirely correct when some observers hastily report that Mr Breton’s portfolio includes defence (when in fact, it covers only its industrial aspect and overlaps with space policy). We can only hope that the new HR, who has the Treaty on his side, will resolutely get stuck into defence policy, even though he appeared less at ease on this subject during his hearing. However, he did speak in its favour in a long interview with the French daily newspaper Le Monde of 9 November, responding to President Macron’s comments about NATO’s ‘brain death’.
Implying a departure from Mogherini’s approach, Borrell has told both the Parliament and the press that you cannot be everywhere at once nor take on every single problem. He prefers to prioritise. Geographically, his priorities are in the Western Balkans (particularly Serbia-Kosovo dialogue), the relationship with Russia and the Ukrainian question, plus the Middle East (Syria, Turkey, terrorism). In other words, areas that could have a direct or indirect impact on the security of the EU. With regard to this, as President Macron, a card-carrying pro-European, has convened a ‘Normandy format’ (Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France) to be held in Paris on 9 December (EUROPE B12370B29), it would be an elegant move on his part, and certainly a very useful one, to invite the High Representative.
With various major powers seeking to diminish and divide the European Union more systematically and cynically than ever before, it would be responsible not to tighten up security policy and the seniority of the position attached to it. Given the recent cracks that have appeared in the Atlantic Alliance and the unpredictability of the American leadership, it is vitally urgent for the mutual defence clause set out in paragraph 7 of article 42 TEU to constitute an absolute guarantee for each and every member state.
The future of the EU’s geopolitical position will play out in the course of the five years of the new Commission. We will then see whether the adjective ‘Hight’ to describe its security policy representative is justified and has been taken seriously. And we will also be able to see whether or not, instead of being just a commercial and verbal power, it will be a politically influential entity, morally and territorially untouchable, seen in the eyes of the world to hold… high authority.
Renaud Denuit