*** KAARLO TUORI, KLAUS TUORI: The Eurozone Crisis. A Constitutional Analysis. Cambridge University Press (The Edinburgh Building, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK. Tel: (44-1223) 326050 - Fax: 315052 - Internet: http://www.cambridge.org ). Cambridge Studies in European Law and Policy. 2014, 285 pp, £19-99, $32-99. ISBN 978-1-107-64945-3.
This book is a modern J'accuse. It is the remarkable fruit of cooperation between a constitutionalist and law theoretician, Kaarlo Tuori, and a lawyer-cum-economist who worked at the European Central Bank at the time of gestation of the single European currency, Klaus Tuori. The entire book is written by the two authors as a joint effort, leading the reader on a search for the causes of the crisis currently being experienced by the eurozone - and the European Union as a whole - which they say goes well beyond a simple bank, financial or public debt crisis. As Jo Shaw and Laurence Gormley (who edit the series into which this jewel of a book fits) deftly explain, the book's editors explain with the meticulous detail and precision of academic jewellers that 'the eurozone crisis goes to the very heart of the European constitutional order' and it therefore behoves us to take into consideration the question of democracy and transparency and it 'entreats to consider also issues of democracy and transparency, as well as issues about the values which underpin our societies in the early twenty-first century including issues around security in its widest sense.'
Kaarlo and Klaus Tuori both work at Helsinki University. They develop an argument in eight chapters in three sections combining the constitutional and the economic approach. They rely on the concept of economic constitution, which is of ortho-liberal origin, but are careful to not allow it to be the corset that it has become in the history of contemporary Germany - and therefore also of the European Union too… They start from the principle that Europe, unlike its member states, did not inherit its constitution from some form of revolution, but instead from a 'continuous process of constitutionalisation,' which is both multidimensional (they discern a constitutional grouping made up of economic, legal, political, security and social constitutions) and multi-temporal, because it cannot be denied that these various constitutions did not become a reality at the same moment in time. The Paris Treaty that gave rise to the first Community, followed by the Treaties of Rome, made the economy into a constitutional precedent before the European Court of Justice gave it its legal imprint through its action. Its political nature was endowed by the Maastricht Treaty and its security dimension by the Amsterdam Treaty. The high point was the triumphant return to centre stage of the economic constitution with the crisis in the eurozone. The authors say the problem is that while the first level of economic constitution was microeconomic in nature, that no longer applies with what arose from the Maastricht Treaty with the eurozone and the remedies demanded by the crisis over the past five years mean that a macroeconomic constitution had to be introduced.
The Tuori argue that the economic objectives and policies drawn up and developed under the Maastricht Treaty have been put to the test and there is no doubt in the authors' eyes that several assumptions upon which they were founded are no longer valid. What is far more serious is the fact that what arose from this is that 'an essential part of the Eurozone crisis as a constitutional crisis consists of its repercussions for democracy and social rights.' The most recent version of economic constitution is such a constraint on 'social constitutionalism' that it now threatens the political and social values not only at European Union level but also in its member states, particularly those in the eye of the storm. Consequently, the authors say, the austerity programmes have social consequences and also impact on state sovereignty, which make them a major constitutional and democratic problem. In the concluding chapter, Kaarlo and Klaus Tuori explain their doubts about the future, because the intergovernmental route favoured by European leaders to deal with the crisis is changing the key fundamentals and the objectives of what they view as a mistaken economic policy.
Michel Theys
*** CHRISTOPHE LAMFALUSSY, IVO MAES, SABINE PETERS: Le sage de l'euro. Alexandre Lamfalussy. Editions Racine (Tour & Taxis, Entrepôt Royal, 86C av. du Port, B-1000 Brussels. Internet: http://www.racine.be ). 2013, 206 pp. ISBN 978-94-014-1719-8.
His name is only known to insiders, but when this young Hungarian arrived in Belgium in 1949 with just a suitcase and a fistful of dollars in his pocket, he was to become, as Jacques de Larosière says in the preface, one of the most outstanding personalities of modern international finance and an economist by training who exercises a major influence on the monetary destiny of Europe. Alexandre Lamfalussy, the former boss of the Bank of International Settlements, was one of the technicians to be listed as one of the founders of the Single Currency because he participated in the work of the Delors Committee on Monetary Union before becoming the first president of the European Monetary Institute, the midwife for the current European Central Bank - of which he could have become the first governor, if he had wanted, but he decided that given his age, he would retire instead. He was coaxed out of retirement, however, to become the head in 2000 of a committee of the wise on regulating the financial markets in Europe. It goes without saying that one has things to say after a career of this nature, and Lamfalussy said them in eighteen interviews with his journalist son Christopher and an advisor from Belgium's national bank from 2010 to 2012. The book tells the tale of the man and his path, along with the action and sometimes controversial views that so often proved to be premonitions - on the question, for example, of financial stability and the flaws in the global monetary system. He relates the truth of an expert who provided enormous service to Europe, who was in the front line when the euro was being devised. He attributes the paternity of this venture, which was unlikely and majestic in equal measure, to political leaders, Jacques Delors and Helmut Kohl first and foremost. He also denounces the congenital weaknesses, explaining them without excusing them, and slams the 'colossal error' of allowing Greece to join the future eurozone club, being even more critical of the mistake made by Germany and France when they ignored the constraints of the Stability and Growth Pact, an example which other countries rushed to follow... Alexandre Lamfalussy also talks of the error made by those who penned the Maastricht Treaty by only focussing on budget criteria. He states, however that the introduction of the euro 'was infinitely more successful' than he himself had forecast. Which is a way of saying that all is still possible, the best as well as the worst…
(MT)
*** THIERRY GROSBOIS: L'euro, un rêve qui s'effondre? Éditions BoD - Books on Demand (12/14 rond-point des Champs Élysées, F-75008 Paris. Tel: (49-40) 534335-11 - Fax: 534335-84 - email: info@bod.de - Internet: http://www.bod.fr ). 2013, 190 pp, €17-20. ISBN 978-2-3220-2601-2.
In a very reader-friendly manner for the general public, Thierry Grosbois explains in this book the historical, political economic and social reasons for the big problems encountered in the eurozone - and by extension, in the European Union as a whole. The author first works as a historian, relating the main events that led to the creation of the single currency, and one of the clever ways he does this is to go back to previous attempts - from the economic and monetary decisions taken by the Roman Empire to the Belgium-Luxembourg economic union via Zollverein and Latin Monetary Union. He then reviews the various problems affecting the euro, from the lack of convergent budget and fiscal policies to the 'failure of social Europe,' not to mention the 'weakness of democratic pluralism in economic and monetary governance decision-making.' He ends by considering a number of options for resolving the crisis, both positive - issuing bonds, creating a European Monetary Fund and 'supranational and pluralist economic governance' - and negative - 'Is leaving monetary union a viable solution?' Running throughout the book is the fact that it is time to think big rather than in terms of small improvements.
(PBo)
*** NIKOS CHRISTODOULAKIS: Euro ou drachme? Les dilemmes, les illusions et les intérêts. Editions Gutenberg (37 rue Didotou, GR-10680 Athens. Tel: (30-210) 3642003 - Fax: 3642030 - email: info@dardanosnet.gr). 2014, 208 pp, €9. ISBN 978-960-01-1626-7.
Leafing through the concerns and problems feeding into the deep recession in Greece, a mish-mash of political forces that have never been enthusiastic about European integration is actively encouraging a return to the former currency, the drachma. Professor at Athens University and former economics minister Nikos Christodoulakis aims to combat this mistaken, vote-garnering point of view. The way he sees it, the euro is undeniably the best option for Greece, because it is a fact that returning to an unstable and profoundly under-valued currency would most greatly penalise those it is claimed it would save. He says that getting out of the current crisis requires a different combination of policies in Greece and the eurozone, and returning to the drachma would amount to a painful way of committing suicide.
(AKa)
*** YORGO CHATZIMARKAKIS: Le facteur Grèce: les valeurs grecques pour une nouvelle Europe. Éditions Patakis (38 Panagi Tsaldari, GR-10437 Athens. Tel: (30-210) 3650000 - Fax: 3650069 - email: bookstore@patakis.gr). 2013, 221 pp. ISBN 978-960-16-5264-1.
German MEP of Greek origin Yorgo Chatzimarkakis - who set up a new political party in order to stand for the European elections in May - is at pains in this book to show that the Greeks are not the only ones responsible for the European crisis and new economic and social policies are needed well beyond that small country to overcome the consequences of the crisis. Without any smugness, he explains in a tangible manner the errors made by Greece in the past, but calls on readers not to make it a handy scapegoat or victim, but rather to see it as a source of inspiration and regeneration. Europe needs a new social model, in his opinion and he argues that the Greek spirit has always acted as a cultural ferment in Europe, which is why Greece can play a huge role in a renaissance of European integration. A book that goes against the stream!
(AKa)
*** KOSTAS MELAS: Petites leçons pour l'économie grecque. Les particularités - Le chemin vers le mémorandum - L'injure et la vengeance. Éditions Patakis (see above). 2013, 232 pp, €11. ISBN 978-960-16-4632-9
In this book, a doctor in urban and regional development, specialising in the global monetary system, examines the Greek economy in the light of its political, social and cultural changes. After two hundred years of history, he describes it as lacking in ethical aspirations and unable to treat the numerous illnesses that it has succumbed to over the years. The first chapter looks at the specificities of the Greek social world. The author goes on to explain the social, political and economic processes that led to the country's collapse. The third and final chapter contains thoughts on the "Economic Memorandum of Understanding." Throughout the book, Kostas Melas shows how Greece did not take part in the period of social evolution that followed feudalism. It was not part of the scientific revolution and Enlightenment, the industrial revolution or the emergence of the liberal bourgeois state. This study highlights the role of the Greek state in the efforts to industrialise and the historic persistence of foreign deficits, loans, transfers of cash from the diaspora and the success of shipping and, more recently tourism, given the lack of industrial productive capacity able to provide exports to balance out the imports. Commenting on the MoU, the author says it was badly designed, and he criticises application of the budget adjustment programme and the fight against public debt, although he feels that all players have a role to play in the European Union, including Greece.
(AKa)
*** YANNIS PAPADOYANNIS: La fin sans gloire. Le parcours douteux, l'écroulement et la renaissance des banques grecques. Éditions Papadopoulos (9 Kapodistriou Str., GR-14452 Metamorfosi Attiki. Tel: (30-210) 2846074 - Fax: 2817127 - Email: info@picturebooks.gr - Internet: http://www.ekdoseispapadopoulos.gr ). 2013, 224 pp, €11-99. ISBN 978-960-484-376-3.
At the end of 2007, Greek banks were in their heyday. Unseemly profits were counted out by the billion, acquisitions in the Balkans and the heady heights of bank shares on the Athens stock market were reached in those carefree days. Banks were the synonymous with success. As we now know, this spectacular rise was to be short-lived and plenty of water has flowed under the bridge since the peak of 2007. In 2011 and 2012, Greek banks' losses quite simply cancelled all the profits made in the golden years of 2001-2010, and also gobbled up all their funding. A new term suddenly entered Greek vocabulary - recapitalisation. In this book, Yannis Papadoyannis, a business analyst for newspaper 'Kathimerini,' describes the path followed by the Greek banking system and explains the reasons for the banks and their shareholders falling from paradise into hell. The author also explains how the bank system has been responsible for the emergence and predominance of an economic model that produces very little, but is nevertheless gobbled up with greed! A model that was destined to hit a brick wall…
(AKa)