Brussels, 03/10/2013 (Agence Europe) - On 3 October, the Court of Justice of the EU upheld (case C-583/11 P) the order of the General Court (see EUROPE 10453) deeming inadmissible the action for annulment of the regulation on trade in seal products. This regulation restricts the trade in seal products in the EU to products from traditional forms of hunting practised by indigenous communities and contributing to their subsistence. The action was brought by a Canadian Inuit association, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, and a number of other stakeholders.
The appeal brought related solely to the admissibility of the action, the appellants arguing that the distinction made by the General Court between a “regulatory act” and a “legislative act” with regard to the regulation at issue denied them the possibility enshrined in the Lisbon treaty of challenging the regulation unless they could prove direct and individual concern.
The Court finds that the Lisbon Treaty's less stringent admissibility rules apply only to regulatory acts and that the General Court correctly stated that legislative acts, although they may also be of general application, are not covered by the concept of regulatory acts and continue, therefore, to be subject to more stringent admissibility rules. The Court states, too, that the Lisbon Treaty did not alter the content of the condition of individual concern and, consequently, the General Court correctly ruled that the appellants did not satisfy this condition.
Responding to the argument put by the appellants that the General Court applied too restrictive an interpretation of Article 263 of the TFEU (review by the Court of EU acts intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties) with regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Court states that the Charter “does not require that an individual should have an unconditional entitlement to bring an action for annulment of European Union legislative acts directly before the Courts of the European Union”. It states that it is only “where responsibility for the implementation of those acts lies with the European Union institutions” that an individual is entitled, “under certain conditions”, to bring a direct action before the Courts of the European Union “against the implementing measures” and to plead, in support of that action the illegality of the general act at issue. On these grounds, the Court dismisses the action in its entirety. (FG/transl.fl)