The Federation of Nation States has been launched. The week which is now coming to a close can be ranked among the successful periods of EU history, thanks to the launch of the Federation of Nation States project by the president of the European Commission and thanks to the “yes” of the German constitutional court to two crucial laws for the functioning of the euro.
José Manuel Barroso's project (see EUROPE 10687) picks up again with the description of the future EU long held by Jacques Delors, which is not surprising because the words “Federation of Nation States” describe the desired objective most effectively, while respecting the principle of a Community grouping in which the States retain their character. The project will need a few years to be accomplished, and in principle the citizens will express their opinion on it at the 2014 European elections, before which the Commission will have given a sketch of the development that it advocates.
Let me return to our report in EUROPE 10687 simply to recall that:
Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Guy Verhofstadt and other MEPs who took part in the discussion believe that Barroso's project is not ambitious enough, while for some British MEPs it is too much so;
Most speakers call for the political ambition to be accompanied by the strengthening of economic and social policies, thanks to the expansion of the EU's 2014-2020 financial perspectives.
Mr Barroso put forward the reasons that make it a true Federation: in particular the EU's democracy must be transnational in front of the financial markets, which already are. He does not advocate a Super-State but rather a democratic federation between states which will share sovereignty.
Delors' project is different. Why did Barroso not refer to Jacques Delors' project? Because the two projects differ considerably. In a very recent interview with the Italian review Il Mulino Mr Delors particularly pointed out that the Big Europe, bringing together all the member states, “will be unable to be as ambitious as in the 1950s to 1980s; hence the need for a differentiation to allow factors of dynamism to come into play in domains like the euro, Schengen and perhaps defence”. (Information distributed by the Notre Europe association.)
Mr Barroso had clearly expressed himself in the opposite direction: “Our proposals will be based on the Union as it exists today, on its institutions and on the Community method. Let's be clear. There is only one European Union. One Commission. One Parliament.” This means that Mr Barroso rejects the idea of institutionalising the eurozone and, indeed, separating it from the rest of the EU. Our readers will perhaps remember that this column believes that a two-speed Europe is unavoidable because the eurozone has to be managed by specific instruments. Indeed, in my opinion, a two-speed Europe already exists and not all member states want to participate in it.
Meaning of the German constitutional court's double “yes”. Alongside the launch of the Federation of Nation States, the other striking event of the week has been the German constitutional court's preliminary green light to Germany's ratification of the financial support instrument for eurozone countries in difficulty - the ESM (European Stability Mechanism). Looking back to EUROPE 10687 for the details, let me highlight the powers that the court attributes, or confirms, to the German parliament on financial control - every overshoot of the figures foreseen for this instrument will have to go through the Bundestag. And the same Bundestag will be able to have access, on request, to all information on this financing, even information that the beneficiary countries consider confidential. Article 34 of the ESM provides for secrecy but the constitutional court has judged that the secrecy rule is not valid for the parliament, which is the seat of popular sovereignty. It's as if the German judges had deemed that the German Constitution is founded on the principle of democracy, but not yet so European rules.
The Federal Constitutional Court (the real name of the German constitutional court) at the same time gave its green light to the budgetary treaty (the text that is often called the fiscal compact although it is not to do with taxation, but rather budgetary discipline).
Reading this text, which still in particular has to be ratified in France, is really nothing amazing. In reality it is a monotonous set of technical arrangements aiming to watch that the member states respect budgetary discipline, by detailing obligations, controls and possible sanctions. It is understandable that it does not arouse much enthusiasm but it is crucial for the awaited institutional reforms. I'll come back to this.
(FR/transl.fl)