Difficulties and obstacles to revising Treaty. The symptoms of a shift towards a two-speed Europe are being borne out in many different ways. In some instances, it is considered as being unavoidable and formulas and modalities are already being discussed. It is true that a large part of the European Parliament, in principle, is opposed to it (see our publication yesterday on the debate focusing on next week's summit perspectives). Different analyses and predictions proliferate. Here are a few considerations on the different aspects of this question.
1.) Revision of the Treaty through an accelerated procedure is difficult in practice. Legal experts have been examining this possibility and have explained that revision would be limited to the simplification of a few procedures and would be possible through a simple inter-governmental conference, without having to go through a Convention or ratification by all the different member states. The British, however, have already indicated that they are not willing to support such an operation. Mr Cameron has announced that in the event of any revision, his country would put forward the amendments that he advocates, namely those that go in the direction of increasing national autonomy. The United Kingdom rejects this perspective of an accelerated Treaty revision and would not accept either political union or centralisation of powers in Brussels. Aspects of the revision that aim to toughen up budgetary rules are not to the taste of member states outside the eurozone or to the taste of those within it which are experiencing difficulties. This it is not a feasible option.
2.) Revision of the Treaty through the normal procedure would be lengthy and complex, requiring a Convention and ratification in all member states, and in several countries it would require a referendum. A single no vote would mean that everything would need to be done again. This process would in any case take several years, while for Germany certain innovations constitute a prerequisite for the creation of eurobonds and other innovations. Ms Merkel will undoubtedly make a few concessions but she will not withdraw the automatic nature of sanctions against countries in the eurozone which go off the rails.
3) Member states are considering alternative ways. Enhanced cooperation in the Lisbon Treaty? An inter-governmental agreement between eurozone countries? A “stability pact” inside this zone, reserved for member states that respect eurozone rules or will be able to? A cautious approach is required with regard to the different hypotheses mentioned or described because they are more of a reflection of the personal opinions of those pushing forward the different projects being examined.
It is inevitable that the orientations we are talking about are essentially of Franco-German origin, even though this is sometimes hard to accept. Nonetheless, the smaller states that respect the rules largely agree. Next week, Ms Merkel and Mr Sarkozy will present a common position at the summit - and they want to involve Italy in this project as it is currently headed by an individual they trust, although they will continue exerting pressure on Italy to put into place the ingredients for recovery. Mr Monti, however, considers that a positive decision on eurobonds is indispensable (Ms Merkel links this to a revision of the Treaty).
Other aspects. The Ecofin sector is at the centre of the reflections because it largely determines the other aspects of a possible two-speed Europe. These are not insignificant. For example, cohesion policy for 2014-2020 has produced a number of fundamental differences with regard to macro-economic conditionality, a rather solemn definition for really quite a simple concept: member states that do not respect budgetary rules (Stability and Growth Pact) will lose the right to cohesion policy funding. This brings together five different structural funds, European support instruments to poorer countries and regions. The link between future European funding and member states' obligations with regard to budgetary deficits has created a lot of misgivings. Poland, as president of the Council, has developed some rather low-key preliminary conclusions on this subject. At a national level, however (as from next month), it will speak openly against macro-economic conditionality in Community funding. It won't find itself alone on this question.
Inevitable differentiation according to Jacques Delors. He has explicitly come out in favour of enhanced cooperation as a means of avoiding the necessity of consensus between all member states for each eurozone initiative: “differentiation between the eurozone and EU27 is indispensable and inevitable (…), it should have been made a long time ago” even though it is easier to skirt around in an effort to avoid “angering the 10 member states that are not in the eurozone” (EUROPE 10505). We can see that Jacques Delors is avoiding any mention of a two-speed Europe; but in practice he admits that it is unavoidable.
(FR/transl.fl)