A subject of cooperation at a difficult point in time. How can we prevent the EU-Africa summit at the end of this month from turning into an extra opportunity for declarations of principle on joint willingness to work together and step up relations? For this aspect, we can have every confidence in the imagination of those taking part; there will be no shortage of neatly-turned phrases. The results? There are several elements which call for prudence, starting with the venue for the meeting - Libya, the only country in Africa with no official ties with Europe, being a member of neither the Union for the Mediterranean nor the ACP group, and having no bilateral agreement in place. But that is neither here nor there. The economic partnership agreements (EPAs) will meet with reservations and mistrust in most of the countries of Africa (see this section in our bulletin 10245).
The information we published two days ago (bulletin 10253) confirms the extent to which the African leaders are having doubts and asking questions. Their freedom of choice in cooperation with third countries, the use of their natural resources and the general assessment of their interests are not in question, obviously. What remains to be defined is the role of cooperation with Europe in this new context. Amongst a number of suggestions, that of agricultural partnerships, which we discussed in our previous edition of this bulletin, is the one I feel should be retained, because - unlike other developments - it would feed into three essential objectives: safeguarding nature, a reasonable and progressive degree of food autonomy, and lots of jobs. And it may also help to re-establish confidence in other areas of cooperation.
A clear message on Afghanistan. The committee on foreign affairs of the European Parliament approved by an overwhelming majority (60 votes in favour, one against and five abstentions) the Arlacchi report, which calls for a radically new policy in Afghanistan. Next month, the plenary session will take position. Nearly 4 months ago, this column referred in detail to this report (bulletin 10186), wishing to stress the Parliament's desire to put its stamp on the foreign policy of the Union. Our bulletin 10185 provided a summary of the report and of the press conference in which Pino Arlacchi (ALDE Group) spoke out in the strongest possible terms against the ineffectiveness of the war, international civil aid going astray (it is believed that 80% never reaches its destination) and the scale of the poppy crop, the source of almost all of the opium produced in the world.
If the plenary session confirms its support for this report, the EU will have sent out a very clear message, radically distancing itself from the official stances through the position of this institution, which is created by universal suffrage.
The EU's “military cooperation” door is not closed. I do not tend to discuss military issues in this section, and still less to take position on the attitudes and initiatives of the member states in such areas. There are two reasons for this: to write on this complex and sensitive subject means having to know it inside out; and our Agency publishes a twice-weekly specialist bulletin, Europe Diplomacy & Defence, which covers the subject area more than amply. If I am devoting these lines to military issues today, it is not to pass judgement on the Franco-British agreement of 2 November, but to make a few comments on some elements to be taken on board before we can conclude that this bilateral agreement marks the end of the European military cooperation project. The first comment is this: the most outstanding aspect of the agreement concerns nuclear cooperation. The United Kingdom and France are the only countries of the EU which have nuclear weapons; only between them is cooperation in this field even possible. The second is that one major objective of the measures decided upon is to rationalise expenditure. Yet the two participating countries are, by a very long way, the ones which bear the heaviest financial burden in the EU; money-saving exercises would be unreasonable with member states not observing commitments to defence spending subscribed to under the aegis of NATO. Third comment: London and Paris are believed to view cooperation as a matter of urgency (with the resulting rationalisation of expenditure). But how many years would it take to reach an agreement of this kind in the framework of the EU? One final comment: by moving closer to Paris, London may also be wishing to indicate that it does not wish to cooperate solely with the United States in defence matters, an area which also covers industrial and technological cooperation.
These comments take nothing away from any considerations and objections raised elsewhere, criticising the potential dangers and repercussions of the London agreement. These, I feel, are not negligible.
(F.R./transl.fl)