Different priorities. I sometimes ask myself if Turkey's real friends are those who so stubbornly support its accession to the EU or those who consider this accession to be a mistake. In my opinion, the real defenders of Turkey's historic role in Asia, Europe and the world, are those who share Ankara's goal to relaunch and diversify this role by taking into account the geographical and historic realities, rather than those who call for the country to accept Community rules, which are often very much removed from its aspirations and traditions. Ankara is currently developing an autonomous foreign policy, with both robustness and imagination, and for which freedom of action is indispensable. We could say that some member states are also doing this. This is partly true but the Lisbon Treaty has modified and will continue to modify this situation further. The road ahead will be slow and complex and Turkey's hypothetical accession will, in any case, be at the time when the EU common diplomatic service is fully up and running and when the EU has gradually, subject by subject, got used to expressing itself with a single voice. Everything would suggest that a common or coordinated European foreign policy would not have the same objectives or priorities as Turkish policy because it is currently being outlined on a step-by-step basis and is beginning to assert itself.
I am aware of the US thesis that the EU would be responsible for Turkey becoming less and less “western” and for it focusing its priorities more upon its relations with Russia, Iran, Iraq and several states that have arisen from the dismantling of the former USSR. According to this thesis, EU misgivings with regard to Turkish accession are at the source of Ankara's new orientations. Although it is the US minister for defence who affirms this, I believe it to be false. What was abnormal, was the previous weakness in the relationship between Turkey and the countries and territories that were formerly part of the Ottoman Empire, and which in a number of cases remained loyal to the Turkish language. Relations with Syria have been transformed. We are aware of Turkey's role in relations with Iran. Close relations with Iraq, particularly with Iraqi Kurdistan are indispensable, notably with regard to the Kurdish problem. Political links go together with the development of economic ties: the expansion of trade with Syria; Iran is the second biggest gas supplier in the world; purchasing oil in Iraqi Kurdistan, etc. Closer ties between Turkey and newly industrialising countries, such as Brazil, should also be added to this equation.
The Turkish minister for foreign affairs, Ahmed Davutoglu, is not known for holding back on his illuminating and sometimes booming declarations about the role to which his country aspires, which certainly is not to become a pawn in EU foreign policy, with Mme Ashton as its spokesperson. His priority is to establish good relations with all his neighbours, including Greece (he has discussed with Greece the possibility of reducing respective military spending) and Armenia. His country aims to become recognised as a regional power.
Essential relations. In this dynamic context, relations with the EU continue and will continue to occupy an essential, not to say, primary role, for political, economic, geographical and historic reasons. Mr Davatoglu was in Brussels the day before yesterday to open a new chapter in accession negotiations with the EU. Stefan Füle spoke about there being no doubt on the EU's determination to conclude negotiations (see our publication yesterday). Nonetheless, it should not be forgotten that, after years of negotiations, the number of chapters that have been opened is 13 (out of 35) and only one has provisionally been closed, with two major EU states - France and Germany - having taken a position against Turkish accession. Some member states in Eastern Europe will have to rethink the viability of cohesion policy and the common agricultural policy as they currently stand, if Turkey joins. The way in which the EU institutions function would be shaken up because Turkey would have the biggest Parliamentary delegation and carry more weight at the Council than Germany. Insisting on accession as the immutable formula risks making Euro-Turkish relations worse, when the two parties are already in customs union (this is a practically unique case) and when economic, cultural (the fascination of Istanbul!) and other ties are deep-rooted and continue to develop all the time. Misunderstandings could compromise or even blow energy cooperation off course, including the Nabucco plan, although this cooperation is indispensable. At the military level, Turkey is gradually playing an autonomous role, even within the framework of NATO - how could we imagine its role in the ESDP? Let's forget the question of religion, it has nothing to do with it.
Why risk ruining everything that exists, as well as future developments, when prospects for increasing and concrete cooperation are positive and almost without limit? (F.R./transl.fl)