Shared responsibilities? The assessment of the way in which the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) is working, published in this column (EUROPE 10156), provoked a number of reactions from diplomats, civil servants, legal experts and other readers. Agence EUROPE authorised Medafrique to republish our article and it is therefore to this destination that the reactions have been addressed. All of them acknowledged that the situation was not satisfactory. Some of these responses should be highlighted and I would like to add a few of my own comments in this connection.
The opinion that the UfM is inefficient is widely shared and there is a tendency to consider that responsibility for this failure lies with Europe just as much as it does with the Mediterranean third countries. Moreover, our objective is not, at least not for the moment, to discuss the substance of cooperation or what line the EU could or should take with regard to Israel or Libya, etc, but rather to evaluate the framework for discussions, as well as the structure in which this cooperation should be put into practice. I believe that the UfM is not efficient because the third countries do not constitute any form of comprehensive block, which could act as the interlocutor with the EU. This situation makes it both materially and physically impossible to create a comprehensive free trade zone, as well as free movement of persons within that zone. In these domains, as in many others, only bilateral arrangements between individual countries are possible and the EU is not responsible for existing divergences on the other side of the Mediterranean. It is acting in the only way that is possible, by developing its bilateral cooperation, taking into account the goals and capabilities of each country and by supporting joint projects in countries that seek to participate in them. Several bilateral relations are in fact developing positively, an Advanced Status has officially been recognised in a few cases but the term Union is totally unrealistic. It is nothing less than rhetoric and symptomatic of bureaucracy. If Algeria or other countries affirm their specificities and particular objectives, the EU can do nothing about it. This is not criticism, it is simply an observation.
It is significant that none of the reactions made came from Balkan countries; the way in which they were artificially included in the UfM is implicitly recognised by this silence.
Harsh criticism. Some of the analysis contained in the responses was quite virulent. While portraying himself as a “diplomat” Abdellah Majed in fact wrote nothing short of a tract with regard to Libya having sucked in petrodollars, Algeria with its Soviet style politics and economy, Morocco tangled up with its Sahouri issue, Jordan which is a non-country and so on and so forth. Nonetheless, some of the less excessive positions are also quite severe. According to the consultant Mohamed Rachidi, “the South is suffering because there is not even the beginning of any regional integration. Trade between each of these countries is essentially with the EU and horizontal trade remains insignificant … each southern Mediterranean country is a thousand times more in favour of trading with the North than with its neighbours, and this situation is not likely to change any time soon”. According to Pierre M, a civil servant (obviously at the European Commission), “every country on the southern side of the Mediterranean has a single aspiration - ensuring that it is able to obtain finance and access to the European market. Everything else is just purple prose”.
But the EU's responsibility is also affirmed for its “persistent absence of political will”, (Mr Moez). The EU is particularly criticised for its weakness and uncertainties with regard to the Palestinian question (without ever pointing out that it is in fact the EU that has provided almost all of the funding to Palestine).
In our publication, yesterday, we reported on the balanced response made by Tamar Sioud, the former Tunisian ambassador in Brussels and former minister of foreign affairs and trade for his country. He considers that on the southern side of the Mediterranean, not just in Tunisia, there is “a genuine political will to be anchored to the European block” and that “Europe's responsibilities are more apparent” for the current failure, given its capacity to influence the course of events. If the EU does not find a solution to the Palestinian problem, “it will find it impossible not to appear as pedantically giving out lessons that are both inconsistent and lacking in credibility”.
An illusion that should not be trusted. I believe that southern Mediterranean countries must not trust the illusion according to which the Palestinian problem represents the only key: if this problem is solved, then almost everything is settled too. This conviction might provide a convenient alibi for neglecting other very real conflicts such as Cyprus, the Western Sahara, Libya's non-participation, quarrels over water, Ceuta and Melilla and so on. It would be absurd to consider that these problems cannot be settled; Europe is well placed for finding ways to smooth out these divergences and identify where co-operation is possible. Nonetheless, there needs to be a desire for it and the appropriate instruments need to be created and used. The Union for the Mediterranean is not one of these instruments. (F.R./transl.fl)