Special report by Bertrand de Montluc [Associate researcher at the French 'Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (CERI, Sciences Po, Paris) and senior lecturer at the political science faculty of the'Institut d'Etudes Politiques' (IEP)]
People are often tempted to look at political bodies and the state system as relics from times past, given that globalisation in this new millennium demonstrates the dominance of economics. It is well known that globalisation operates in waves or cycles (because waves can progress in a non-linear fashion); with economic, trade and financial liberalism both domestically and internationally; technological revolutions; advances in transport, telecoms and information technology; and so on. [See 'Livre blanc sur la politique étrangère et européenne de la France, French Foreign Ministry (March 2008). Nevertheless, at the same time one can see another, equally clear, phenomenon - the reaffirmation throughout the world of national political entities. In fact, the advent of re-created countries following the collapse of empires and the emergence of new economic powers stimulated by globalisation has led to a strengthening of national pride at the same time as a strong desire for international recognition. Experts talk of the “geopoliticisation of globalisation” [see interview with Marcel Gauchet in Le Figaro, 22 November 2007 (p.7)], the global puzzle [ISS-EU/IES-EU, 'The New Global Puzzle' by N. Gnesotto and G. Grevi], and the return of geopolitics and the logic of power [Address by P. Levy, director of the French Foreign Ministry's 'Centre d'Analyse et de Prévision' to the 5th French Defence Ministry's strategic affairs delegation (DAS)'s future planning seminar, Paris 2008]. Natural elements like resources, population, geography and political colouring are crucial. The international system may be becoming intangible (information technology, global markets, the importance of influence and transnational issues like the climate and health) but it is also returning in force to natural anchors, to diplomacy in spheres of influence (a bulimia of resources to counter energy blackmail in particular). It is true that the logic of power is subject to recoil forces pulling in the direction of interdependence; it ebbs and flows; moreover, not all players are playing the same game according to the same rules. But broadly speaking, the emergence of new players, large or small; the growing difficulties in ensuring law predominates over force; and the intensification of asymmetrical threats, open the door to what is usually called competitive “multipolarity”, which has a greater tendency than the collective security desired at the end of the Cold War to bring in its wake tension, violent clashes and a strategic arms race [Le Monde, 23 February 2007, 'Espace, missiles et satellites, nouvelle frontière stratégique']. The geopolitical logic, which comes together with the logic of economic globalisation, requires means of action that allow it to draw up or symbolise a balance of power and also requires sufficient and autonomous capabilities.
In terms of international security, the danger of a war between superpowers may have declined but violence is spreading as the world order is itself declining and is ever less credible in the eyes of the new players. The world order is being eaten away from the inside by three factors: the authority of the institutions upon which the Western order is built is being greatly challenged; most of the new state and infra-state world that is taking centre stage is not located in the West but rather in the “Rest”; and culture and religious antagonisms are intensifying. [P. Hassner, “Who killed nuclear enlightenment?”, International Affairs 83, 3 (2007). See also anthropologist M. Godelier' approach in “Au fondement des sociétés humaines”, Paris, Albin Michel, 2007.] In such a situation, arms proliferation and nuclear weapons is becoming particularly dangerous for both technological and cultural reasons. Nuclear weapons have become easier and less costly to acquire [B. Tertrais, “L'Europe face à la prolifération nucléaire”, Cahiers de Chaillot No. 66, December 2003] and actually making use of them has become less of a taboo. [P. Hassner, “The Fate of a Century', The American Interest, July/August 2007.] Overall, to quote the words of Pierre Hassner, “the central problem is that the world is becoming both more asymmetrical and heterogeneous in terms of perceptions and passions (under the influence of resentment and the religious dimension) and less asymmetrical and uneven in terms of power (due to the new effectiveness of “the weapons of the weak” and the new difficulty for the strong to make use of their material advantage).” [Le Monde, 3 October 2007.]
Space policy does not escape from these contradictory developments and from an international set-up where order is being challenged and all balance is unstable. For several years now, we have seen a growth in the 'nationalist' nature of some space programmes around the world, traditionally focussed on unaligned or 'useful' space applications with regard to the United States' vision. These days, it seems that China and India and, in the future, South Korea and perhaps other countries too will set themselves objectives of a more political colouring symbolising national pride in their space programmes. These countries are asserting their desire to send their own nationals into orbit (Malaysia for example), to be involved in conquering the moon and future space exploration projects. At the same time, these countries and others, like Iran, make no attempt to hide their plans to have their own defence capabilities in space: anti-missile shields (Japan) or anti-satellite systems (China). [C. Malis, 'L'espace extra-atmosphérique, enjeu stratégique et conflictualité de demain' (ISC-CFHM-IHCC, http://www.stratisc.org ).] The absolute pre-eminence of the United States, Russia and Europe is starting to fade. Research by the US thinktank CSIS shows that while few countries have space launchers (some 8 to 10 in the medium term) and manned space travel, the number of players controlling their own telecoms systems by satellite has doubled since 1980 (one of the first was Indonesia and Vietnam is the most recent but there are also “Arabsat” and others besides). There are reported to be 27 countries that possess the technology to observe the earth from satellite, compared with only 3 in 1980; not to mention the ever growing number of countries which already have their own station for receiving telesurveillance images (due to falling purchase costs). There are now 25 space agencies in the world, some larger than others. Countries like Nigeria, Algeria, Argentina, Malaysia, Indonesia and many more have their own space programmes as a symbol of autonomy, national pride and a desire to attract young people. Governments have introduced public funding for start-ups or development in correlation with this (ranging from between US$ 10 million and US$ 60 mil to more than US$ 100 mil for countries like Australia, Brazil and South Korea). [Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS, Brad Glosserman, 'Briefing of the working group on the health of the U.S. Space Industrial Base and the impact of export controls' (February 2008). Euroconsult 2006] As Hubert Védrine explained in his report on globalisation for the President of France, Nicolas Sarkozy, emerging economies are well and truly emerging and are no longer simply trying to move center-stage in the broad global economy but also want to have a geopolitical role to match. [Report on globalisation for the French President 'Rapport pour le président de la République sur la France et la mondialisation', 4 September 2007.]
It is in this new context that the space policies around the world should be set in order to understand their politico-strategic external determinants (I) and, for the largest projects, to highlight on their own main characteristics (II). Such an overview is also useful in terms of understanding Europe's space policy against the global backdrop - all too often a disservice is done by ignoring what is happening elsewhere or referring to concepts from the past.
The geostrategic approach to space policies
The key idea underlying this approach is simple: for big countries with nuclear weapons at least, on the post-1989, post-September 11 and post-Iraq War international stage, space resources are becoming an integral component of strategic position - even though the “space” layer may seem limited or marginal - or an “asymmetrical” capability aiming to destroy the credibility of certain advantages held by the potential enemy (the United States in this case). It would discredit claims of national deterrence directly or indirectly even if such advantages remained invicible. For emerging economies, space programmes and systems are described as being one of a range of symbols of the desire for national independence, of regional influence and technological maturity, in other words of identity. Over and above this, the question is raised of whether it is appropriate to imagine the arms race around the world being likely to spread in the future to areas other than nuclear weapons, areas like space, because satellites are becoming more important key elements (C4ISR and reactive infrastructure) of modern strategic posture and anti-missile defence, the advent of which now seems inevitable. [See the recent hearing at the US House of Representatives during presentation of the 2008 BMD budget by LG H.A. Obering, Director of the Missile Defense Agency (27 March 2007): 'I believe the performance of the BMD system could be greatly enhanced by an integrated space-based layer.']
The diplomatic context was discussed in the introduction - an unbalanced multi-polar world in which strategic stability is affected and arms proliferation is spreading from Asia to the Middle East, not to mention the new danger of the use of weapons of mass destruction by irresponsible or suicidal individuals. [P. Hassner, CEREM conference at the 'Ecole Militaire' in Paris, 'Éthique et relations internationales', 19 February 2008.] The deployment of “space” missile interceptors, which are also capable of destroying satellites (as was shown by the destruction by the Pentagon of a defective NRO satellite in February 2008) could act as a deterrent for arms proliferators but might also have the perverse effect of providing some countries adept at doublespeak with an excuse for updating their weaponry. Europe must cease to ignore such questions.
Three examples can be given of continent-sized nuclear states which use space as part of their strategic posture to different degrees, namely the United States, Russia and China. Europe is a special case.
In terms of the United States, the most striking development is the implementation of the new “triad” defined in the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review [D.M. Gromley, 'Silent Retreat: The Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons”, The Nonproliferation Review, July 2007, Vol. 14, No. 2. CRS Report for Congress, “U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues”, A.F. Woolf, 5 September 2007. Also, the Arms Control Association.org “Nuclear Posture Review”.] This new triad has the explicit aim of providing the US President with options other than nuclear strikes, and comprises: 1) offensive strike systems (nuclear and non-nuclear); 2) defensive systems (active and passive); and 3) a renewed, reactive defence infrastructure. It should be noted that space resources (command and control, intelligence and surveillance and counter space) are part of this third element and form the backbone of all three elements. [K. Becher, 'High noon in orbit: will more satellites be shot down?,' ESPI, Vienna, 9 April 2008.]
Russia no longer has a true arsenal of high-level, operational space resources. ['La place du spatial dans le projet de restauration de la puissance russe', FRS memorandum, May 2007. Unpublished CAP memorandum 'L'évolution du complexe militaro-industriel russe: perspectives et contraintes pour la coopération spatiale' (12 November 2007).] But Russia's desire since 2000 to assert its confidence in nuclear weapons implies modernisation, including of satellites. [N. Sokov, 'The origins of and prospects for Russian nuclear doctrine,' The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp.208-210.] Moreover, what we know about Russia's ideas about war in the future is coherent with such a move. In 1993, Russian Defence Minister P. Gratchev said that in the future, war would start with aerospace operations. The Russian military see space as a potential strategic theatre. The need is felt in Russia to have space forces to counter an enemy, create anti-missile systems and monitor space. [M. Fitzgerald, “The impact of the military-technical revolution on Russian military affairs,” report for the Hudson Institute (Vol. 1, 20/8/1993).]
Unable to follow the United States in conventional defence and facing the growing strength of Missile Defense, China, like Russia, attaches importance to maintaining the credibility of its deterrence and overcoming its shortcomings (C2/C3I, guidance and precision, mobility and miniaturisation). [Jin-dong Yuan, 'Effective, reliable, and credible: China's nuclear modernization', Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 14, No. 2, July 2007 (pp. 226-301).] In addition, as the January 2007 ASAT test demonstrated, China is trying to provide itself with asymmetrical capabilities to match US strong points. [See A. Tellis' publications for the Carnegie Foundation or 'China's Military Space Strategy', Survival, Vol. 49, No. 3, Autumn 2007, and various Chinese writers like Bao Shixiu, 'Deterrence Revisited: Outer Space', China Security, Winter 2007, pp. 2-11 (2007 World Security Institute).]
Europe, by comparison, is a special case. It only has an integrated space policy to a partial extent through civilian European Space Agency (ESA) programmes and through the space policy document (Commission Communication 212 of 26 April 2007) endorsed by the Council of the European Union. A single country or a group of countries carry sovereign or “strategic” programmes. Moreover, although the early stages of a defence Europe exist (ESDP), this is not a defence Europe with an army and a deterrent force. In the predictable future, therefore, the European Union's military space capabilities and those of its Member States will not actually be an integrated key element in European strategic posture. [For an outside view of EU capability, see 'European Military Space Capabilities', T. Hitchens & T. Valasek, CDI, Washington DC, March 2006.] At EU level, it is highly likely that some or all space capabilities will be harmonised in their definition by the European Defence Agency in order, for example, to meet certain C4ISR or vital telecoms requirements needed to implement the EU's defence and security policy. OCCAR has been given the responsibility (by certain Member States wishing to get involved) for development of programmes by industry (the ESA may be involved in cases where dual use is required, as with space surveillance). When it comes to use, the programme will be coordinated either by framework nations or at least for some of them and for specific work like the Petersberg tasks and operations under the aegis of the EU, by European Union competent bodies. [See P. Cardot's research for the 'Conseil Général de l'Armement' in Paris, June 2008.]
The space policy of major powers
The rationale for US policy
Ten years after the Clinton Administration's publication of the “National Space Policy”, the Bush Administration published a declassified document on 6 October 2006 signed by the President entitled “U.S. National Space Policy”. The report did not leave the international community indifferent in the context of rising “missile defence” and greater use of space resources for defence operations and appropriate anti-satellite land resources! In parallel, economic developments have led, alongside US dominance of the entire range of space activity [For a recent analysis, see the French national assembly's newsletter No. 688 of 5 February 2008 by S. Grouard and O. Saugues.], to the desire by other powers - such as China, Russia, India, Japan, South Korea and other emerging economies like Algeria, Brazil and Iran - to have their own modern space resources to meet 'public service' needs, economic and military needs and sometimes to boost regional influence or prestige (moon programmes and manned space travel). Motivations can be mixed. [See the detailed OECD study 'The Space Economy at a Glance 2007' and indicators analysing demand for space services and stressing the need for sustainable infrastructure to be brought online aimed at meeting service needs.] Typical examples of the policy guidelines given by the US government can be described as follows:
Emphasis on the important role of space programmes in the modern world and the need for greater freedom of action for the United States in this domain (“Freedom of action in space is as important to the United States as air power and sea power”) This twin demand is repeated in the White House document in a paragraph on principles: space capabilities are vital for US national interests; the United States shall protect its rights, capabilities and freedom of action in this domain; the US shall dissuade others from opposing it; shall respond to interference; shall, where necessary, deny adversaries use of space capabilities hostile to US national interests. Later on, in a paragraph on security principles, the document states that the Secretary of Defense shall develop capabilities, plans and options to ensure freedom of action in space and, “if directed”, shall deny such freedom of action to adversaries.
The policy is also characterised by opposition to the development of 'new legal regimes,' and other restrictions aiming to ban or restrict access or use of space.
A third point should be noted because it characterises Washington's desire to dominate the entire range of space activities - namely the option of carrying out operations in and through space “unhindered” in order to defend US interests, along with the ambition to develop an innovative manned and robot programme to explore space. Some specialists say public funding for all activity including classified programmes now exceeds US$ 40 billion. [University of Maryland study, 'Reconsidering the rules for space security', Nancy Gallagher and John Steinbruner, October 2007. On the policy outline, see IISS's Strategic Survey 2007, 107: 1, 33-84, September 2007.] There is only a single paragraph on international cooperation, noting that it should be based on mutual interest and conducted in line with national interests.
What lessons should be drawn from this new US doctrine on space? It makes no spectacular breaks with the past and is rather direct in tone. Not only does the United States reassert its full leadership in this high tech domain and confirm its plan to resume manned flights to the moon or even to Mars, but it also calmly and confidently displays its firm desire to dominate space and have freedom to act there. There is a clear refocus on protecting national interests, typical of a certain feeling of being surrounded or persecuted. The idea of protecting US interests runs throughout the document. Some aspects of the 1996 policy, like international cooperation and seeking partnerships, are not included in the 2006 document. Unlike in the days of the economic advisors to Bill Clinton's team, the mood is no longer one of freeing up services originating in space programmes, like teledetection and telecommunications. Space policy now is self-centred, resolutely designed for “US eyes only”. The Pentagon has left its mark. Where the 1996 policy highlighted the challenge of developing an international space station in order to ensure human beings were in low orbit beyond land borders, and where the 1996 policy asserted the need to prepare a new generation of rocket launchers with the private sector and the need for support for space science, the Defense Department's influence is felt today (the Defense Department has become the first federal space budget and the main user of space systems and is now a full player). If the next Administration is Democrat, the tone will probably be revised more in favour of international cooperation without actually abandoning [See B. Obama's campaign document 'Advancing the frontiers of space exploration' (barackobama.com).] the imperative of protecting US national interests in space.
Russia inches forward
In Russia, there has been growing political interest in the space industry since 2001, essentially in terms of political speeches but this has also been turned into action: budget support, policy documents, desire to reinstate Glonass as a national programme, meeting of the security council on military space matters, reorganisation of the Roskosmos agency, the cosmodrome policy, and so on. It all looks as if the powers-that-be want to re-appropriate the achievements of the Soviet era, wishing to exploit the achievements differently and politically by lending credibility to the role of the state. Space is said to be a way of integrating “post-modern”, post-industrial society. The fact that an advisor to Vladimir Putin attended the celebrations in Moscow of the 40th anniversary of Franco-Russian cooperation (17-18 October 2006) can be interpreted as a sign of renewed political interest in this domain. On the other hand, the Roskosmos agency's role has been restricted to simply implementing tasks (at a lower level than in the past, compared with under Yuri Koptiev and the oligarchs).
Budget resources remain low (perhaps one billion US dollars a year) compared with the rest of industry. It is true that in addition to the civilian budget, there is probably finance for strategic programmes from similar level military budgets. The state has, however, more clearly returned to the arms industry than to space. Strategic and economic concerns, particularly but not solely in terms of export, are of more immediate importance in the defence industry. When it comes to space, the power objectives and industrial strategy in place are not yet clearly discernible. Russia obviously would like to prove both domestically and on the international stage that it has inherited a “long history” in this domain and is planning to maintain its position and make the most of its technological achievement, which are in fact being updated (launchers and navigation by Glonass satellite). [Among other illustrations, see the address by Russian representative V. Putkov at the recent UNIDIR conference in Geneva 'Celebrating the Space Age: 50 years of space technology, 40 years of the Outer Space Treaty' (2-3 April 2007), and the address to UNESCO on 21 March 2007 marking the 50th anniversary of Sputnik by B. Chertok, one of the founders of the prestigious Soviet space programme.]
New prospects in Asia
Asian players are emerging of various types, ranging from confirmed space powers to emerging economies. China, whose case deserves special attention (see below), has space launchers (the Long March series and the future high-power Long March 5 launcher) and a manned space travel programme. After many failed attempts, Japan has managed to run a civil launcher programme (H2) and develop a civilian observation satellite industry and dual use satellites for military use (IGS [Information Gathering System, IGS: high digital resolution and radar programme decided upon in 1998 following the launch of the North Korean Taepodong missile.]. India has space autonomy in most domains (satellite applications) but is lagging behind somewhat in the field of launchers (PSLV/GSLV). New capacity is being acquired by countries like South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia and Thailand, which are confirmed users of space systems. [Some examples: launch of high resolution optical satellite Komsat 2 by South Korea on 28 July 2006, followed by civil and military telecoms satellite Koreasat 5, and the future launch of multi-functional Coms satellite which will probably have advanced warning capacity; launch for Thailand on 11 August 2005 of the 6.5 tonne Thaicom 4 satellite for broadband services in Asia; launch on 11 December 2006 of Malaysia's Measat 3 telecoms satellite. Analysis of the emergence of these nations warrants further separate study beyond the range of this report.] The budgets of countries like Japan and India remain modest compared with the US and European budgets [Japan's space budget is US$2 billion. India's space budget is US$ 0.8 bn. China's space budget is probably US$1 bn. The US public space budget is in the order of US$35-40 bn, the EU's budget is in the order of US$6 bn.]
The reasons for the interest shown in general in Asia for space programmes do not tend to be purely military in the first instance. There is always a desire for autonomy vis-à-vis high technology (India), concern for regional or international recognition, desire to incorporate technical skills in national development (Japan, India and China) and sometimes national pride combined with domestic and international political messages (manned space travel and prospects of exploring the moon for China, and possibly for India too in the future [In November 2006, India announced plans to get involved in manned space travel and exploration (New Scientist, 7 December 2006, 'Indian scientists support human space missions', M. McKee).]). In fact, there is a hierarchy in space activity depending on the various development organisation models. The objectives of a country's space programme vary according to the history of the country, its feelings of identity and the role of the state and the private sector as engines of development.
Japan, whose technological developments have been restricted by the United States' “umbrella”, has often had to cooperate with other countries rather than develop its own technology. Its launcher and satellite industries have not been able to take advantage of dual use technology, technical and financial support from a defence ministry or a strong space agency (NASDA, later JAXA). Until recently, there has been a series of failures, dead-ends and programme delays. The situation was turned around in 2006 in the domain of launchers (H2 with 90% reliability) and the successful launch in September 2006 of the new model of the IGS reconnaissance satellite. In addition in May 2008 , the ruling liberal PLD party revised the 1969 Japanese law restricting space development to the wholly peaceful use of space resources in order to allow military use for domestic security imperatives.
India initially benefitted from the technology transfer from the USSR and then the United States (in the 1960s and 1970s with a gap between 1980 and 2000) and then from Europe [“Indo-US space cooperation”, S. Vadlamudi, Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No. 1, March 2005.]. With a new vision of its destiny, it decided in the early 1980s to take the road of autonomy and openness, encouraged by France (the granting of production permits for the storable propellant Viking engine for the Ariane rocket up to Ariane Mark 4). India today is distancing itself from its references in the past to non-alignment and is now a mature space power at the same level as France in the 1980s [India achieved this in 40 years through sustained moderate investment (around US$ 2.5 bn)], with the IRS range of observation satellites (Cartosat, Oceansat and Risat), the Insat telecoms and television satellites, scientific missions and PSLV and GSLV launchers (demonstration flight of Mk III scheduled for late 2008) [R. Jakhu, McGill University, 'Indian space program and policy', report published on 6 October 2006.]. Now, in an unexpected demonstration of power, it is considering autonomously sending manned vessels into space [Air et Cosmos, No. 2051, 3 November 2006, 'Les ambitions spatiales indiennes'].
The special case of China
China has inherited much of the Soviet programme and still uses Russian technology (manned Shenzou space capsule) but does not have the resources of as structured a scientific and technical set-up as the USSR's system, driven by a centralised power that cannot be compared to Moscow's over its military-industrial complex of several thousands of technicians. Today, however, China is benefitting from the dynamism of the commercial sector. It has reorganised its project management structures and, as a continent, is displaying genuine need for 'useful' space and defence systems.
The Pentagon assesses China's overall defence budget at around US$ 100 billion, but a study by Rand, “Modernizing China's Military, opportunities and constraints 2005” suggests it is around US$ 30-40 billion [DoD, “Annual report on the military power of PRC”, June 2000 (pp.14-17). “Military power of PRC”, 2005 edition (pp 35-36). The 2007 edition suggests an annual increase of more than 11% and quotes Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)'s figures of between US$ 80 and US$ 125 billion.] In this connection, China is becoming one of the leading space players (application programmes, manned flights, lunar probes and launchers) [The first lunar probe (Chang'e-1) was launched in October 2007. At the 17th Congress (15-21 October 2007), President Hu discussed the space programme in his speech (CSIS, '2007 Asia Trip Report', G. Ryan Faith, 8 January 2008).]. It has military capabilities (surveillance and anti-satellite weapons). Some analysts, however, claim that Beijing is still twenty to thirty years behind in big arms programmes [R. Foot, “Chinese strategy in a US-hegemonic global order”, International Affairs, 82, I (2006), page 89. For historical considerations and the role played by Qian Xuesen since 1956 to get China to set up a space programme, see Aviation Week, 7 January 2008], that defence modernisation only comes fourth in China's list of “big modernisations”, and in the domain of space at least, China is not a global threat. De facto, China's ability to translate foreign technology into autonomous modern, operating technology is reported to be proven but to be limited [On space, see the balanced study by the US army's Strategic Studies Institute “Building for the future: China's progress during the tenth 5-year plan and the U.S. response” by K. Pollpeter, March 2008 (http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/ )]. In addition, since the 1998 reforms, space developments have been in the civilian domain under the authority of the Science, Technical and Industry Committee COSTIND ['A new direction for China's defense industry', Evan Medeiros, R. Cliff, K. Crane, J.C. Mulverson, RAND Corporation, Project Air Force, 2005, page 34: “COSTIND was stripped of responsibility for direct management of the operations of defense enterprises'], management of which was conferred on the Industry Ministry in 2008. However, as François Godement explains, 'there is huge lack of precision about the true force of the Chinese army' ['L'Asie préfère les affaires à la guerre', Alternatives Internationales, December 2005 (p. 21)]. It cannot be ruled out that the technical and scientific investment in the civilian space domain with government support granted using monies gleaned from economic growth or support from foreign know-how might be used for the defence forces at the end of the day [There is the government/industry/academia digital triangle that the authorities expect to be of indirect use in modernising the army (see above-mentioned RAND report, chapter 5, 'The digital triangle'). See also the famous Cox Report in the United States of 3 January 1999 (classified) and the declassified version of 25 May 1999 quoted in Jane's Intelligence Review, December 2003 (see above-mentioned article, p. 38, on surveillance capabilities). For a more conservative analysis of the Chinese space threat, see research by G Kulacki and D Wright, Union of Concerned Scientists, September 15, 2005, 'An analysis of March 2005 report by the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) - Challenges to US space superiority']. The West should therefore remain vigilant in terms of controlling the export of sensitive technology as one should not underestimate the powers of persuasion of a country which knows better than others how to play on its weakness in order to restore its power. Nevertheless, when it comes to the updating of China's military equipment, one cannot really talk about a transformation along the lines of the “military business revolution” or “Network Centric Warfare” (NCW). China's strategy probably aims instead to update existing equipment through modern IT systems developed by national industry rather than deploying very high tech new generation platforms [See above-mentioned Rand report, p. 250]. The White Paper 'Les activités spatiales en Chine en 2006' [Communication d'I Bouvet, CNES (information report of 25 October 2006, 'Le Livre Blanc: les futures priorités spatiales chinoises')] seems to confirm that China's space industry seems to have been moving in step with the government's economic priorities since the 1980s. Space science research, moon exploration and manned flights are mentioned but do not come top of the agenda for the highest levels of government - which focus on industrial objectives. China is planning to master the space industry chain in order to cover manufacture, launch services, terrestrial equipment and associated services (telecoms and broadcasting satellites, satellite navigation and teledetection).
Internationally, China is promoting its capacity to sign useful cooperation agreements with new countries wishing to become familiarised with the use of application satellites for their own development needs (Brazil, Venezuela and Nigeria [The Nigerian programme 'NigComsat' (2008) and the Venezuelan 'Simon Bolivar' programme]), which do not have access to standard Western technology. In this way, China is putting itself in a good position with its partners, which are energy-rich or raw materials-rich countries. Space may prove useful to China to demonstrate its presence on the international stage and its desire to become part of the family of nations. The process of asserting mature capabilities, seeking cooperation and acquiring know-how has changed over time in line with the current situation and concerns, in addition to continual political concerns. The apparent rejection of the weaponisation of space [The weaponising of space means active and aggressive military use of space. China wants the peaceful use of space and, along with Russia, defends the idea of a binding treaty banning the military use of space for aggressive military ends. This political and legal view does not mean that China will refrain in any way from testing anti-satellite technologies, particularly if the United States continues to defend a policy of total freedom of action for the US in space to protect its 'vital interests'.], often repeated at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, and the call for the 1986 principles on observation of planet earth formulated by the United Nations' COPUOS space committee, [United Nations General Assembly Resolution 41/65 of 4 December 1986 'Principes sur la télédétection'] demonstrate this desire to present a flattering image of China's peaceful and harmonious integration. [J.L. Domenach, “La Chine m'inquiète”, Perrin, March 2008.]
Potential for weaponising space
China's ASAT anti-satellite tests of the past two years leave no doubt. While Beijing's message is aimed both domestically, at supporters of the idea of China taking a bigger strategic role, and externally, at the United States and its allies in the Pacific, the true reason for the Chinese tests lies deeper. Apparently preceded by several failed attempts, the ASAT 'hit to kill' test of 11 January 2007 seems to be part of Beijing's search for asymmetrical capabilities to counter the absolute conventional military superiority of the United States in the event of conflict in the Taiwan Straits. From this viewpoint, the test did not really come as a surprise. The Chinese government's 2006 White Paper on National Defence stressed a defensive nuclear strategy and growing insecurity in the Asian Pacific region. [Report in the Hong Kong Singtao newspaper on 30/12/2006.] The strategy aims at preventing any country from using, or threatening to use, nuclear weapons against China. More than ever, China seems to be concerned about its own nuclear capacity to respond to aggression from abroad, particularly in the context of growing tension in the Taiwan Straits. It also notes with concern the installation of anti-missile systems in the region and the United States' space control plans. Abundant Chinese military and scientific literature has borne witness to this for several years now, analysing the transformation of the Unites States' defence system and trying to learn lessons from this for Chinese defence position. One of the recurrent subjects of interest in APL publications is precisely the need for China to acquire capabilities to respond to the United States' superiority in space [Examples: Wang Jiangqi, Guangming Ribao, 28 December 2001, Zhang Ling, “Initial appearance of the Characteristics of Informationized Warfare” (Liaowang No. 28, July 2003), Liu Qichang, “The new military strategy of the G.W. Bush Administration”, (Xiandai Guoji Guanxi, May 2003), Wei Qiyong, Qin Zhijin and Liu Erxun, “Analysis of changing emphasis in US military strategy”, Weng Hansong, “Military Observations of US space empire marks the start of the “sixth war” (Renmin Wang, January 2005), Chen Xuejun and Lang Daqiang, “Methods for defeating GPS” (Junshi Wenzhai, November 2004), Gu Lixiang, Daodan yu Hanhgtian (Yunzai Jishu, April 2003), Bao Shixiu, “Deterrence revisited: Outer Space” (China Security, Winter 2006) and the “China Security Dossier” of the World Security Institute Chinese Program, 2006 Issue No. 2]. Considering that these plans could jeopardise China's vital national interests, it wants to prepare counter-measures to lend credibility to its own forces.
It is interesting to note in passing that the arms race in the world during the Cold War essentially resulted in strategic interaction between the US and the USSR, but what we have here is perhaps the first tangible sign of a potential arms race between the United States and China - not in the nuclear field but rather in the “new triad” defined by the Nuclear Posture Review de 2002 [This new deterrent triad does not comprise land-based nuclear weapons (submarine missile launchers) and strategic bombers as in the past, but rather offensive capabilities (nuclear, convention and non-kinetic), defensive systems (mainly anti-missile defence) and reactive infrastructure, to which one must add means of control, command, communication and intelligence.]. It is likely that rather than being convinced of the virtues of arms control in space, the US Administration will take the view that the Chinese test validates its strategy of space dominance and that the United States should therefore continue to develop its space capabilities with determination, including first-strike capabilities, and develop defence counter-measures (particularly quick launch measures). [Would Washington be tempted to replace the Iraqi or Iranian threat with a threat existing prior to, but obscured by, 9/11 and the Iraq War, namely the Chinese threat? It is not easy for a nation to emerge as a world power while remaining peaceful and harmonious. See the hearing of J. T. Mathews, president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, at the US Chamber of Representatives, 10 October 2007.] In turn, such a view is likely to have a perverse impact on other parties which, feeling threatened, would be encouraged to develop their own capabilities, however modest, with the whole cycle leading to lower overall security in the space environment. This is why the efforts currently being undertaken on either side of the Atlantic to define guidelines and confidence measures to ensure better space security (the European Union's draft code of conduct), the realisation by the Europeans of the need to provide themselves with autonomous space surveillance resources (surveillance and trajectory calculation, the ESA's SSA programme) over and above strictly military capabilities (the GRAVES ground radar in France), and the adoption at global level in 2007 of rules on the management of space debris [United Nations General Assembly resolution approving the COPUOS space committee's rules on debris mitigation in space, prepared following technical work by the IADC inter-agency group] are extremely important symbolically in that they are a counterweight to the now perceptible trend to weaponise space (although star wars is not reported to be on the horizon).
Europe's position
The European Union's space policy is designed as a “shared competence” in the meaning of the Lisbon Treaty, with each Member State sending a delegation of varying sizes to the European Space Agency to conduct the main development programmes. Since the first EU-ESA Space Council (1999), a better integrated European Space Policy (ESP) (in terms of the main principles at least) has been in the process of being drawn up. Given the changes in the EU's international partners, there seems to be a growing need to consolidate the image of a strong space Europe in its own right at global level. A Competitiveness Council meeting of ministers from the Member States was held in Guyana in July 2008, chaired by the French Presidency, which highlighted this mobilising theme. In the autumn of 2008, a joint EU-ESA Space Council will define a 'vision' in more detail, along with priorities (Galileo, GMES, how space technology can help tackle the issue of climate change, security, the Lisbon Strategy and space exploration). On 10 July 2008, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on space and security looking at the political issues surrounding EU's satellite capacity needs ahead of any future initiatives by the European Defence Agency and OCCAR (observation and surveillance).
Space technology astride globalisation and power struggles
Two dynamics superimpose on each other to fashion the world. On the one hand, there is globalisation with its well-known motives (financial liberalisation and a technological revolution) which creates interdependence and the use of networks. On the other hand, there is the geographical or geopolitical logic, which is right back and generates power struggles. In military terminology, two roads seem to be ahead of us, either merging or the fragmentation of the planet, either preserving unity or diversity in conflict. [Address at the 5th French Defence Ministry's DAS future planning seminar in 2008 by J. Dufourcq.] It is striking that space technology will play a role in both. Satellites are at the heart of globalisation networks (telecoms, navigation, detailed sat-navs and managing sustainable development). Space technology plays a crucial role in heading off and managing crises, leading armed operations (geographical information, geolocalisation and C4ISR) and, for some nations, in assuring their global strategic position. In the future, space may even become a battleground, with the dominant power for such a long time, the United States, being determined to use appropriate means to maintain freedom of action in this domain.
For a few years now, we have been seeing greater number of players enter the space arena and the desire of some of them for power. Only a handful of countries, however, which differ according to the modalities, control the entire range of space capabilities to the extent of acting like the United States and making this a key aspect of their overall strategy. From eight to ten countries (including Italy and Brazil in the long term) have direct access to space. The number of states with earth observation and reconnaissance satellites has doubled since 1999. The number of countries with satellite navigation satellites may triple. A huge number of new countries now have the infrastructure to receive satellite imagery and nearly forty countries have obtained operational control over their own space telecoms industry.
Against this dynamic but fragmented backdrop, Europe should be one of the key global players of reference and influence. Only a strong, autonomous, world-class space power relying on undeniable skills, long-lasting infrastructure, effective organisation and open to the world can meet the multi-polar challenges that are beginning to emerge in this domain and ensure profitable fallout for all its members, particularly the newest ones. The responsibilities of France in such a demanding international environment - France which has had a far-sighted, continuous space industry for 45 years now - goes well beyond the 2008 six-month presidency of the European Union and chairmanship of the ESA ministerial conference in the second half of this year.
Stepping back a little and ending on a positive note, it should be noted that the competition logic raised many times above, rightly so because it corresponds in fact to the historic period of transition that we have been living through, is not the only logic at work. In a difficult to predict timeframe, we can expect a pull in the opposite direction. In the space domain, space systems can actively help answer big issues facing humanity (the climate, the environment, communications, transport and security). It is likely that big, permanent space infrastructure (stations in orbit, coordinated exploration missions and even planetary exploration) will be organised on a global level by cooperative effort in the future as 'global public goods' rather than through highly costly competition between nations. [Interview with D. Vassaux, CNES.]
The current disorder due to erosion of the bi-polar world order (1990), and then the uni-polar order (since 2001-2003), may lead to a more open form of multi-polar global governance after the complex period of fragmentation and rebalancing that we are currently experiencing. Likewise, space policies, which are currently borne on a move towards greater national and regional pride, may later combine this with a comprehensive, international approach when it comes time to build infrastructure useful to all of mankind and our understanding of the universe. The big question is whether humanity can work together to develop and manage the most important global public goods, aware that the various players have very different visions of security, values and economic interests.