Continuing perplexity. The ceremony launching the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), which we reported upon widely in issue 9706, unfolded exactly as expected. No more and no less. There are two positive aspects to the UfM - refocussing political attention on this vast, crucial region, and also political dialogue among some participants on the fringes of the summit to try and ease conflict in the Middle East. But these are outweighed by areas of perplexity - a colossal mismatch between the aspirations and positions of non-EU Mediterranean countries, the vagueness of objectives, confirmation of disagreements over institutional issues, and a nebulous notion of budgets and finance. These disagreements and uncertainties impacted on the ceremony in the form of a few absences (Libya and the King of Morocco, in particular), diplomatic acrobatics to avoid the wrong people getting too close to each other, and dropping the traditional 'family photo'. Above all, over and above the official statements, several perplexed or sceptical attitudes were summed up in the comment by an old-hand in EuroMed cooperation (who had attended a similar ceremony in 1995 for the launch of the Barcelona process) that on that day in 1995, all the participating countries had been represented at the highest level but that afterwards nobody attended and that, politically, the process got bogged down. There are plans for a UfM summit every two years and we will have to wait until 2010 to see whether these turn out to be efficient meetings or superficial ceremonies.
Bilateralism works. My preceding comments refer to the new “Union” (a dangerous term given the meaning that the word has taken on in Europe) rather than to the current or foreseeable achievements and changes in the EU's relations with particular Mediterranean countries - a customs union with Turkey, a free trade zone with Tunisia (not covering farm products), a special partnership with Morocco, an energy partnership with Algeria, not to mention the EU's accession talks with Turkey and Croatia and, in time, other Balkan countries. But a 'Union' of 44 or 45 countries with such divergent ambitions and possibilities?
A sleight of hand that should be eliminated. First of all, the verbal sleight of hand of comparing the Union for the Mediterranean with the first European Community should be eliminated. It is true that unity in Europe started with tangible solidarity in the coal and steel industries but if we delve into the memoirs of Jean Monnet, we read that “the Schuman proposals were revolutionary. Their fundamental principle is the delegation of sovereignty in a restricted but decisive area. Cooperation among nations, no matter how large-scale, does not resolve anything.” The ECSC High Authority had a supranational structure and powers. Back then, coal played the role that oil plays today, and steel was the nervous system for wars. Comparisons will be valid on the day, for example, that Algeria and other oil countries agree to hand their fossil fuel reserves over to a supranational High Authority, decisions about oil are taken in common, and frontiers have been opened everywhere.
Comments on the common statement. Our readers can read the common statement approved in Paris in Issue 2500 of our Europe-Documents series. I will add a few comments. The statement announces that the Barcelona process has been extended to Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Montenegro and Monaco. The nature of the connections between the EU and the southern Mediterranean (which includes countries that cannot aspire to join the EU) has been watered down by this - does the extension run the risk of damaging cohesion since the objectives of the participants are so different?
Second comment: paragraph 2 of the statement sings the praises of the Barcelona process and its ambitions and results, the aim of the new UfM being to reinforce it. Does this contradict the previous statements on failure of the Barcelona process? The political part of the statement (peace, security, democratisation, human rights and fundamental rights) explicitly quotes from the 1995 Barcelona statement. Several commentators have criticised the new plan for its neglect of these aspects - they have indeed been included - but referring to the Barcelona document.
Third comment: non-EU Mediterranean states were able to have their main demand clearly incorporated in the statement. The new initiative will complement the bilateral relations between the EU and the Mediterranean countries (they are set out in a list). These bilateral relations will continue to exist in the current frameworks (paragraph 13). The UfM's action will be independent of the EU's enlargement policy, the accession negotiations and the pre-accession process. It has therefore been established that each country shall keep its objectives and ambitions which we know are so radically different and are, for the countries concerned, far more important than involvement in the new UfM, namely some of them want to join the EU, others want a special partnership with the EU, energy cooperation in one case and free trade in another.
Fuzzy finance. The financial aspect has not been forgotten. For some non-EU member states, it is essential. But as we know, the EU has its worries - the member states' budgetary situations means they have to tighten their belt. The big pools of monetary reserves and cash are found in other climes these days, like China and oil producing countries. European countries are finding it hard to consolidate their social systems. The funding section of the common statement (paragraph 31) is therefore cautious. An annex to the common statement reassures non-EU Mediterranean states, however, by stipulating that it will not be possible to fund the six “regional projects” decided upon, (cleaning up the Mediterranean Sea, highways of the sea, solar plans, etc) to the detriment of existing bilateral budget resources and no use will be made of bilateral EU subsidies under the EU neighbourhood policy or the pre-accession fund. Beneficiary countries managed to have this spelt out. On alternative sources of funding, however, the above-mentioned paragraph 31 of the common statement does not make any commitments. Instead, it sets out a principle - the new UfM will have to have supplementary sources of funding. Alongside this principle there is simply a list of possible sources - contributions from the EU budget, contributions from partner countries, private sector funding and the use of existing loan instruments.
Institutions to be developed. The most detailed section of the statement is the one on institutional functioning and the additional bureaucracy to be set up in Brussels and elsewhere. But the controversial issues have not been settled, like how long Sarkozy's co-presidency will last, where the new permanent secretariat will be located (we know that many cities have put themselves forward), and the funding. For the moment, we know that the secretariat will have its own distinct 'legal personality' and an autonomous statement (paragraph 24). The foreign ministers will have to clarify these issues and decide by consensus. The UfM will not be short of devoted officials and there is no fear of not having enough candidates.
Several simple conclusions. My overview of the texts and the reality on the ground, beyond the inevitable rhetoric at the official ceremonies leads me to a handful of simple conclusions:
1) The word “Union” does not fit. The term “Union” is just a rhetorical flourish. There is no unity of action or ambitions now or in the future between Croatia and Egypt, Mauritania and Slovenia, Monaco and Egypt, Turkey and Algeria. Each country is continuing to pursue its own objectives, as before.
2) In areas where some meeting of minds seems to exist on objectives, no concrete action could have a multilateral nature if the southern Mediterranean countries fail to act as a single body. This applies to the EuroMed free trade zone. This is not just my opinion - it is a stubborn fact. Free trade zones are areas where goods circulate freely among all participating countries and there are uniform rules, failing which it is at most possible to introduce a variable degree of bilateral freedom of trade between the EU and specific countries on the southern Mediterranean shores. And this is precisely what is happening - be it fully (as with Turkey), to a very wide extent (Tunisia) or partially. It is not because a French secretary of state (Anne-Marie Idrac) announces that a EuroMed free trade zone in 2010 is “everything but theoretical” that anything changes on the ground. Official documents, including European Parliament statements, should take this on board rather than simply swallowing suggested timetables devoid of any meaning.
3) Weakened cross-compliance? The common statement repeats the grand principles and political objectives of the 1995 Barcelona text (see above) but when push comes to shove, respect of these principles is not a precondition for implementing the UfM. Its bodies and institutions exist and the door is open for the listed projects. Nicolas Sarkozy's attitude is well-known - the EU will remain faithful to its principles and continue to pursue them, but if it waits for democracy, freedom and human rights to be recognised and put in practice everywhere before taking action, EU dialogue and cooperation with the rest of the world would not amount to very much.
Reducing preconditions is seen by some as a sign of realism and by others as an unacceptable step backwards. The contradictory reactions at the European Parliament to Sarkozy's decision to attend the Olympic Games opening ceremony in Beijing are typical of these extremes when it comes to evaluation. To what extent can the EU “lecture” and dictate to other communities and cultures that they must adopt EU rules and principles? There is no simple answer to this given that the EU itself would not countenance being asked to give up its own principles. This is an important aspect of EuroMed relations and I will return to it in my column tomorrow. (F.R./transl.fl)