Political message from Dmitri Medvedev. There is no consistency in the analyses of the outcome of last week's EU-Russia summit. Several commentators have highlighted the decision, finally, many months late, to open the long-planned partnership agreement talks; others the difficulties to be overcome. The points are, both, very real. The decision to set up a “strategic partnership” has a significance that is far greater than the muted response to the opening of negotiations on Friday. At the same time, it is true that the obstacles are sizeable. I believe that, all in all, the optimism is justified, if a number of conditions are met. Results could be quicker and more concrete than those of other projects announced amid considerable hype, but which are largely extravagant and unrealistic, such as the Euro-Mediterranean free trade area or the EU-Mercosur free trade agreement. With the Russians, the objectives are, to a large extent, shared by both sides.
Before the summit, new Russian President Dmitri Medvedev made a political gesture at a conference in Berlin by outlining a three-headed West: Russia, Europe and the United States. This is a radically new vision. The planet used to be divided into three parts: the West, the Communist states and the “third world” (developing countries). Only the last of these terms is now used from time to time, although it no longer carries any meaning. And here is a Russian president placing his country in the West! Of course, one must beware of giving too much importance to a university speech, but it would indeed seem clear that Mr Medvedev wanted to send his message. He knew that Europe was wondering about the stance he would take, his personality, his intentions, and he wanted to give an answer. The ideological bases for taking EU-Russian relations out of an often stormy period are now there.
Two basic differences. Mr Medvedev's theoretical direction does not mean that change will be in any way easy. Those who have had to conduct negotiations with Russia are of one voice: Russians are skilful, often stubborn, negotiators and they never appear to be in a hurry. The preparatory phase of the current relaunch was, indeed, informative. The opening of talks was linked to specific issues, such as restrictions on the export of meat; and if Moscow was unhappy with the way a Baltic country acted, the supply of Russian fuels was halted - always, of course, for technical reasons that had nothing got do with the real source of conflict.
On the level of principles, two differences had already appeared before formal negotiations were opened: one apparently formal (the nature of the agreement, see our newsletter No 9692), the other relating to the issue that is fundamental to future relations - energy. On the first, a diplomat summed up: “We'll have to be somewhere between a basic contents list and an encyclopaedia”. The second foresees a key point of the negotiations.
Before the summit, Gazprom officials had made all sorts of great statements on their company's ambitions, seeking to become the largest distributor of natural gas to European users, while, of course, retaining the dual role of producer and transporter. Two European commissioners, Peter Mandelson and Neelie Kroes, have already given a firm response: any Gazprom activity in the EU will be required to comply with Community rules (and so, there would have to be unbundling of production and transport activities, in whichever form the EU decides on definitively) in the same way as European companies operating in Russia have to comply with Russian rules. This is the first example of the difficulties that will be met during negotiations on energy issues.
(Difficult) requirement for compact EU. For the EU, it will be essential to present a united front. This would seem, at first, to be self-evident; but for the energy sector it has to be underlined and repeated, since hitherto it is the “everyman for himself” principle that has held sway, both within governments and companies. Several member states have hastened to develop privileged links with Russia, outside any European policies: the oil pipelines affair is, at one and the same time, a good illustration and a matter of deep disappointment. In this area, Russia is strong and compact, the EU is divided and, therefore, weak. Yet the trump cards the EU holds are of incalculable value: outlets, duration, technology, investment. It is only by acting together that the EU will be able to use them effectively.
(F.R./transl.rt)