Yesterday, when I wrote that official positions on Turkey have not changed, I was also referring to the vote at the European Parliament: - there was a very clear majority in favour of membership (467 in favour, 62 against and 61 abstentions). However, when it comes to substance, it has been noted that: - a) several MEPs have taken a stance in favour of the alternative solution to membership, i.e. a privileged partnership. In my article yesterday, I cited Jacques Toubon, but Werner Langen of Germany spoke along the same lines and the result of the vote shows that this tendency is gaining ground; - and b) the resolution approved, while being in favour of accession, highlights the conditions and denounces the slowness of the progress. Describing 2007 as a lost year, the EP requests that 2008 be the year of reforms, stressing that failure to comply with commitments will continue to seriously affect the negotiation process (see our bulletin 9665 on the debate and vote of 21 May).
What the Turkish foreign minister said. The EU-Turkey joint parliamentary committee (composed of parliamentarians of both parties) then met on 28 May and the problems of substance of the situation in Turkey were raised. These are: freedom of expression, institutional procedure underway against the party in power and the prime minister; refusal to apply the customs union rules to Cyprus, the attitude towards Iraqi Kurdistan, and delays in the Nabucco project. The Turkish foreign minister, Ali Babacan, answered MEPs on the following two points in particular:
- Slowness of reforms. Mr Babacan said there can be no timetable imposed as no deadline exists for accession either. European Commissioner Olli Rehn replied that the accession date depends precisely on reforms and above all on their implementation, and Rapporteur Ria Oomen-Ruijten (Dutch member of the EPP Group) recalled that the EU had fixed the accession date for Bulgaria and Romania beforehand and “very much regrets having done so”. Mr Babacan then pointed out that, without the goal of membership before it, his country would find it difficult to keep up the momentum for reforms.
- Revision of Article 301 of the penal code. MEPs took the view that revision is insufficient as it is no guarantee of freedom of expression. Mr Babacan replied that the approach consisting of revising the former norms is more important than the exact terms of the new text, as it proves that the Turkish parliament does not consider the present situation satisfactory.
The Turkish minister also spoke out before the foreign affairs committee of the European Parliament, mainly on three things:
- The situation in Cyprus. Mr Babacan explained that his country and the EU do indeed have a different interpretation of the Ankara protocol (which above all relates to equal access to Turkish ports for goods from all member states, including Cyprus), but that this divergence will automatically disappear if negotiations rekindled between the two parts of the island result in agreement. This is the opportunity that must be seized, and MEPs should support the process underway with all their might. The minister, however, also pointed out that Turkey has a role of guarantor to play in Cyprus, that is, it has responsibility for the security of those living there.
- Iraqi Kurdistan. Mr Babacan explained that Turkey respects the territorial sovereignty of Iraq, and that its interventions are limited to pursuing terrorists in the north of Iraq.
- Turkey's energy policy. Mr Babacan confirmed his government's support to the Nabucco project, while explaining that the participation of a growing number of countries puts a brake on the progress, which is therefore less rapid than expected. One will recall that Turkey had prevented Gaz de France from entering the Nabucco consortium, and that the French giant then moved towards active participation in the South Stream rival project, launched by Gazprom (in which other EU member states play an active part).
Reasons for which Turkey cannot link its action to Community rules and procedures
It is becoming increasingly obvious from the above that, in the areas mentioned and in others, Turkey needs to be able to make autonomous decisions and have freedom of action. I would go as far as to say that it is impossible for it to give this up. It is understandable that the authorities don't mention it, as possible renunciation of membership is an option for which Ankara will be able to request considerable compensation, not only financial but also political and economic. I am convinced, however, that there is no other possible outcome, unless ….. Unless Europe itself gives up its ambitions of integration, agrees to weaken its common policies and discards the aim of strengthening its institutional workings. In this case, why should Turkey not be allowed to enter? It is not by chance that the member states most in favour of Turkey's membership are those that reject consolidation of integration, do not take part in single currency or the Schengen Area, distrust common policies and wish to reduce the Community budget. If this tendency prevails, why should Turkey not be allowed to enter? In this case, the evolution towards the “two Europes” would become inevitable. But we are not there yet, and for now efforts are being made in the other direction: - ratification and entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, institutional reinforcement, consolidation and development of the eurozone, consolidation of common policies, and expansion of financial perspectives. These ambitions are incompatible with Turkey's membership and unacceptable for Ankara. Let us have a look at the essential dossiers:
1. Turkey and Cyprus. It is good news that talks are being resumed between the two parts of the island and it is logical that the Turkish government affirms that, in the event of agreement on reunification, the question of the regime that its country applies to Cyprus would be settled. But, going beyond congratulations for rekindling dialogue, reality is more complicated. During a visit to France this month, the Cypriot foreign minister, Markos Kyprianou, gave a few indications about the starting positions, and, as he sees it, the positions of the “Turkish” part of the island are the “positions of Ankara”, which is the real interlocutor.
In particular: a) Future status of Cyprus. The Cypriot minister said: “We refuse the creation of a new state and defend continuity of the Republic of Cyprus. Ankara maintains that it is first of all necessary to recognise two countries in order to conceive a new federation, the model of Czechoslovakia sometimes being evoked”. b) Military regime. “In our view, Cyprus will continue to be a member of the EU and does not need a third country to guarantee its security. Turkey plans to keep troops there and speaks of its right to intervene in Cyprus if it considers it necessary”. c) Population. Most inhabitants of the northern part of the island are not Turkish Cypriots but Turks from Turkey who arrived after the colonist war. Except for a few exceptions, they must leave”. This, of course, is a stance rejected by Ankara.
Real relations between the Turks who reside in Cyprus and Turkey had been described in this column almost two years ago (our bulletin No 9239 of July 2006), and I'm not going back on it. Also, see above for what Ali Babacan says about his country's responsibilities for the security of the population.
2. Turkey's political and strategic role. Turkey has an essential and direct role to play in the very vast Asian zone covered by the states of the former Soviet Union (USSR), which reconquered their independence and often have huge oil resources. It needs freedom of action, as the EU cannot be directly involved. The EU cannot be dragged into quarrels that may be vital for Turkey but foreign to Europe, apart from the Kurdish issue. What will happen when Iraqi Kurdistan gains independence? Europe will be interested as an importer of oil but it is not up to Europe to interfere, while Turkey needs its autonomy and its ability to take its own decisions and to defend its political as well as economic interests without having to go through Brussels.
3. Internal policy. It is not up to Europe to intervene in a country's internal affairs, whether that country be a member state or a country aspiring to join, except if freedom, democracy or other essential principles are at stake. This is the case in the affair concerning the request put to the constitutional court for a five-year ban from political life of the president of the Republic, the prime minister and 75 executives of the political party that largely won the elections. The situation is hard to believe and Daniel Cohn-Bendit found it “surrealistic” (see this column in bulletins No 9650 and 9651). But indications from Turkey predict that the constitutional court will dissolve the AKP party and that the prime minster will be banished from taking part in political life for five years! It is already said to be a question of preparing a partial legislative election where Mr Erdogan would be an independent candidate. What stance should the EU take between a military power, which wants to safeguard the country's secular nature by every means possible, and a civil power that may evolve towards a religious authority in order to defend itself? And how could Turkey, for its part, allow European intromission? Neither must we forget the problem of freedom of religion and the Kurdish question, which is still a cause for anxiety, or the comment by Minister Babacan cited above, whereby the momentum for reform could weaken if there were no “accession” carrot, which means that this momentum does not exist spontaneously of its own accord. What would the situation be like the day accession is reached?
In my opinion, this brings us to the conclusion that full membership by Turkey would distort the nature of the EU and is impossible for Turkey itself. It is necessary to prepare an alternative solution.
(F.R.)