When waiting is an urgent matter. This formula has become banal but I think it appropriate as a provisional conclusion to the considerations developed in this column on EU trade policy. In the ongoing reflection, two points need to be considered, in my opinion, as having been accepted: a) the battle against bogus products has to be expanded and deepened because counterfeiting is no longer simply a matter of impeding trade, to be fought with the usual instruments, but has now become a threat to health, safety and the environment and it finances organised crime and terrorism; b) Europe has to preserve and develop a strong and diverse manufacturing base by using normal trade defence instruments to combat dumping and other unfair trade practices.
As well as these two aspects, the EU cannot afford to regard four other ongoing developments in an abstract manner, the results of which will need waiting for, to define an overall European global strategy. There are other aspects, particularly linked to exchange rates, but these are permanent and have to be tackled in the here and now. The four uncertain aspects requiring further clarification involve:
1. The results of the Doha round. My mind was made up long ago: if we want to reach an agreement, we have to take note of the results that have already been accomplished (which go beyond anything obtained in previous rounds of the same kind) and put an end to the quarrels on additional improbable or inopportune concessions. In the knowledge of what we now know about the risks to the food situation in the world, Europe has to reject any kind of measure that will reduce its agricultural production and prospects of food self-sufficiency. Rising agricultural prices, world cereal production below the level of consumption, the increasing use of maize in Brazil and the US to replace oil, impending international restrictions on exports (the most recent example was rice), uncertainties about the safety of some imported products, all indicate that any programmed reduction of the EU's agricultural production would be a crime against the food security of Europeans and humanity as a whole. Whatever Peter Mandelson or this or that Swedish minister believes, the EU has reached a limit on possible concessions. Let's not forget that the EU is already the biggest importer of agricultural goods in the world.
2. The new American president. The two candidates of the Democrat Party have announced a more protectionist trade policy that threatens the free-trade zone with Mexico and Canada (Alena) and consider that the US has already promised too much in the Doha round. One of the Republican candidate's promises includes the intention of extending Alena and its free trade to Europe. We can see that these are radically different orientations. Important Euro-American cooperation projects are up and running or being prepared but confirmation of the divergences and difficulties are at the same time being illustrated. We'll have to wait for the new president to outline what the Euro-American future will be.
3. Partnership agreements with Africa. Several African countries reject the hypothesis of gradual free trade with Europe and are strengthening their ties with China. The European Commission is preparing to negotiate agreements in which development policy will be a priority in relation to trade aspects. Uncertainty reigns: special Euro-African relations could be watered down or even relaunched. We will have to wait until the end of the year to see the lie of the land more clearly.
4. Gas and oil supply lines from Russia. The EU cannot do without oil products from Russia, as well as other sources from the same immense region in the world. It must, however, resolve the question of transport infrastructure, which is creating enormous political, environmental and financial problems. In connection with Nabucco, South-Stream (which Russia has managed to push forward considerably) and the very controversial North Stream, under the Baltic Sea, the diplomatic war and conflicts of interests are colossal. At the moment there is no certainty at all about what will happen.
We need to follow developments in these four dossiers so that we can measure and outline future European trade policy. The era of unlimited imports without precautions or reciprocity is over. What is the use of the rules Europe developed for itself and continues to develop (on the environment, food safety, quality, intellectual property and so forth) if it allows unlimited products in from outside and which do not respect these rules? (F.R.)