The EU is right to be considering how it works. The repercussions of the creation of new states on the make up and operation of the EU cannot be ignored. Every new-born state which joins will, of course, be represented in the European Parliament, Council and Commission. The latest case being spoken about is that of Kosovo. Montenegro has been in existence for some time and there is provision for its accession. Before that, Czechoslovakia split in two, resulting in the double accession of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Some political commentators are now talking about Belgium. Some of the reticence on Kosovo is, of course, linked to a fear of a domino effect, which would strengthen aspirations towards independence, or enhanced autonomy, in other regions. Specifically, mention is made in the media of the Basque country, Scotland, Catalonia, and others.
It is not up to the EU to intervene in the internal politics of its member states, but it has an obligation to consider how it works. The European institutions cannot ignore this point. If every population with a history and traditions had the right to be represented, the EU would become unmanageable. The only logical response is for those Community bodies whose role is to represent the regions to become more influential in Brussels. They are increasingly being listened to, as can be seen with the Committee of the Regions and the associations around it. That is the way it should be, because every identity has to be respected. But the EU has also to be able to operate.
The Kosovo case gives food for thought. The case of Kosovo has already given, and will continue to give, great cause for thought. In most capitals, it would appear that the move towards independence now seems unavoidable. It is stated that this is a special case which cannot be considered a precedent. That's fine, but a certain consistency is needed. Some of the statements from the Kosovan authorities have astounded me. The starting point for their call for independence is that there are no borders which, when faced with a people's desire and identity, are inalienable, and that Kosovars are not Serbs. Yet, at the same time, these same authorities vigorously reject the notion that the indisputably Serbian part of the present “province” which is seeking independence could in the future be transferred to Serbia, because the borders of this “province” are inalienable. I just don't understand. Why would the principle that, in their opinion, justifies the independence of Kosovo no longer be valid? Can principles be changed to suit circumstances? If borders which had been set for the Republic of Serbia are not to be considered as definitive, then those of the “provinces” of that same Serbia cannot be either, the will of the inhabitants being the deciding factor.
That point apart, it would serve no purpose whatsoever to recall here the position adopted by the European Council at the end of last week, since our newsletter provided ample coverage of the long and tortuous diplomatic preparations, and the text approved by heads of state and government was reproduced in full in our special Sunday edition (No 9566, paragraphs 65-70 of the Conclusions). After which, the EU approach was firmly rejected by Belgrade and deemed illegal by Moscow. The Serbian prime minister rejected them as being unacceptable and said that the compensatory offer by the EU to speed up his country's accession was indecent. Given the likelihood that the UN will not be able to find an agreement in the short term, if Kosovo declares itself independent, the secession of the areas inhabited by Serbs, and their annexation by Serbia, would, at first sight, appear to be a logical step.
From Kosovo to Cyprus. The case of Kosovo could make that of Cyprus unavoidable. For Turkey, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is a reality: it is occupied by its soldiers, and everything suggests that the local population (half of which are immigrants from Anatolia) does not consider them as invaders. Almost a year and a half ago, analysis of the situation led me to state that the TRNC was already almost part of Turkey (see this column in newsletter No 9239). If there is no reunification of Cyprus and if, hypothetically, the TRNC were accepted into the EU as an independent state, the result would be that Turkey would already have its commissioner in Brussels, its seat on the Council and six MEPs in Strasbourg. After a visit to the island, MEP Françoise Grossetête reached similar conclusions (while still hoping that reunification would be possible).
My conclusion is related to the start of this commentary: the EU must be careful of the implications of the accession of divided countries. There are, however, positive developments to which I will return tomorrow.
(F.R.)