We've had enough hypocrisy. Politically, the Galileo dossier is extremely simple. Either Europe believes it to be an important project from a scientific and economic point of view, as well as for its strategic independence and image in the world, or it takes the view that it is of secondary importance. If the former, the few hundred million euros which are needed (over several years) do not justify the hesitation. If the latter, we should give it up and go on to other exercises.
Vital project, details to be discussed. The European Commission is convinced of the significance and advantages of Galileo, and it has put forward appropriate proposals. In theory, the European Parliament very strongly agrees, whilst, quite logically, reserving the right to voice an opinion on the finer details. Within the Council, the vast majority of member states share this assessment: it is a vital project, but the details remain to be discussed. The United Kingdom is less than enthusiastic, taking the view that the similar project underway in the United States should be enough for the entire Western world, and the Netherlands have shown misgivings, mainly, apparently, for budgetary reasons (EU expenditure is currently an obsession for the Dutch). A certain number of precautions are justified: no member state would like to see its own industry sacrificed; the commitments and responsibilities of the participant companies must be clarified; a few technical aspects are still to be resolved. But on the very principle of moving forward, how can there be any hesitation? The choices must be clear. Those who are against must have the courage to say so frankly, without hiding behind excuses or aspects of the detail. The planned relaunch of the project, prepared under the responsibility of Vice President Jacques Barrot and taken up by the Commission, ticks all of the boxes and brings a reasonable, courageous but simple response to the financial side of things. The reactions must therefore be political, first and foremost.
Galileo is an example of what Etienne Davignon was saying some 10 days ago about the role of the European Commission (see this column in our bulletin 9507): the Commission is more vital today than ever before, because it is the only institution which is able to define the European common interest. When there were six member states, they could define it between themselves: now that there are 27, it is completely out of the question. The Commission has done its work and the time for decisions has come. This will start with the budgetary procedure anticipated by our editor in the bulletin 9503. When he announced two days later that the Commission had taken up his draft, Jacques Barrot reiterated the economic and political scale of Galileo. We must now make sure that the budgetary procedure just getting underway does not overshadow what's at stake. It may be helpful briefly to recap a bit of history.
From national level to European level. It does not often happen that a project of such scale owes its chances of success to two people, but this is the case with Galileo. François Lamoureux launched the idea and managed to make it stick by fighting for it with passion, talent and consistency, right up until his sad death. Jacques Barrot got the project out of the crisis which looked for a while like it might submerge it, by defining the industrial and financial formula for its relaunch, by dint of in-depth and relentless work involving assessments, analyses, surveys and consultations. Both men understood the need to take the project from national level to European level. After the Second World War, France's ambition was to be present in all great scientific and technological adventures undertaken by humanity: the atom (military and civil), the conquest of space, the supersonic aircraft, high-speed. There came a time when it became impossible for a single European country to pursue all of these objectives, and the far-sighted French understood that its efforts must become European in nature, for reasons of efficiency as well as for reasons of idealism. And this was what they fought for.
But nothing can ever be taken for granted. Certain aspects of the crisis in the Galileo project were unpleasant, or at least not entirely clear. These days, we are always hearing that the public-private partnership set in place could not possibly be viable and that the construction phase of the infrastructure must, of necessity, be paid for out of the public coffers. Why did the companies in question not say so at the time? There are two possible explanations: either there were errors of assessment, or there were possibly less shining calculations, based on the certainty that once the project had reached the stage at which it would cost more to abandon it than to put in the additional funds out of the public coffers, the EU and the member states would be obliged to find the money. It seems certain to me that the behaviour of the large companies in question, or of some of them, may have left bitter tastes in certain mouths. Jacques Barrot has said that “the tension between the European industries is regrettable”, which means that there is something to regret.
The wisdom of paying for it out of the Community budget. Let's leave the past to one side. The new financial plan is there and, pending the outcome of the parliamentary debate, appears reasonable. An additional €2.4 billion must be found, mainly for the construction and launch of the satellites, and there are three possible forms of funding: by the member states, by ESA (European Space Agency), and out of the budget of the EU. The Commission is going along with the last of these, and the reasons forwarded by Mr Barrot to disregard the other two are highly convincing: a) ten member states are not members of ESA and the European Parliament has no powers of financial control over it; b) funding by the member states would require a complex mechanism for “sharing the burden”, with the risk that the principle of “fair returns” may be brought in, which would end up taking priority over industrial and scientific effectiveness.
On top of these reasons, there is the fact that Community funding would bring about no increase of the “financial perspectives” for the coming years. The 400 million euros to be included in each of the next six annual budgets of the EU would be covered by the reduction of the budgetary envelopes destined for the Common agriculture policy (CAP) and administrative expenditure. Budget Commissioner Dalia Grybauskaité and the commissioners for agriculture and administrative management have given their agreement to this, because for several years now, the funds earmarked for both of these sectors have not been entirely used up, and the commissioners know that nothing will change until 2013. The agriculture policy will not be affected in any way; this is European money which would not be used and which would anyway be returned to the member states at the end of the financial year. As Jacques Barrot stressed in his press conference, it is the finance ministers who will need to be convinced to give up this refund. Various commentators in the press (of the “Brussels is digging into the agricultural expenditure coffers to pay for Galileo” variety) are wrong, and the protests from the British Conservatives within the European Parliament are halfway between ridiculous and absurd. Geoffrey Van Orden went for a tone of indignation when he accused the European Commission of having proposed, with “tactless indifference”, to reduce subsidies to British farmers, whose profit margins are already under pressure from the market. But, as we have seen, nobody's subsidy will be touched. And when you consider how much the British parliamentarians in general, and the Conservatives in particular, have fought and continue to fight against CAP subsidies and in favour of the opening-up of the European market to agricultural products from the entire world, you can see the lengths ill faith can go to when trying to demolish what the Community institutions are doing (or are trying to do).
Management to be transformed. But, moving on from these pleasant asides, if the financial plank of Galileo is sorted out (not forgetting that, given the modest scale of the envisaged revision of the “financial perspectives”, the European Parliament will deliberate this by simple majority and the Council by qualified majority), the lion's share still remains to be done: the radical revision of the way in which the project is managed. The Commission tried to define a structure which was both effective and institutionally correct. They found it necessary to combine political controls, with the obligatory participation of the European Parliament and of the Council, with the “decision-making” capacity which was missing in the previous phase. A significant role for the member states is politically indispensable, but national blocking of decisions should not be made too easy, as this would pave the way for blackmail or demands dictated by specific interests. At the same time, a certain balance between the member states must be respected.
The Commission has suggested a four-stage structure. At the bottom, a political body whose functioning will be tricky to define. The management of the programme - second level - would be mainly down to the Commission itself. At the third level, that of the “master builder”, would be ESA, with responsibilities including “tender procedures” for the production and launch satellites. At the fourth level would be the most highly technical tasks; preparing and validating contracts, assisting the Commission in its management.
Anybody not wanting to take part can leave. Negotiations on the creation of this structure will be arduous and can be completed only if the authorities with responsibility - the European Parliament and the Council first and foremost - always bear in mind the importance and significance of the project, without ruling out the extreme solution: leaving aside those who refuse to play the game. Anybody who doesn't like it can stay on the outside of Galileo, at a time when so many third countries would like to get involved. Their choice.
(F.R.)