Last week, my commentaries concentrated on several aspects of the new European treaty as defined by the summit. It remains only for me to draw a few conclusions, based partly on comments made by public figures such as Jacques Delors, Etienne Davignon, Jean-Claude Juncker and a few others.
False impression of an institutional step backwards. To start with, I would like to challenge the view of certain commentators that the resumption of the intergovernmental conference (IGC) procedure means a return to diplomatic negotiations, and a step backwards from the achievements of the Convention which brought in transparency (openness to the public, availability of all documents) and the direct involvement of the parliaments (European and national) and, to an extent, of civil society. It is true in theory, but not in this particular case, because the new treaty corresponds to what was approved by the Convention, very often word for word. In most cases, the IGC will not be able to change a thing. The elements which have been removed generally correspond to what had more or less explicitly been rejected by certain populations or national parliaments, because they gave the impression of working towards the creation of a super-state. The German presidency stated that the concerns voiced by the populations in the public debates held in various member states during the reflection period have been taken into account.
Considerable (and underplayed) progress in the defence policy. My second comment refers to the progress confirmed by the heads of government in the field of defence. This progress was, to my certain knowledge, underplayed by the commentators, quite simply because the provisions of the draft Constitutional Treaty were taken up without any opposition from anyone, which meant that they gave rise to no controversy or debate. However, the progress made is extremely significant. “Permanent structured cooperation in the field of defence” is explicitly referred to and clarified in a mandate for the IGC. It will be created by those member states which would like to take part in it and will be in a position to do so, fulfilling the criteria and subscribing to the required commitments. The list of participant countries will be drawn up by the Council by qualified majority; the same procedure will then apply for any other participant countries to join at a later date, but when this happens, only those states which are members of the “cooperation” will have the right to vote. The texts had been prepared by the Naples IGC (November 2003), containing a radical revision of what the Convention had set in place. They are clear and detailed.
The mandate for the IGC does not quote the second essential innovation in the defence policy, which is the “solidarity clause”, and I had wondered about the destiny to be reserved for it by the summit (see the first paragraph of this section in bulletin 9455). People who are far more attentive and better informed than I were able to reassure me: the provisions which the “mandate” to the IGC does not explicitly refer to remain valid as they stand in the draft Treaty approved by the heads of state and government on 10 June 2004. This means that an obligation will be brought in for the member states to provide aid and assistance “by all means in their power” to a member state which is the target of armed aggression. This is not a proper military alliance, because those member states with a policy of neutrality will not be obliged to intervene and the NATO Treaty will remain, for the states which are a member of it, the “the basis of their collective defence and the governing body of its implementation”. But how can anyone fail to see the political scope of this clause? The Union will finally have a provision which, for the time being, features only in the WEU Treaty.
Less obvious innovations. Third fundamental comment: the importance of various significant innovations may be difficult for the general public to perceive. Of these, I quote: a) the primacy of Community law: the legal interpretation of this principle, as affirmed by the Court of Justice, will be annexed to the treaty in the form of the declaration by the legal service, but it is loud and clear; b) the “legal personality”: this will allow the EU as an entity to conclude agreements and treaties on behalf of all member states; c) the removal of the “three pillars” with different legal status and which confer unequal competencies of the European institutions; d) the clarification of “who does what” in Europe: exclusive competencies of the EU, competencies shared with the member states, national competencies.
As for the new challenges, it isn't a treaty which will lay down the orientations to follow, but the principle is affirmed that the EU will act as a body in fields such as globalisation, energy security, the fight against global warming, immigration and the battle against terrorism. These subjects, as Etienne Davignon stressed, “can only be tackled collectively”, and the instruments to do so have finally been created. Along the same lines, Viscount Davignon pointed out that the long list of fields in which decisions will be taken by qualified majority in the future, will make it possible, by removing individual rights of veto, to apply two essential principles: 1) no member state can be obliged to do anything it does not want to, but no member state can prevent the others from moving forward; 2) abuses of the blocking minority system runs counter to the very spirit of Community solidarity.
Furthermore, I would also like to stress that those who are the most directly involved greeted with equanimity the fact that “free and non-distorted competition” will no longer feature among the “principles” of the Union, in the text of the treaty, but among the “objectives” described in a protocol. Also, not only those who formerly held responsibility for competition policy, Karel van Miert and Mario Monti, but the current incumbent, Neelie Kroes, as well, laid emphasis on the fact that this will do nothing to change the rules in place, or institutional powers. However, the affair gave rise to much ado and much commentary, and I intend to return to it in detail in the near future.
National parliaments: no danger. The shoring-up of the powers of the national parliaments in European affairs would have been dangerous if it had given rise to a kind of “right of veto” over the initiatives of the European Commission. But this is not really the case, because the conditions are clear: it would require 55% of the member states (in voting rights) and the majority of the European Parliament opposing the same text. And Karel Van Miert commented: “if this is the case, the Commission's draft would, in any case, be dead in the water!”, and it would be the Community institutions which rejected it. As the legal limitations are clear, the close involvement of the national parliaments in EU activities is a positive thing, because the essential aspects of Union life are part of them: ratification of any new treaty (including the next one), approving the revenue which is the lifeblood of the EU, various essential aspects of European foreign policy. It is far preferable that these parliaments can carry out these powers in full knowledge of them, with frequent discussions of European affairs and by pursuing, or even by reinforcing, their collaboration with the European Parliament.
Appearances and reality. I would also like to turn very briefly to the orientations of the summit, on which various commentators missed the point, in my opinion, by attributing importance to something which, in actual fact, has none, i.e.: a) the title of the person with responsibility for European Foreign Affairs. This person will not be called minister, but high representative. So what? To borrow words from Etienne Davignon: “As if this person's power and influence depended on the title on the business card!” Javier Solana and his successors will chair the Council tasked with External Relations and will be vice-presidents of the Commission. This is what counts (and which may lead to practical difficulties due to… excessive powers); b) giving up on including the flag and the anthem of Europe in the text. I repeat: So what? On this subject, I will turn to the words of Jean-Claude Juncker: “It is not important, because the people of Europe have far more good sense than some of its leaders: they will continue to love the flag, they will continue to love the anthem. But I am bowled over to note that the very people who criticise Europe for keeping too great a distance between itself and its citizens have removed the symbols which the people have already by and large adopted”.
Jacques Delors invites us to anticipate. Generally speaking, even those who believe (Romano Prodi, Jo Leinen, etc) that the new treaty is a step backwards from the draft Constitutional Treaty, acknowledged that it constitutes “progress in all sectors compared to the treaties currently in force”. Jacques Delors observed that “as always in the European saga, two steps forwards are accompanied by one step backwards”, but that, compared to the previous situation, the result “gains years for European construction”. But the steps forward are not yet in the bag. Thanks to various institutional innovations (extending majority voting, increasing Parliament/Council co-decision, etc), and thanks to the definition of new objectives, the conditions for progress to be made have been created. However, Jacques Delors continued: “We will wait until 2010 to judge the capacity of the Union to use the possibilities opened up by the reforming treaty to increase security for the citizens by reinforcing police and penal cooperation, and to judge the willingness to define a framework for public services, adapted to the needs and traditions of each country”.
But he also emphasised a point which I believe is of fundamental importance: there are initiatives which do not have to wait for the new treaty to enter into force, particularly a “pact for the coordination of the national economic policies, and an explicit mandate for the Economics/Finance Council to express itself on the international scene, in the face of monetary disorder”. And he quoted as even “more urgent, a commitment to fund the Galileo project, an instrument of the power and autonomy of Europe”, concluding: “when will we have the first initiative for progress to be made by a group of member states, on economic and monetary union, on social issues, or energy?” The question remains the same: Will Jacques Delors be listened to?
(F.R.)