What is new in terms of preparation for the European Council which, in two weeks' time, is due to make a statement on the new European Treaty? From the German presidency, virtually nothing; from other governments, some, occasionally encouraging, signs; from other players, several initiatives which could take on some significance when the texts are developed, but which, for the moment, have little influence, little response and few readers.
The Merkel method. The presidency's cautious attitude is understandable. Calls for transparency have, at the moment, been invested with a hint of scaremongering. Angela Merkel is in the process of meeting, one after the other, all the heads of government, all of whom have had time to consider the positions of the political forces and civil society in their countries. At the European level, the institutions and other organisations have had their say. The three sections of the Merkel method are simple: a) direct personal contact with those who will be called on to come to a decision on 21-22 June - she has even asked them to reserve an additional night, from 22 to 23, in their Brussels hotels; b) no written text was put to her interlocutors; c) a few vague phrases and sentences to journalists after each interview, with a single thread running through all: we want to find an agreement, but not at any price.
The method, then, is similar to the one used by Ms Merkel in March to prepare the declaration on the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome: bilateral meetings and a text which remained secret until the final discussion, and for which she alone was responsible. It is true that much less was at stake: the aim then was to set out a number of principles, while, this time, it is a matter of setting out the general direction and measures which the intergovernmental conference will then have to set to music under Portuguese presidency. But if this, apparently opaque, process has been effective, why change it?
Different tactics. The statements from the various heads of government (who have had increasing meetings among themselves) or little throw-away remarks, are often quite explicit, but follow different tactics. Some stress the closeness of stance with their interlocutor of the day; others stress the firmness of their position with regard to some specific point and their determination not to concede on it. Let me give two examples. After the Sarkozy-Prodi and the Sarkozy-Zapatero meetings, emphasis was put on the consensus in favour of a simplified treaty, giving up any provisions that were constitutional in nature. At the same time, with the forcefulness that is peculiar to his country, Jaroslav Kaczynski said he was “ready to die” rather than give up his position on arrangement for majority voting. In both cases, the truth is less clear-cut. In fact, there are significant differences between France, Italy and Spain, and Poland has put forward a method of calculation somewhere between the method set out in the Treaty of Nice (which virtually all member states want to change) and the one the draft Constitutional Treaty (which Poland rejects).
Reciprocal understanding essential. In fact no agreement would be possible if every member state refused to amend its starting position, and a certain amount of reciprocal understanding is essential. In the two countries which returned “No” votes in their referendums, politicians will be required to tell their peoples that the text they plan to have approved in parliament is different from the one that these peoples rejected. The British government will have to adopt a similar position to explain why there will be no promised referendum. It is true to say that many more states have said “Yes” than have said “No”; but repeating this fact over and over, like a debating device, will not help find compromises. If an agreement is wanted, it has to be accepted that the new draft will not be the same as the first.
It is true that in some cases it is not just the way things are presented to the public that is open to challenge, but also the content. I have already mentioned the procedure for majority voting in the Council. Under the system set out in the Treaty of Nice (lacking in judgment, on an eventful night when the French presidency gave the impression of having lost all notion of institutional balance), Poland had, in practice, acquired the status of a major power, almost equal to the most populous nations. Must it be that differences on this matter are deemed insurmountable? Mr Saryusz-Wolski who chairs the European Parliament external relations committee, argues that the alternative put forward by Warsaw (based on the square root of the various populations) is somewhere between the Nice system and Giscard d'Estaing's and we could begin by studying it. From another point of view, European Commissioner Danuta Hübner stressed in the Polish press that, for Poland, energy solidarity is a far more important issue than voting procedure, and that the suggestion that national parliaments could have the right of veto over European decisions was very dangerous for Warsaw. It could, for example, lead to a two-speed Europe. The real danger for Poland, and the other Central and Eastern European countries, was the failure of negotiations because this would mean the collapse of the EU cohesion policy and agricultural policy.
Idea of a “Treaty plus”. Questions of how things are presented to the public, with the impression having to be given that the EU is putting itself back in working order, are essential for some capitals. Institutional improvements, then, become the priority, and for some countries, indispensable. For other governments, the main thing is to strengthen common policies and perhaps introduce new ones. According to Mr Zapatero, reducing the new treaty to nothing more than the institutional points would be “inconceivable”. Then the idea of a “treaty plus” is advanced. This idea, says Guy Verhofstadt, is based on a very simple principle: the withdrawal of any provisions in the current text must be balanced by progress elsewhere. There would appear to be a broad consensus on introducing provisions on the new global challenges, principally climate change.
There is no agreement, however, on what to remove. Several countries have their own list of points on which they are not prepared to surrender. This list may, from county to country, include reinforcing Community competence in the area of justice and home affairs (with a move to majority voting), the compulsory nature of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (which the text either includes in the Treaty or quotes, with a footnote), immigration policy, the creation of a European ministry of foreign affairs, a permanent European Council president, giving the EU a “legal personality”, the primacy of Community law. Of course, these points will not all have to be settled at the forthcoming summit. It is likely that the Polish government will suggest that approval of arrangements on majority voting be left to the intergovernmental conference so that it can make a detailed study of the possible compromise.
The British problem. There is a very clear risk that the most problematic attitude could be that of the United Kingdom. Not through any fault on the part of Tony Blair, but because of the attitude of an element within his party, a large part of the Opposition and, as usual, virtually the entire press. The Daily Telegraph set the tone in an avowed objective analysis of the attitude of the House of Commons to one particular point and in a leader, the title of which, “An affront to democracy” says it all. The reason for this indignation is the possibility that Tony Blair could give up the right of veto in justice and home affairs matters (which, in the planned new treaty, could be subject to qualified majority voting). The newspaper calls for debate in the British parliament before any decision is taken, although the government has pointed out that it is not easy to take part in delicate international negotiations after announcing the country's position in advance. According to the Daily Telegraph, the German and French leaders know more about British European policy than the British parliament and people; and this is the affront to democracy. It is not up to us to comment on the internal difficulties faced by a member state. This episode, however, gives an insight into the difficulties faced by Tony Blair in adopting a constructive position on Europe on the eve of his handing over to Gordon Brown.
Non-exhaustive list of main points still open. I will end by briefly recalling the main points that remain open on the “basic treaty” envisaged: 1) extension of areas where decisions are taken by qualified majority; 2) qualified majority procedures (on this point Poland is isolated); 3) the legal personality of the EU and the primacy of Community Law; 4) the status of the charter of fundamental rights; 5) the creation of a European foreign minister (some governments reject the title “minister” and the parallel role of Commission vice-president, some are against the very principle of a unified foreign policy); 6) the call for national parliaments to be able to veto European initiatives; 7) inclusion in the text of the criteria for future enlargements.
General arrangements on energy (particularly in terms of solidarity) and climate change will not be challenged. A number of heads of government (including Mr Prodi and Mr Verhofstadt) have called for the idea of a two-speed Europe to be given consideration if differences remain, others go for a more flexible approach (improving enhanced cooperation).
(F.R.)