Reasons for the return of confidence. The possibility that agreement will be reached before the end of the year on the draft of a new European treaty to replace the draft Constitutional Treaty (while remaining faithful to its broad lines and main content) has now been recognised by major leaders. Jean-Claude Juncker, who is not in the habit of speaking lightly, believes it is possible, if certain conditions are met (see this column in last Saturday's bulletin). The president of the European Parliament Hans-Gert Pöttering has said there is an 85% chance of success, but stresses that negotiations must begin immediately after the European Council in June. The same timetable was set out by Angela Merkel when she addressed the European Parliament on 28 March; and it is up to her to call the negotiating conference before the end of June.
This renewed optimism is due in the first place - I highlighted it last month - to the journey travelled by the member states which have ratified the Constitutional Treaty. They have all agreed to work on a revised text - something that was not at all certain when they decided to meet in Madrid as a group of pro-Constitution countries. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing has been virtually alone in stating that the text already ratified by 18 member states should not be touched. This is an understandable position to take for the president of the Convention which drew up the proposal, but it is one which has been overtaken, despite the wisdom of some of his remarks.
The road between calling the intergovernmental conference (an important decision to be made is whether it will be with or without the involvement of members of the European or national parliaments) and the finalisation of a draft that is acceptable to all, will certainly be long and there will be many pitfalls. It is significant, however, that people are beginning to believe it to be possible. A number of recent developments seem to confirm this impression.
The Netherlands' real position. The first encouraging sign comes from the Netherlands. The government must, of course, take account of the Dutch people's rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in a referendum. In my opinion, however, this country has been too quickly assigned to the eurosceptic group. I commented on this at the start of the month (bulletin No 9399). Basing my thoughts on the letter the Dutch government sent to its own parliament, I wrote, “don't expect me to put the Netherlands among the eurosceptics”. The very recent statement by the president of the European Parliament following his meeting with Dutch authorities confirms my view. Mr Pöttering said: “The level of engagement I found during my visit, at all levels, gives me hope for a satisfactory outcome to the current difficulties in the EU … I went to The Hague to listen and to understand the particular sensitivities of the Dutch people; and I left the Dutch capital with a positive attitude”. He went on to say that the Dutch authorities had confirmed their support for the work of the German presidency (as does the EP) so that a clear direction and a roadmap could be approved by the summit on 21-22 June. The Netherlands does not like the term “constitution”, but, for Mr Pöttering, what is important is to retain the substance and the spirit of the draft treaty. He said that the Netherlands supports European-level action in energy, climate change, international crime, terrorism and immigration, and that, in his meetings, he had stressed that, logically, this would mean qualified majority voting in the Council, and co-decision making with the European Parliament in the above areas.
This statement from Mr Pöttering ought to have righted the false impression created among some MEPs by the hearing of Dutch European Affairs Minister Frans Timmermans, at the EP constitutional affairs committee on 10 April. Mr Timmermens, that day, perhaps did not sufficiently stress the positive points in the government's letter to the national parliament, or perhaps some MEPs put more emphasis on the presentation of the Dutch position (that the Treaty of Nice should be the starting point for new negotiations) than on the substance (where it is clearly stated that the Treaty of Nice is not a sufficient basis for the effective and democratic functioning of the EU, and that some parts of the draft Constitutional Treaty must be kept because they seek to strengthen democracy and the dynamism of the EU “which the Netherlands wants”). The fact is that, during the hearing, the Dutch minister was strongly criticised by two former EP presidents, Klaus Hänsch and Enrique Baron Crespo, and that Austrian Green MEP Johannes Voggenhuber has expressed his great astonishment at seeing one of the EU founding states advocate the re-nationalisation of European integration.
There may still be differences between MEPs and the Dutch authorities, but Mr Pöttering's statement should have brought back a better balance between the two parties. The alliance of the Netherlands with the United Kingdom (see following page of this bulletin) is, at first sight, basically tactical and not about substance.
Some development in Czech Republic. The second positive sign comes from Prague. Deputy Prime Minister Alexandr Vondra has denied that his government is somehow blocking the upcoming negotiations (see yesterday's bulletin). In particular, he stressed that a) the Czech Republic accepts that “the constitutional text, as it was signed, is the basis for negotiation”; b) the Czech Republic “is ready to take part in the search for a consensus so that everything will be ready in 2009”. He also said that his government was not against merging the functions of the EU high representative for the CFSP and those of the European external affairs commissioner, but had reservations only over the term “European minister”. These are three key points, to which can be added the statement that his country believes it is essential to become part of the eurozone “in the near future” (a programme has already been drawn up). In this context, the reference to the Treaty of Nice has not more importance than with the Netherlands. President Vaclav Klaus remains resolutely eurosceptical, certainly, and at the time of writing I do not know the outcome of his meeting with Angela Merkel. Possible differences of opinion between the government and the president are a domestic Czech issue.
The positions of the three reluctant countries are not all the same. Three member states retain explicit reservations: the United Kingdom, Sweden and Poland. Their authorities have expressed reservations over the timetable under which negotiations on the new treaty will be concluded by the end of this year and the treaty in force in the first half of 2009. The British and the Swedes believe a preparatory period would be useful before officially bringing together the intergovernmental negotiating conference. Jaroslav Kaczynski would prefer the new treaty to come into effect in 2011, when Poland will hold the presidency of the EU Council of Ministers, including the European Council (the new treaty is likely to make provision for a long term president of the European Council, to replace the current six-monthly rotating presidency).
Thoughts on Poland. These reservations over the timetable clearly imply differences or concern about the substance of the problems, in Poland particularly. The two brothers currently leading the country have publicly expressed their hostility towards European integration. Two of their demands are well known: a) rejection of double majority (majority of states and of population) in Council majority decisions, in favour of the system set out in the Treaty of Nice; b) reference to be made to Europe's “Christian origins”. This second could be considered a position of principle, which would no longer have any justification if the new treaty did away with the current draft's preamble.
At first sight, the first point is more serious, because the Polish authorities do not hesitate to talk about their “veto”, while suggesting an alternative mathematical formula (see our bulletin No 9397). At the same time, however, these same authorities seem to realise that it is impossible to adopt a systematically negative stance on European projects. This can be seen in the veto on opening talks on a new agreement with Russia (see bulletin No 9402), and we are beginning to see it on energy, which is such an important issue for Poland. In Warsaw, there is the realisation that the (justified) concerns over energy supply can only be eased through a European energy policy. The Polish authorities are beginning to realise that Poland has everything to gain if the EU advances and that it would lose a great deal if the opposite were true, whether in the agricultural sector or in cohesion policy. And it must not be forgotten that, if the talks on the new treaty fail, some member states could decide to move forward anyway in energy, in which, Jacques Delors says, there could be “strengthened cooperation” (see this column in yesterday's bulletin).
United Kingdom and Sweden will have to choose. The British and Swedish cases are specific. If their euroscepticism is confirmed (in Sweden's case) or strengthened (in the United Kingdom's), strengthened cooperation, such as described by Jacques Delors, would allow progress to be made without the involvement of these two countries, as is the case with the euro. It is up to them to choose. At the end of last week, Sweden's young liberal and conservative political leaders published a position paper which called on the government to radically amend Sweden's policy with regard to European integration. Their country should reject all moves towards integration and the “unnecessary competencies Brussels has” in agriculture, fisheries, regional and social policies must be handed back to the member states, with, in particular, the complete dismantling of all EU agricultural subsidies. If this were to become Sweden's future policy, compromise could be sought in vain. The new treaty is likely to be drafted in any case, with each free to become involved or not.
(F.R.)