What attracted most attention from the news media among recent energy-related events, even more than the European Commission's “package” dealing with Europe's energy future, was the short interruption in the flow of Russian oil transiting through Belarus. This is understandable because it was the most spectacular, and the simplest to present to the public. The incident is now old news, but the lessons it provided remain valid.
1. Mr Putin's priorities. Vladimir Putin's political objectives take priority over trade commitments. He has never sought to hide his belief that the break-up of the Soviet Union was a historical error. History cannot be changed, but it is Mr Putin's firm intention to keep a number of former Soviet republics in, or to bring them back into, Russia's sphere of influence, so as to avoid their slipping into NATO's orbit. In this context, which covers large, important countries (one need mention only Ukraine), the case of Belarus is a special one, because it would seem that Mr Putin's aim is to bring it into the Russian Federation, to make it a part of it. According to several observers, this is not simply a pipedream. With such an objective, what are a few days when the oil does not flow in one pipeline? Europe must be aware of this, no matter the formal declarations from Moscow on the reliability of Russia as a supplier of energy products and on the, historically real, observance of contracts undertaken by Gazprom.
2. Dependence is reciprocal. The gradual advance of Gazprom into the European gas distribution system and the gradual development of Western investment in the production of Russian hydrocarbons are effective tools in the hands of the EU and its Member States to ensure that supply commitments are respected by Russia. The European institutions have always stressed the reciprocal nature of dependence: the EU depends greatly on Russia for its supply, Russia depends on the EU for secure outlets and for the investment and technology which it absolutely needs. Currently, this principle is becoming a reality: after some reservations on the European side, Gazprom's penetration in Member States has become reality, in the same way as, after some spectacular incidents, investment by European and American oil companies are about to re-start. This means that “reciprocal dependence” is no longer something abstract but, for the future, a reality which Mr Putin has to take account of, despite what was said in the previous point.
3. Laughable hypothesis. The direct involvement of political authorities in energy decisions has been definitively achieved. It is a more than evident reality in Russia, it is imposing itself on the Western side. The idea that it is simply issues to be resolved by companies in the sector today seems laughable, almost bizarre whatever the size and influence of these companies and their historically proven power.
4. The European dimension is essential. No individual Member State can act effectively with Russia: it is essential to act at European level. As they prepare to deliberate on the Commission's “energy package”, governments must be aware of this. Certainly, the deadlock in the Constitutional Treaty prevents a real energy policy from being implemented; but, if the Member States have the political will, they can act together effectively. Moreover, some matters are the responsibility of the Community: the negotiations on a new and strengthened EU-Russia cooperation agreement would already be underway had it not been for the Polish veto (the German Presidency believes this obstacle can soon be overcome), the commitments of the energy charter are European, and the aims and commitments which the Commission put forward last week are also.
Building on the facts. In conclusion, at the present moment, everything seems to indicate that there are unlikely to be any further interruptions to supplies, since Mr Putin, in preparation for future developments, has decided to restore his country's reputation as a reliable supplier, and Gazprom chiefs have said they have sufficient reserves (held in European depots) to enable it to deal with anything that may happen. The four points above nonetheless remain valid even if there is no immediate threat. They do not come from my wild imaginings, but are based on the facts and on definite developments, which I will speak about tomorrow.
(F.R.)