An act of faith (or almost). Should it be believed or not? The evaluation of the results of the European Council is to a large extent an act of faith. Heads of State and governments did not take any decisions but did set out orientations for the future that are quite precise in some cases. In the particularly sensitive sector of immigration and the freedom, security and justice area, they have set out what could be called a genuine action plan.
Political figures and observers have often criticised the European Council for becoming a kind of arbitration body in charge of problems that the normal institutional mechanisms have not been able to resolve. They should therefore welcome the return of a role for a body that indicates the way ahead and which calls on the Community institutions to decide. At the same time, however, it is understandable that a certain scepticism persists because orientations are too often not translated into operational measures with precious little follow-up. It is understandable that public opinion greets simple incentives to do better, with disinterest and perplexity. Nevertheless, experience often teaches us that “conclusions” can stay around for sometime and remain valuable over the years for laying down other areas of action by the decision-making institutions. Suffice it to say, the “Copenhagen criteria” for the enlargement of Europe are permanently cited as being the parameters for assessing new accessions. Even the “Lisbon strategy”, considered for a long time to be purely theoretical exercise because of its unrealistic calendar and too ambitious figures, is gradually demonstrating its usefulness in encouraging economic reforms and assess efforts made at a national level. We should therefore not underestimate, a priori, the summits' conclusions even when the results are still awaited.
We can be moderately optimistic in our interpretation of the conclusions adopted last Friday and trust the good faith of Member States and the dynamism and effectiveness of European institutions for their implementation. A few remarks on the different aspect follow.
1. Constitutional Relaunch. The text of the “conclusions” do not go beyond a few banal sentences but the information gathered for our bulletin by Olivier Jehin and Helmut Brüls on what was said orally during the session are interesting in another respect. The Finnish presidency indicated during the confidential and informal consultations that it had observed a clear shift by Member States to keep all the different parts of the current project (including most of part three). Jean-Claude Juncker confirmed the demand for the “yes” vote of eighteen Member States to be granted its due and deserved recognition. The intention of these eighteen countries to meet on 26 January in Madrid (if it takes place), is an important sign. France and the Netherlands and a few others are obviously left out and the United Kingdom is doing its uttermost to impose its view of the Constitution being dead. Angela Merkel remains cautious and wants to keep dialogue open with London but speaking overall says that she clearly favours a constitutional treaty. This won't be an easy task.
2. Future enlargements. The summit had nothing to say about Turkey and, as expected, asked for any questions about the issue to be referred to the text adopted by the Council a few days previously. I'll do likewise and ask readers interest in the matter to refer to my column published in bulletin No. 9326.
On the general question of enlargement, the summit carefully established a parallel between the opening up in the western Balkans and the ability of the EU to integrate new members without damaging its decision-making capacity or its common policies. Jean-Claude Junker and Guy Verhofstadt wanted deepening to be made a clear priority (it is significant that the draft of the text in this sense was presented by the Benelux countries with the support of the Netherlands. It's a long time since the Benelux countries defended a significant common position).
In any case the parallels represent spectacular progress compared to the epoch where Heads of governments thought that enlargement had nothing to do with deepening and provoked a bitter and sometimes sarcastic reaction from Jacques Delors (see Mémoires). I also consider the robust paragraph in the “conclusions” on the merits of enlargement to the east and the advantages that will result for stability and peace and prosperity and competitiveness in Europe, as very timely.
The summit vigorously underlined “the future of the western Balkans is in the European Union” and it is with pleasure that I read the strong paragraph on Serbia, which highlighted this country's ability to speed up its pace towards accession. At last, a positive sign with respect to a country whose equally strong historical and cultural attributes have helped in the creation and defence of the European identity!
3. Innovation, energy and environment. The fact that the European Council considers energy and innovation policies, together with the Lisbon Strategy as a whole, responds to a certain logic. It limited itself to confirming the main principles in European action in these areas by referring to the specific Spring Summit action plan on energy, whose principle has been acquired. It has now affirmed some orientations on other aspects: support for the setting up of a European Institute of Technology as proposed by the Commission (uncertainties about this therefore appear to have been overcome even if the nature of this body still needs working out) and a complete strategy on intellectual property. Will the EU finally be able to clear the obstacles (some of them petty and illogical) on the way forward for the European patent?
4. Immigration policy. Now we have an action plan that has been approved in the context of creating the common freedom, security and justice area. The summit highlighted the institutional aspect by recognising that it would be difficult to meet expectations in the existing decision-making framework and called for studies to be made on possible improvements. But in the text adopted, two explicit references to the Constitutional Treaty disappeared (they are contained in the draft), even if the orientation is clear: the right of veto needs to be got rid of and which, as recent examples prove, block any progress even when 24 out of 25 Member States agree. The way ahead, however, is not clear. Disagreements on the “bridging clause” that allowed for this matter to be transferred from the third to the first pillar and therefore allowed for majority voting on cooperation measures between police forces and magistrates in different Member States, continue to obstruct progress despite proof of them being indispensable. How can this disagreement be surmounted when Tony Blair says that the constitutional treaty is dead? Summit references to the inefficiency of current procedures are, however, quite explicit. What then? Can we imagine Heads of governments admitting that their orientations can be ignored and be treated as nothing but a wish list without any weight or importance? Unless in some instances there are those that believe “reinforced cooperation” should be prepared for by Member States that want to participate in it…
With regard to other aspects, the summit explicitly decided to strengthen “financial and human resources” for the Frontex Agency and to implement a European system for “monitoring the southern maritime border”. For those wanting the detailed “conclusions” on this subject, as well as for comments regarding some of the participants at the summit in the context of the impasse on the “bridging clause”, I suggest they refer to the broad summary by Benoît Cusin in our previous bulletin.
5. External relations. “Conclusions” on the EU/Africa partnership in Kosovo, neighbourhood policy and other aspects of EU external relations do not contain any new developments and simply resume the well known positions of the EU. Specific declarations on the Middle East, the Lebanon, Iran, Afghanistan and some African countries, summarised in our previous bulletin, will be re-published, as well as the “conclusions in our EUROPE/DOCUMENTS series. Our readers who have not yet had the time to read these texts in extensor should not be alarmed, Heads of governments haven't read them either, but are putting their trust in Javier Solana and their ambassadors who carefully prepared them. A single passage, it seems, was mentioned at the summit meeting on Syria, due to the differences on conditions for deepening the dialogue. Nothing dramatic, it appears, and CFSP specialists will certainly succeed in developing a uniform orientation or at least find appropriate formula for avoiding differences exploding onto the scene.
(FR)