Short term advantages. The conclusions of the EU Council on the way talks are being held with Turkey do not resolve any problems of substance but do have several short term advantages:
They prevent the Summit this week from having to look at technical details, the main one of which was the list of chapters on which negotiations will not be opened. You cannot ask some thirty Heads of State and Government to decide between two or ten chapters (national points of departure), but, even if they do not have to do this, there is nothing to ensure that discussions at the European Council will be any more interesting or views loftier.
They confirm that the Member States very often recognise that the Commission's proposal is the right solution, in that the Commission had already carried out appropriate assessments and taken appropriate decisions. The Commission had suggested suspending eight chapters. This was the number the Council had decided on after never-ending discussions and debate.
Without saying so, they take account of certain after-thoughts - both electoral and other. Each government, in its own country, may place emphasis on the EU's firmness towards Turkey, or on its flexibility so that negotiations are not interrupted. It is no mystery that one of the candidates running for the French presidency, Nicolas Sarkozy, has taken a stance against Turkey's membership, and that the Cypriot and Greek governments express concern about the public opinion in their countries.
No significance, or almost none. This said, the Council's conclusions have practically no operational significance. The rules in force allow each Member State, including the smallest, to block the process at any moment, as unanimity is necessary not only to open talks on a given chapter but also to close them. For the time being, there will be no negotiation on chapters relating in some way or another to customs union, but other chapters are ready to be discussed, and they are important - monetary union or industrial policy, for example. And the lengthy discussions on the evaluation process to be entrusted to the Commission - whether or not a deadline has been set prior to this - had no significance other than psychological or polemic significance as the Commission regularly reports on how negotiations are unfolding with every candidate country.
Why the result is positive. Should one conclude that the Council was a waste of time? It is certainly not my view. On the contrary, I consider the result is doubly positive as:
1. Division was avoided. There was no split that would have compromised relations between the EU and Turkey for a long time to come. Good relations are essential if (as is my case) we want both parties to come to the conclusion, by common accord, that accession is not the right solution either for the EU or for Turkey and that both parties should at some time move towards a close partnership, the basis of which is already in place thanks to customs union.
2. A step towards an alternative solution. Difficulties encountered should help to make the Turkish authorities understand that it is impossible for their country to subscribe to all “transfers of sovereignty” that EU membership implies. The Council's conclusions not only invite Turkey to apply customs union rules to Cyprus but also point out the effort that is needed in areas such as freedom of expression, religious freedom, women's rights, trade union rights and, in particular, the rights of minorities and civil control of the armed forces. On several occasions in this same column I have tried to demonstrate that it would be in Turkey's interest to keep its full autonomy not only in foreign policy but also in some important aspects of its internal policy, without having to fully comply with Community rules and institutional decisions (Commission and Parliament). I also stressed quite recently (see this column in our bulletin No. 9320) that the problem of Cyprus involves several explosive aspects. And I have also defended the argument that all objectives sought by accession (dialogue of civilisations, energy cooperation, etc.) can be attained through a special enhanced partnership.
Recent developments give weight to this conviction. See, for example, the new Commission guidelines for Neighbourhood Policy (summarised by Fathi B'Chir in our bulletin No. 9319) and the expansion of EIB lending in Turkey (described by Olivier Leroy in our bulletin No. 9323).
My conclusion is that reasonable and positive developments are still possible for all. (F.R.)