Brussels, 28/11/2006 (Agence Europe) - As briefly mentioned in our bulletin No 9314, Commission Vice-President Margot Wallström presented the conclusions of a working document by her services on the “Costs of no Constitution” to the members of the European Parliament Committee on Constitutional Affairs on 22 November. The conclusions reached are that, even if the Union is able to move forward without the Constitution, it would have had more effective means to face up to the challenges of globalisation if the constitutional treaty had come into force, as planned, on 1 November 2006. With the Constitution, the EU would also work with greater democracy and efficiency, “not only internally but also externally”, and would better maximise the benefits of its enlargements, the document concludes.
The paper highlights the fields in which, without a constitutional treaty, the Union is “paying”, being unable to act in a “swift, decisive or effective manner”. These areas are:
Strengthening of EU policies. A. Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. European citizens have high expectations of the Union when it comes to combating terrorism or organised crime, the Commission states, saying that, without a Constitution, such expectations will be frustrated. The intergovernmental framework, the decision-making process that governs cooperation in criminal matters and problems of delimitation between pillars are the main reasons for this, it explains. Simple cooperation quickly reaches its limits, mainly when unanimity prevails and when cooperation is kept within intergovernmental instruments not having democratic and legal legitimacy inherent to the Community method. The Constitution provides for a total recasting of provisions relating to the area of freedom, security and justice, thus making a complete EU policy. Grouped under a single title, policies on border control, visa, asylum and immigration policy, as well as judicial or police cooperation, come within the Constitution under the scope of the Community method and, in particular, ordinary legislative procedure (codecision) and qualified majority. Without a Constitution, the Commission states, the Union is deprived of a really European asylum system, a real common immigration policy. It above all misses its opportunity for police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters and, finally, makes less likely the prospect of establishing a European prosecutor's office, able to seek out those responsible for committing crimes against the financial interests of the Union, pursuing them and bringing them to justice. B. Energy. The European level is recognised as the most appropriate level for meeting challenges such as supply security, the rise in demand and climate change - but without a Constitution, which introduces a legal base allowing for the adoption in codecision with the European Parliament, any measures relating to energy policy, the solutions available to the Union for developing a large-scale policy, remain limited. C) Research: It is imperative to act more effectively in this field and to have the means to face up to international competition. Without the Constitution, however, the EU must limit itself to supporting research, mainly through the framework programmes and specific programmes without real development of a European research area. D) Social Policy. Although social changes remain limited in the constitutional treaty, the result of tricky consensus between Member States, some provisions would, however, allow a strengthening of the social dimension of Community policies and actions. By way of example, a new horizontal clause would make it an obligation for the EU, when defining and implementing policies, to take into account the requirements relating to the promotion of a high level of employment, to the guarantee of adequate social protection and to the fight against social exclusion. Also, the Community legislator should, according to the Constitution, observe the economic and social rights and principles of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in all fields. Without the Constitution, citizens lose the guarantee that such requirements will be taken into account not only in the policy development phase but also in the context of their implementation. The Constitution also introduced a provision for clarifying the Union's power to legislate in the field of services of general interest, the Commission notes. E). Participatory democracy. Without the Constitution, the Union is deprived of the citizens' initiative which would allow one million citizens to call directly on the Commission to present a proposal. F) Fundamental rights. By integrating the Charter of Fundamental Rights into the Constitution, the EU would have had a base of legally binding fundamental rights for the Union, its institutions, agencies and bodies, but also for its Member States regarding the implementation of Community law. Thus, the rights proclaimed can be effectively invoked by anyone who feels that his/her freedoms have been injured. If the Constitution does not take effect, citizens will be deprived of this guarantee.
Coherence in external policies. "Without the Constitution, however, the Union does not have the adequate instruments it needs to guarantee the coherence and efficiency of its external actions". At this moment in time, provisions on the external actions of the EU are scattered throughout the treaties. The common foreign and security policy comes under a title in the Treaty under the European Union, whilst trade policy or development cooperation appear in various places throughout the EC treaty. "The absence of a Constitution is a lost opportunity to bring a little clarity and coherence into these scattered provisions. By bringing together all provisions concerning external relations under a single title, the Constitutional Treaty has the merit of improving their readability and improving the coherence of Community actions. This also allows principles and objectives to be formulated, which then steer Union action on the international scene in all its forms, including the external planks of internal policies", states the Commission. Another "missed opportunity" concerns the European security and defence policy (ESDP). "The prospect of proper common defence, organised within the framework of the Union, is drifting further away and any possibility of reinforced cooperation in this area remains ruled out. The mutual defence clause, which brings about the obligation to lend assistance to any State of the Union which becomes the target of aggression is not being applied", the Commission regrets.
The instruments at the service of the Union's external actions. "In the absence of a Constitution, a very important institutional actor, in the pillar of EU external action, will not see the light of day: the European foreign affairs Minister". The current treaties do not permit the creation of such a post, "because the Council/Commission double allegiance is incompatible with the provisions of the treaties". In the absence of this minister, the creation of a European service for external actions tasked with assisting the Minister "makes absolutely no sense", the Commission concludes.
Decision-making process. The Constitution brings in a new definition of qualified majority to simplify and facilitate decision-making at the Council. The Constitution introduces the principle of a double majority of Member States and population instead of the current system of vote weighting. "This system, which is simpler and more transparent, reinforces the double legitimacy of a Union of States and of peoples. Furthermore, its implementation would make it easier to attain the qualified majority required to adopt various proposals". Furthermore, the Commission continues, not only is it easier to obtain a qualified majority, but it will also be applied more frequently. In many cases, the role of unanimity at the Council can lead to deadlock, as a rejection on the part of a single Member State overrides all the others. However, the more Member States there are, the greater the a fortiori risk of deadlock. The Constitution limits this risk, by extending the scope of application of qualified majority at the Council which, in 24 cases, will use it instead of the rule of unanimity. "In this way, for example, decisions in the field of immigration or culture will, in the absence of a Constitution, remain subject to the unanimity rule", the Commission laments. By making the co-decision procedure into ordinary legislative procedure, and by applying it to a greater number of fields, the Constitution reinforces the role of the Parliament as legislator. The Constitution also shores up the power of the European Parliament in the field of international agreements: the latter must give its blessing to all agreements concerning matters which come under co-decision. The national parliaments, whose scope to intervene in the Community decision-making process is facilitated by the Constitution, "have also much to lose from the lack of Constitution", states the Commission.
The institutions. At the moment, the European Council is chaired by the Head of State or Government whose country holds the rotating Presidency of the Council, which changes every six months. "Whilst there is no Constitution, this system will continue instead of a stable Presidency, which would allow us to improve the coherence, continuity and efficiency of the work of the European Council", the Commission notes. The President of the European Council, as provided for by the Constitution, would be able to stay in place for a mandate of two and a half years to five years, which would reinforce the Union's representation at the very highest level. As for the European Commission, the Constitution provides that as of 2014, the College will be made up of a number of members corresponding to two thirds of the number of Member States, which would make 18 Commissioners in a Union of 27. The European Council will establish a mechanism of equal rotation between the Member States, ensuring that the demographic and geographical ranges of the Member States are reflected. "In the absence of a Constitution, this question remains pending. It will have to be resolved- already for the next College- on the basis of the Treaty of Nice, which does define the principle of a reduced Commission, but does not set the number of Commissioners, thus leaving the way clear for much discussion. Furthermore, by taking the question of the composition of the Commission on its own, we risk damaging the institutional balance we would have with a more global and balanced agreement", the Commission notes. (hb)