Uncertainty over the Parliament's orientation. To see clearly into the European Parliament's orientation on the future of Europe, we will have to wait for the Parliament itself to decide on the Duff-Voggenhuber report on that subject. I won't go back over the approach chosen by the two rapporteurs, since they themselves defended it heroically at the end of last week (see our bulletin 9054). It is enough to recall that it is based on the conviction that the constitutional process should be relaunched immediately in order to achieve a revised text in 2009 which could then be put to a European consultative referendum. Would the majority of the Parliament agree? Two elements justify this question mark. The first concerns the relation of internal forces: the rapporteurs belong to two minority political groups (liberal and “green”) and the success of their plan will depend on its reception by the PPE group and the socialist group. The second element of uncertainty in linked to the fundamental choice between two trends: under one, the EU should give priority to things which respond to the immediate concerns of the citizens (financial perspectives, adapting and safeguarding the social model, etc.) whereas an institutional debate will not mobilise the crowds; under the other trend (which is that preferred by the rapporteurs), the urgency of responding to the concerns expressed in particular by the referendum “no” votes in France and the Netherlands should not lead to the nth postponement of the essential questions on the meaning and ambitions of European construction, on which everything else depends.
A doctrine bouncing back. The Council Presidency's silence and the Commission's upsurge in authority (see this column of yesterday), as well as the question mark over the European Parliament's orientation, brings us automatically to the fourth part of the ongoing reflections: the attitude of the national governments, some of which have already been expressed. The aspect which most struck me was the renaissance of the “two-speed Europe” doctrine: spatial Europe, bringing together all of the current and future Member States in a vast united market, with common Institutions, and the Europe of power, bringing together those Member States which want to go further along the path to integration. Certainly the terminology has been refined along with the mechanism, compared to the first projects along these lines. But the substance and significance remains unchanged: having established that it is impossible for 30 countries or more to agree at the same time to bring about significant advances in European integration, certain governments think it necessary to concretise the principle which has oft been stated but which is so difficult to apply, that is, that no Member State can be forced into an enterprise which they do not want, but neither can any Member State prevent those who want it and are able to carry it out from doing so. If we had waited for unanimous agreement from the Member States, the Schengen agreement on the elimination of border controls would not exist (at the start there were no more than five countries which wanted to be involved) and the euro would not have been born.
At the same time, though, analyses have proved that “Europe à la carte” (where everyone chooses the initiatives which they want to participate in) would not be viable because the functioning of the Institutions, particularly the European Parliament, would not be possible. The new formula therefore envisages that the countries at the vanguard, the pioneer group, would participate together in all the new initiatives, with the other Member States having the right to join the group if they want to and if they fulfil the necessary conditions. Those speaking most explicitly along those lines have been the French foreign affairs minister Philippe Douste-Blazy and Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt; other governments have either made similar statements or have let it be understood that they would not oppose it.
A necessity? This formula brings with it a large number of difficulties and traps. Those relaunching it would do well to re-read the results of Jacques Delors' reflections, aiming first to define the objectives and ambitions of “grande Europe”, and elaborate the “strengthened cooperation” open to all on that base, without modifying institutional structure. This is the principle of “differentiation” in a single whole. But it is not yet time to discuss the details; what is important is that the idea has reappeared with such force. In my view, this trend suggests awareness of an increasingly obvious state of reality, that is, the abyss which separates the British conception of Europe from that of the oldest Member States (or most of them), leading to the conclusion that progress towards integration and a real “European identity” will not be possible with the United Kingdom and the countries which share its ideas. Which is why there is a need for differentiation if we want to advance.
(F.R.)