The EU's growing involvement in the western Balkans is good news. Since its participation in the significant steps on the road to its external policy and common defence, and with the prospect of radical progress if the Constitution is approved, the Union is gradually taking on all responsibilities, both “on the ground” and with the strengthening of its links with the countries in question. With Croatia, the decision to open accession negotiations has already been taken; with Serbia-Montenegro, negotiations on an association agreement will open fairly quickly; with others, it will take longer, but the route has already been mapped out. Throughout the region, these prospects determine progress towards democracy, seeking peaceful solutions to differences of opinion, and efforts to relaunch the economy. Without the Union, the area would be a powder keg once more.
Croatia: Not forgetting the main thing. The above observation does not mean that all of the EU's initiatives and stances are convincing; I have already voiced my confusion over the fact that in practice, the decision about when to open accession negotiations with Croatia is in the hands of Carla del Ponte (see this column in bulletin 8919). The assessment should, in my opinion, be political and global. It is true that those responsible for war crimes must be brought to justice, but we must not forget the main thing. For Croatia, accession negotiations are an historical turning-point, enshrining its permanent commitment never again to use force against its neighbours, to consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and to protect minorities by recognising their rights.
Can Montenegro choose? On other aspects, the EU's position seems to me a bit inflexible. I'd like to know what the basis is for its fixation with viewing the union of Serbia and Montenegro as necessary and definitive. What if the people in question preferred a different set-up? Why not leave it to them to choose? Are we not running the risk of repeating the experiences of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where it is increasingly apparent that the complicated, pre-ordained formula of the multi-ethnic State, with its three armies, three sanitation systems and three economic policies, is not working, thus calling its very sustainability into question? A word on Montenegro: I could be wrong, but its degree of autonomy compared to that of Serbia seems to me less important than other things, such as ensuring that the country's economic activity is no longer largely based on cigarette smuggling or sugar fraud. What is it in this dossier I'm not getting?
The Kosovo conundrum. My greatest confusion lies in the dogmatic way some of the Community institutions, led by the European Parliament (and, elsewhere, by the NATO “contact group”), seem to be excluding the independence option for Kosovo, or that of sharing part of the territory with Serbia, out of hand. Why? Because considering that the coexistence of various ethnicities, protected by “respect for minorities”, is the only acceptable formula, like yesterday in the case of Bosnia? History teaches us that sometimes, “politically correct” solutions, which are satisfactory in theory, can, in practice, cause conflicts and disasters further down the line, if they do not have the support of the populations. I wonder about this even more since, in the meantime, the international committee chaired by Giuliano Amato has published the report on Kosovo, as requested by several major European and American foundations, and its conclusions were a long way from what can be understood to be the EU's position. Mr Amato himself explained that his committee, feeling that the status quo was dangerous and unsustainable, chose a gradual formula, to be applied with prudence and caution, but which would lead to autonomy for Kosovo and its accession to the EU an in independent country by 2014. Stage by stage, obviously: a European Summit in 2006 would pave the way for the accession of all the countries in the region; Kosovo would start off with “independence without sovereignty”, designed to offer proof of its respect for the Serbian minority; its accession would be planned for 2014, the hundredth anniversary of the murder in Sarajevo which triggered the First World War.
The dream of an idealist? I don't know. I am only saying that at this stage, nobody should be imposing “the” magic formula. Last week, the Belgian Senate held a debate on the future of Kosovo, to which it invited the local and Serbian authorities. The Kosovar President, Ibrahim Rugova, was there, and he spoke of independence and economic viability. But the debate was not contradictory, because the Serbian ambassador refused to take part, on the grounds that the organisers had given too much of the spotlight to Mr Rugova. No conclusive result, therefore, but the Belgian initiative shows the path to be taken by dialogue. (F.R.)