And Europe? Let's be quite clear about one thing: the panel of speakers at last week's colloquium held by IERI (European Institute of International Relations, see this column yesterday), on Turkey's accession to the Union, was unbalanced: with just one exception, everybody there had reservations or was openly opposed. Michel Rocard, the only one to come out in favour, felt under siege (which didn't prevent him from being brilliant, ironic, full of subtle innuendoes). All the others took the line that Turkish accession would be incompatible with fulfilling Community ambitions, and that the European Commission's opinion in favour of opening negotiations does not answer the real questions. The Commission replies that it did what the Summit asked of it, and stated whether or not Turkey respected the Copenhagen criteria, and that these are the criteria used in past and future waves of accession by other candidate countries. Why, and how, should Turkey have its own special set of conditions to fulfil? In fact, the heads of government are responsible for the lack of preliminary debate on the feasibility and suitability of Turkish accession, as it is taking place today instead of years ago as should have been the case. As Valéry Giscard d'Estaing put it, the question should not be "and Turkey?", but, first and foremost, "and Europe?".
Opening the work, IERI President Irnerio Seminatore set the tone by stating that the time had come to talk about "what's really at stake", as the Copenhagen criteria don't fully cover this. The problem lies in relations between European and the Muslim world, which, despite the diplomatic slants put on them, have always been based on an historical opposition of cultures, religions and destinies. I don't share the view that the past necessarily proves anything, because relations between European countries have also been characterised by endless conflicts, and the aim of integration is precisely to put all this behind us. But it is also true that integration presupposes an identity of values and objectives, which, in the case of Turkey, is purely hypothetical. Mr Seminatore also brought something new and convincing to the geopolitical analysis of the dossier (see this column of 22 September).
Confusion. Robert Badinter criticised what he described as confusion: he believes that behind the oratory caution and vague expressions used, the heads of government have already decided to open negotiations. This, in his view, means that the process towards accession is irreversible, because he does not believe for a second that it could result in failure: a "no" after years of negotiations is inconceivable, and would outrage Turkey. The argument of "past commitments" is inadmissible, as what Europe promised in 1963 went no further than access to the common market (which they now have), and made no mention of ambitions of a political, military, monetary Union with an area of freedom and justice, all of which came later. According to Mr Badinter, Turkey has no place in the Union, for three reasons: a) human rights, and, more particularly, women's rights. We must look beyond the cosmetic and make genuine gender equality a "prejudicial question"; b) Turkey is not a real democracy, because its army budget is subject to parliamentary approval; c) the rights of the Kurdish and Armenian minorities are not respected. And even without these three points, we haven't even touched upon the fundamental question: is Turkey a European State? In Mr Badinter's view, the answer in the negative goes without saying: barely five per cent of its territory is in Europe, and to let it into the EU would be to move the boundaries of the continent. Why would we then reject Russia (whose participation in the culture and history of Europe is even greater), the Maghreb countries, and Quebec, for that matter? Any conception of the unity of Europe based solely on the Copenhagen criteria means nothing. And we would have to add "political blindness" to "geographical blindness", because we would be bringing Kurdish, Armenian and other disputes "in the most tense and conflict-ridden area in the world" into the EU.
Anomalies. Elmar Brok said that he did not speak on behalf of the parliamentary committee he chairs (that on foreign affairs, which is putting together a report on EU/Turkey relations), and even less so for the European Parliament as a whole, because neither one had taken position yet. He was, therefore, speaking for himself when he said that there were anomalies in the opinion of the European Commission in favour of opening negotiations. For example, the fact that it was in favour of a "permanent safeguard clause" for the free movement of Turkish workers means that there are doubts as to whether one of the pillars of the Community acquis will be observed. Furthermore, delaying (until 2014 at the very earliest!) of any assessment of the cost of applying the common agricultural policy (CAP) in Turkey leaves an enormous gap in the future financial perspectives. We don't know what the CAP would cost in a Union which includes Turkey.
Mr Brok has heard an estimate of 24 billion EUR a year, removed from the document. How can the current EU discuss the future of the CAP without knowing this? According to Mr Brok, "we must tell the truth on all aspects of the dossier today", including the hidden elements. He said that behind closed doors, certain heads of government have acknowledged the confusion, but they're all waiting for the leader next to them to raise it. I took the liberty of asking him whether he thought Parliament would have the courage the leaders appear to lack, and he said he was "not too optimistic" about that, but added that if even a very few people have spoken about confusion in a very small way, this is already significant.
To be defined, together. That said, Mr Brok stressed that Turkey is an "essential partner [for the Union], with whom we must establish very close ties". For this, we must have a third option between yes or no, and move towards a partnership, the content and functioning of which will be defined together with the Turks, duly taking account of their opinion, trying to be "realistic without disappointing them" and taking care not to repeat the mistakes made with the Balkans States and eastern Europe, for which partnership would be a better option than accession. It is true that Turkey may ask: why did you start with us? "I have no answer to this legitimate question", said Mr Brok, who believes that from the word go, there should have been a reasonable framework and a "realistic political environment" for all of the neighbouring countries, including Ukraine.
And public opinion? Jacques Toubon brought up the argument about the need to take public opinion on board. The citizens who are unsure whether Turkey should join, or who oppose it, are very much in the majority; however, Community mechanisms and the weight of EU/Turkey relations are pushing us the other way, towards the "democrat and citizenly position". The problem is the old chestnut of relations between official Europe and its citizens. Why should they vote in the elections to the European Parliament if they are not heard? The issue is particularly acute in this case, because there is everything to prove that Turkey is of interest to the people If the citizens got the impression that "the princes" do what they liked without listening to them, that Europe is some kind of automated machine, their reaction could be expressed "particularly violently, perhaps even ferociously". Looking the truth in the face is not populist, said Mr Toubon. If we want the citizens to take an interest in European affairs, they must "feel that they are not sidelined for decisions, and that their wishes are taken into consideration". If not, the marriage of Europe and public opinion will be getting its decree absolute through any day.
We may ask whether it's in fact public opinion which has got it wrong. Mr Toubon doesn't think so. Europe has its part to play in the world, on a political, economic, scientific and technological level. According to Mr Toubon, this conception is not compatible with the accession of a country which will have the largest population of all and with an undeniable geographical, economic and cultural distance from the rest of us. Turkish society is not secular, even if some of their laws are, it is Muslim, and this is what gives it its size and strength. But the EU would become a "Europe of fringes", with its centres in London at one end and Ankara on the other, a vague, nebulous, borderless Europe. We must offer Turkey a substantial "privileged partnership". Even in the political and military fields, we should go beyond current ties by "allowing Turkey to play its full role as a regional power, from three points of view: a) that of reality; b) that of Turkey, and what it is (a genuine civilisation); c) that of Europe and its future".
A "deliberate trap". For Jean-Louis Bourlanges, the EU should take position on the basis of one question and one question only: which Europe do we want? All other questions are wrong or pointless. The EU has never promised Turkey automatic accession. The "Copenhagen criteria" (democracy, human rights, respect for minorities, etc) only relate to European countries, and Turkey is not one. Repercussions on relations with the US? We must take this into account, but it is not a decisive factor. And so on. Given the results of opinion polls and other things, Turkish accession would be "democracy denied", because it would mean imposing the "choice of the elite". The reasons forwarded in favour of Turkish accession apply also to Maghreb countries, countries of the Middle East, the Caucasus, and then there'd be no limits to enlargement. A Community thus enlarged would quite simply not work. For the budgetary and financial dimension, "the trap is in place, and it's quite deliberate". When the time comes, we will see that the cost of Community policies (agriculture, cohesion) could not be borne, and we would have to reduce these policies to insignificant dimensions. The EU would be turning its back on all its ambitions. Some want this, but "we are not all resigned".
Since her book "Le Grand Turc et la République de Venise" (see this column of 9 October) came out, Sylvie Goulard has become unstoppable in this debate. She has found yet another happy formula: if Turkey joins, "we run the risk of having more States but fewer peoples".
Tomorrow will be the voice of a proponent of Turkish accession, Michel Rocard, that of the public and a few personal comments to conclude my analysis of an enthralling colloquium. (F.R.)