Valuable and accurate, but… The Commission's texts on Turkey are in themselves both valuable and accurate. Valuable because they stem from in-depth analyses which no other European or global organisation would have been able to carry out, accurate because they answer the question put by the European Council as to whether Turkey was respecting the Copenhagen Criteria. The Commission is leaving the door open to all possible outcomes, stating that accession will not necessarily be the end result of these negotiations. It is making a rule of the principle that negotiations on a given chapter will not be considered closed when they are concluded on paper, but only when Turkey has actually applied the measures agreed upon. All of this is highly laudable.
Fundamental issues side-stepped. So is the issue resolved? Not at all, because the real debate within the institutions hasn't even started. Stances, some of which are a little extreme, more than you can shake a stick at. But a contradictory public debate? No. We must wait for the European Parliament and then the Council. The primary responsibility in this situation lies with the European Council, which asked the Commission to take position on Turkey's progress in respecting the "Copenhagen Criteria", and nothing else. In the abridged version generally referred to (the comment is by Slyvie Goulard, I shall come back to this), these criteria concern human rights, freedom and democracy. These, obviously, are essential: but the analysis of whether they are being observed should have been added to the answers to the fundamental questions, which is the basis for the attitude of the public and the stances taken by politicians, writers, historians, etc, which have unfurled throughout Europe and beyond. These questions are actually fairly simple: Is Turkey European? Would Turkey's accession allow the political objectives and the spirit of European unity to be maintained? Or would it force us to abandon our ambition of building a strong and compact Europe, which can hold some sway in world affairs? The Copenhagen Criteria should come on top of the answers to these questions, not instead of. In its document on the impact of Turkish accession, the Commission prepared reams of documents to establish a few partial answers, but it did not take position on the substance. Nobody had asked it to.
The second reason for confusion relates to the impact on public opinion. The Commission has left the door open for an outcome other than accession, and has not given a date for negotiations to start. But all that the public remembers is the "yes" to the opening of negotiations. Turkey has indeed made much welcome and impressive progress; it is fair to recognise this and congratulate them. But the details, the safety nets and the alternative solutions brought in by the Commission are hard to spot; all we see is the "yes", with all the risks it brings with it in certain Member States (even for the ratification of the Constitution).
Arguments or pretexts? This is where we are, with an avalanche of arguments for and against accession. Some of them, though passionately expressed, are not valid. Shouting about the fact that relations between Europe and the Ottoman Empire have always been at variance, for example, due to a desire to conquer rather than to integrate, is not an acceptable argument, even if it is used by the vice-president of Hungary's Pen Club (Andras Petøcz) or a European Commissioner (Frits Bolkestein), because the objective of European unity is precisely that of overcoming past conflicts. Who would seriously use that kind of argument today about the constant (and much more recent) warring between France and Germany? But arguments in favour of Turkish accession are sometimes just as passionate, and do not answer the essential questions listed above. None of them proves that the very real and important questions raised by relations between the EU and Turkey could be resolved by close links other than accession. I happen to think that the strategic aspects (see this column of 22 September), the budgetary aspects and the institutional aspects could find solutions which are more in line with the interests of both sides through an in-depth partnership agreement. Today, Turkey has ruled out that option, and we can see why. But it may change its mind when it is more aware of just how much sovereignty it would have to give up by joining, in terms of foreign and security policy, the role of the army, minority rights, freedom of religion, decisions on oil networks, etc. The requests by the European institutions which Turkey already views as "attacks upon its sovereignty" will tomorrow be binding obligations resulting from the accession treaty and the future Constitution. Unfortunately, this realisation will be slow to dawn, but the difficulties, particularly the Union's internal ones, are immediate.
(F.R.)